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1 Executive summary 
This Report concerns capacity development in the economic and public sectors of PNG. In particular, 
it focuses on the use of advisers to develop the capacity of PNG counterparts in economic and public 
sector agencies. Such advisers were funded by the Government of Australia and completed or 
commenced their placements during the period 2006–2013. The research was commissioned by 
(then) AusAID and commenced in mid-2012. It was completed in mid-2014 under the auspices of 
Australian Aid, Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade. The project was overseen by the Economic 
and Public Sector Program administered by Coffey International. The research brief posed several 
research questions about adviser-counterpart placements; these are summarised below. 
 What are the advisers’ and counterparts’ views of the success or otherwise of their 
partnerships in achieving their placements’ stated aims?  
 What approaches were adopted to enable counterparts to learn what was required to fulfil 
their placements’ aims? What were the main things learned by counterparts? What can be 
understood from these experiences and how might capacity development be improved? 
 What were the main enablers of and impediments to the success of the placements? 
 What have been the outcomes of the introduction of other modalities of capacity 
development including short-term consultants, twinning arrangements, targeted training, 
grants and research? Do these modalities provide increased efficiencies and effectiveness 
compared to adviser-counterpart placements? 
 What are the main improvements that can be made to ensure the success of future adviser-
counterpart placements? 
 What do major stakeholders in PNG conclude from the evidence produced by this study 
about the impact and success of adviser-counterpart placements? 
 What may be asserted from the evidence of the worth or otherwise of adviser-counterpart 
placements and other capacity development modalities undertaken since 2006? What 
suggestions or recommendations may be made for the future? 
To answer these questions, the research design incorporated a variety of research methods to 
collect and analyse both quantitative and qualitative data. These data were collected from: advisers’ 
final reports of their adviser-counterpart placements; counterparts’ progress reports on their 
adviser-counterpart placements; online surveys, interviews and/or focus group discussions with past 
and current advisers and counterparts; interviews, group discussions and/or a validation workshop 
with key informants and stakeholders in the Government of PNG, the Department of Foreign Affairs 
& Trade (Canberra and Port Moresby) and others.  
The evidence presented in this Report shows that, in general, adviser-counterpart placements have 
been successful during the period since 2006. Importantly, the counterparts, the stakeholders and 
the Government of PNG senior managers commonly expressed views about, and reported instances 
of, the success of the placements. Across the range of research participants some criticisms were 
made, and some examples of problems, limitations and weaknesses were identified. Likewise, most 
participants offered views about how adviser-counterpart placements could be improved in the 
future; and they wanted adviser-counterpart placements to be part of PNG’s future capacity 
development. Most research participants reported that it was necessary to sustain continuous or 
regular capacity development to maintain good quality public services within the changing social, 
political and economic circumstances of PNG. It was not, therefore, a single ‘boost’ of capacity 
development that was required by PNG for its national development. The extent of social and 
economic change occurring in the nation requires capacity development, either donor-supported or 
provided by PNG itself, for the foreseeable future. 
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PNG’s aforementioned need for sustained capacity development is viewed in this Report in the 
context of international concerns for human and national capacity development, especially those 
embodied in the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action (OECD, 2005/2008). The 
Declaration’s five key principles—ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and 
mutual accountability—emerged after longstanding international concerns about aid effectiveness. 
Internationally, Australian aid has been at the forefront of efforts to embed the principles articulated 
in the Paris Declaration into capacity development initiatives, spearheading a move that has been 
characterised in the literature as a shift from the first to the second generation of technical 
assistance. Despite these efforts and various consultative processes, the Government of PNG 
stakeholders identified remaining tensions between the Government of PNG’s interests and those of 
the Government of Australia. The Government of PNG stakeholders and senior managers and, 
indeed, the advisers and counterparts, generally saw the placements as being primarily ‘owned’ by 
the Government of Australia although they generally understood that the outcomes were ‘owned’ 
by the Government of PNG.  
It was asserted that the Government of PNG agencies involved in negotiating adviser-counterpart 
placements need to scope the Terms of Reference as a foundational investment toward the agency 
owning the placement. Several counterparts stated that they were not informed about ‘their’ 
placement until after it had been established, or were not fully consulted about their needs and 
requirements, which suggests that these staff ought to be involved in formulating their Terms of 
Reference, too. Arguably, the foundation for such collaboration centres on the Government of PNG 
and the Government of Australia negotiations about adviser-counterpart placements being 
genuinely and formally conducted in a manner that ensures that the Government of PNG ‘owns’ 
each placement. Consequently, the Government of PNG accepts and fulfils its responsibilities to 
support the adviser-counterpart placement and its Terms of Reference, processes and outcomes, 
and to embed and sustain these in the agency. To achieve this it is recommended (Recommendation 
1) that a comprehensive planning document be developed for use in these negotiations. This should 
involve an agency (or cross-agency) capacity diagnostic framework with a specific capacity 
development needs analysis and an analysis of the contemporary capacity and infrastructure in the 
agency (or agencies) available to support adviser-counterpart placements. These analyses need to 
show that satisfactory capacity and infrastructure exists, or will exist by remedies applied prior to 
the commencement of adviser-counterpart placements. Steps have already been taken recently in 
this direction by EPSP.  
Two recurring themes found in the research were that the time required to fulfil the Terms of 
Reference and outcomes was often unrealistic within the original duration of the placements, and 
that the agencies’ capacities (staffing, staff’s knowledge and skills, IT infrastructure etc.) to support 
placements were inadequate to enable the placement to commence at the level of the Terms of 
Reference. These impeded the implementation and/or institutionalisation of changes prior to 
project completion. 
To address the aforementioned time and capacity impediments, it was common for extensions to be 
granted. Although this may be seen as a laudable piece of flexibility, it occurs so frequently that it 
appears to be a planning failure. An obvious weakness was that often adviser-counterpart 
placements’ schedules did not match PNG agencies’ annual planning cycles or the amount of time 
required—typically said to be three to five years—to achieve sustainable change within agencies. 
This could be remedied partly by ensuring that the agency, supported by the managing contractor, 
uses appropriate capacity diagnostics and needs analyses. The research showed that the capacity 
diagnostic processes for placements completed by 2012 did not provide an accurate assessment of 
individual and organisational needs, and inaccurately gauged the requirements for achieving 
placement outcomes.  
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The research showed that one-third of advisers noted in their final placement reports and in their 
online survey responses that their Terms of Reference were unrealistic given the conditions at the 
start of their placements. The Terms of Reference were acknowledged as central to the success or 
otherwise of the placements. They were seen as emblematic of the placements’ planning and 
preparation processes. As noted above, several counterparts stated that they were not involved in 
the planning process for their placements. They generally had lower levels of satisfaction at the 
beginning of the placement but had less reduction in satisfaction during the placement than did the 
advisers. It may be concluded, therefore, that the counterparts were more realistic in their 
appraisals of the Terms of Reference than were those who developed them. This suggests that 
(prospective) counterparts should be involved in the agencies’ planning processes from the outset; 
this would also encourage their early ‘ownership’ of their placements. 
It was reported that Terms of Reference were sometimes unachievable targets or limitations on the 
success of adviser-counterpart placements. If they were unachievable targets (for example, as 
previously mentioned, if they were unrealistic for the agencies’ capacities) then advisers became 
frustrated at their lack of achievement or focused narrowly on meeting the Terms of Reference to 
the extent possible whilst ignoring other important matters including capacity development. Terms 
of Reference were limitations when they distracted from adapting to changing circumstances in the 
agencies or government so that desirable outcomes that advisers or counterparts felt useful were 
unable to be addressed.  
A range of research participants argued that, if adviser-counterpart placements are to develop 
capacity that can sustain self-generating performance improvement, then Terms of Reference need 
to be reconfigured to accommodate the processes required to achieve such. Such Terms of 
Reference need to enable advisers and counterparts to work more collaboratively in partnership—
from design, through to implementation, evaluation and assessment. Recommendations 2 and 3 
address the placement duration and ToR matters. 
The Report emphasises that capacity development is about counterparts learning and that change 
must occur in all the people concerned for the agency to achieve capacity development. This 
recognises that the capacity development relationship between an adviser and counterpart involves 
advisers working to change—sometimes in a fundamental way—the thinking and behaviour of their 
counterparts. The receptivity of the counterpart to the adviser depends on multiple factors, one of 
which is the level of trust placed in their advisers. This trust is partly founded on the advisers’ 
understanding of, and sensitivity to, PNG cultures. It is also based on the interpersonal skills and 
teaching competencies of the advisers. Broadly, the research participants appreciated the advisers’ 
technical expertise and experience in their particular fields, but the research data showed that the 
advisers’ strategies and approaches to teaching their counterparts were relatively unsophisticated 
and over-reliant on mentoring. Advisers’ cross-cultural competencies (or lack thereof) were 
generally of little significance in appointment decisions, as was their understanding of PNG cultures, 
which was often limited and depended on ‘learning as they went’ in their placements. This 
contributed to some dysfunctional working relationships and limited human capacity development. 
Recommendation 4 addresses this matter. 
Given that the foundation of capacity development requires advisers to shape, enable and assess 
counterparts’ learning to improve and change their (and their agencies’) practices, the advisers’ 
knowledge and skills around teaching for capacity development are crucial to success and 
sustainability. Those advisers who do not possess such skills need an appropriate course and 
assessment to ensure that they have the necessary teaching capabilities. Some advisers reported 
that they received little advice about how to structure their counterparts’ capacity development; 
furthermore there was no mention of assessment being conducted of or with counterparts about 
their learning and, likewise, no explicit suggestion of remediation being provided for counterparts 
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whose learning was insufficient. Recommendation 5 suggests that an online module and resources 
be developed by/for the Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade Australian Aid covering matters 
including: developing learning plans, assessing in the workplace, and collaborative teaching and 
learning in PNG contexts.  
The required approach to planning for learning within the development process of each adviser-
counterpart placement and its Terms of Reference is more complex than ‘knowledge transfer’ or 
‘skills training’, although these may be part of the learning plan. Advisers need to become, in part, 
‘learning managers’ who ensure that the learning plan is monitored for scheduled achievements and 
provide assistance, remediation etc., as required to maintain the schedule. The counterparts, as a 
consequence, will also be learning about how to facilitate learning in their agencies. 
Learning plans are best seen as ones that contain an iterative process that enables each adviser and 
their counterpart(s) to review, reflect and act to keep the learning plan attuned to the agencies’ 
needs and circumstances as these evolve during the placement. Process-centred, participatory, 
people-centred and iterative approaches are most likely to produce knowledge and outcomes that 
are ‘owned’ by counterparts and thus more able to be adapted and sustained in their future 
contexts. There was evidence that some adviser-counterpart placements successfully used team-
based, departmental- or organisation-wide approaches to enhance counterparts’ and agency staff’s 
knowledge and skills. The success was partly concerned with the increased propensity for 
sustainability when a number of agency staff shared the same knowledge and skills. It was said these 
approaches had positive team-building effects; led to an increased appreciation of consultation and 
the need to review existing practices; improved counterpart ownership of outcomes; and enhanced 
transparency and accountability. Recommendation 6 addresses the suggestions discussed above. 
It was noted previously that the Government of PNG, agencies and counterparts should ‘own’ and 
take responsibility for the success and sustainability of their placements. The current practice, 
therefore, of advisers writing and submitting ‘their’ final reports to the Government of Australia’s 
managing contractor is inconsistent with such indigenous ownership and responsibility. Previously it 
was acknowledged that there are tensions between the interests and needs of the Government of 
Australia and the Government of PNG concerning adviser-counterpart placements. 
Recommendations 1 to 3 suggest processes and procedures to minimise these tensions in 
accordance with contemporary OECD approaches capacity development. Recommendation 7 derives 
from these and suggests that that each adviser and counterpart(s) should take responsibility for 
producing the final report in their placements. Not only is this consistent with the collaborative 
approaches, such as action learning, to adviser-counterpart placements, it is also consistent with 
counterparts learning how to take responsibility themselves for the sustainability of the changes. 
In most instances, advisers usually have bifurcated reporting relationships, one to a senior staff 
member in the agency, the other to a senior person in the managing contractor’s establishment. This 
reflects the aforementioned tension between the Government of PNG and the Government of 
Australia ownership of adviser-counterpart placements. Additionally, some counterparts reported 
concerns about these relationships and believed that the adviser is another ‘boss’ to whom they 
must answer. In concert with Recommendation 7, Recommendation 8 argues for similar and 
consistent reporting relationships for advisers and counterparts. 
The Report also considers the matter of ‘other modalities’ including: short-term consultants, 
twinning arrangements, targeted training, grants and research. The research design was principally 
established to collect data on adviser-counterpart placements from 2006–2013. The other 
modalities research was conducted on the 2012 and 2013 period, but there was little development 
work in other modalities during this period. A literature review on the topic conducted for this 
research project, together with the small amount of data collected, provided an insight into the 
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other modalities used in PNG, especially short-term consultancies. Given the limited data, however, 
no firm conclusions about these matters could be made other than that further research will be 
required to do so; this constitutes Recommendation 9. 
This Report shows that there are some important interrelated areas of learning for future practices. 
These areas of learning, which focus heavily on the day-to-day operational and distinctly human 
aspects of capacity development, are suggested by some of the findings and reinforced by the 
current scholarship around capacity development and technical assistance discussed in the literature 
review. 
First, while EPSP tends to employ second-generation principles to design its technical assistance 
interventions, the data indicates that a focus on sustainable capacity development (as opposed to 
more tangible placement outcomes) tends to result in more third-generation style approaches being 
employed on the ground. These approaches take the concept of indigenous ‘ownership’ and apply it 
at the micro level, giving rise to a system whereby processes and outcomes emerge from the local 
context under adviser direction and guidance. At present, this seems to occur more frequently out of 
exigency than by design. However, this can create a tension between the flexible and iterative 
approaches required to ensure that change processes are owned by, embedded in and sustainable 
within an agency, and donor requirements for efficiency and control, results and accountability. This 
can be conceptualised as a tension between ‘product’ and ‘process’. Certainly the data indicate that, 
as currently constituted, placements in which advisers pursue ‘product’ over ‘process’ are likely to 
encounter problems with institutionalisation and sustainability, whereas the pursuit of ‘process’ 
over ‘product’ is likely to result in tangible outcomes remaining imperfectly realised within 
placement timeframes. Future practices for capacity development should endeavour to take into 
account both of these fundamental requirements and aim for some level of integration between 
them. 
Future practices for sustainable development should also be based on the awareness that more 
attention needs to be paid to the intangible elements of capacity. These elements, such as culture, 
politics and interactions within stakeholder networks, structure and influence the behaviour of 
actors in systems in important ways, yet are by their nature more difficult to analyse and 
understand. This is perhaps one of the reasons, in addition to the donor requirements mentioned 
above, why more attention tends to be paid to tangible aspects of capacity—such as the 
development of policy and IT systems—in the planning, management and evaluation of capacity 
development initiatives. The research data show, however, that intangible elements can have a 
decisive influence on placement processes, outcomes, success and sustainability. Cultural 
awareness, mentioned earlier, was seen as a very important enabler of placement success, whereas 
features of Papua New Guinean organisational culture and politics were often isolated as the biggest 
impediments to the successful pursuit of placement outcomes and/or sustainability. The operational 
implications of these intangible elements, and their potential to act as both opportunities and 
constraints, stands out as an important area for further investigation.  
Related to the focus on both process and the intangible elements of capacity is the emphasis that 
was placed by both advisers and counterparts on interpersonal relationships as important enablers 
of sustainable capacity development. In addition to direct focus on the relationship, a number of 
distinctly interpersonal processes, such as collaboration and communication, as well as qualities that 
support interpersonal relationships and processes, such as cultural awareness, were ranked as being 
of fundamental importance to placement success and the creation of sustainable outcomes. Taken 
together, these interpersonal factors gave the impression of being ‘drivers of change’ in that they 
gave momentum to placement activities and created the energy required for counterparts and KAS 
to overcome obstacles and engage in and commit to a sustained process of change. 
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Overall, there were strong similarities between advisers’ and counterparts’ responses to the 
research questions about their engagement in human capacity development. In general, they were 
positive (especially the counterparts) about their experiences and the outcomes of their work and, 
where they identified concerns (time constraints, difficulties with Terms of Reference, management 
problems) they typically held similar views. The need for capacity development in the PNG economic 
and public sectors was strongly advocated and external, particularly Australian, donor support was 
recognised as invaluable. 
In conclusion, this Report shows that the capacity development provided by the Government of 
Australia through EPSP to the Government of PNG between 2006 and 2013 was important and 
valued by the agencies and counterparts involved. PNG agencies need to sustain continuous and/or 
regular capacity development to maintain good quality public services within the nation’s changing 
social, political and economic circumstances. Future capacity development in the PNG economic and 
public sectors may increasingly come from PNG’s own resources; the evidence suggests, however, 
that Australian aid will remain important to help guide an efficient and effective public sector for 
national development. 
The following recommendations draw on the findings and conclusions of this report and are 
intended to assist the processes of the Government of PNG’s capacity development that are 
supported by the Government of Australia. If the PNG and Australian Governments decide to adopt 
third generation capacity development principles in the future, then the recommendations need to 
be adapted to embrace broader ‘trans-agency’ or whole of government planning and 
implementation, within more flexible, responsive approaches for which the PNG government would 
exercise responsibility 
Recommendation 1 
The Government of PNG and the Government of Australia develop a planning and approval 
document to be used by agencies, assisted by the managing contractor, for the establishment, 
operation, evaluation and post-placement support of their future adviser-counterpart placements.  
Recommendation 2 
Agencies, including prospective counterparts, and managing contractors should verify that each 
adviser-counterpart placement’s Terms of Reference address the capacity development needs of the 
agency and can be reasonably expected to be fulfilled within the agreed schedule. The Terms of 
Reference must be feasible within the agencies’ contemporary capacities, especially including the 
prospective counterparts’, and the agencies’ infrastructures.  
Recommendation 3  
Adviser-counterpart placements’ Terms of Reference should be sufficiently flexible to enable 
adaptations to change the Government of PNG policies or procedures, and changed agency 
circumstances and needs etc. during the placements. 
Recommendation 4 
Advisers should be appointed, not just for their technical expertise, but also for their interpersonal 
capacity to help others learn in cross-cultural environments. 
Recommendation 5 
Early in their placements, advisers should be provided with a course on the knowledge and skills to 
teach and assess in adviser-counterpart placements in PNG. 
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Recommendation 6 
Adviser-counterpart placements should be planned and operated explicitly as learning engagements 
for the counterparts and the agency more broadly. At commencement, advisers and their 
counterparts should develop a detailed learning plan for the placement. This should specify what the 
counterpart(s) need(s) to learn to develop their capacities and what teaching actions the adviser will 
provide to enable them to learn. The plan should specify a schedule of learning goals and their 
assessment, and should include scope for remediation, if required. 
Recommendation 7 
The final reports on adviser-counterpart placements either should be co-produced by advisers and 
counterparts, or there should be equivalent final reports from each. 
Recommendation 8 
Consideration should be given to each adviser and their counterpart being accountable to, and 
supervised by, the same senior staff member in the agency to oversee the placement, and for 
consideration and approval of any modifications etc.  
Recommendation 9 
If other modalities are to be researched, they will require more substantial enactment before they 
are researchable 
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2 Overview of the project  
2.1 Introduction 
The Australian and Papua New Guinea (PNG) governments have been engaged in many 
development activities in PNG since Independence in 1975. A key early investment by AusAID and 
managing contractors was made in employing both long- and short-term advisers to work with 
counterparts with the intention of developing both human and organisational capacity. Since 2006, 
adviser-counterpart placements (AC placements) within the economic and public sector have been 
managed by firstly the Advisory Support Facility (ASF) and from 2010 the Economic and Public Sector 
Program (EPSP); both were funded by AusAID. These placements were part of a selected range of 
capacity development modalities and had the aim of improving the capacity of the economic and 
public sector. 
This project was commissioned in 2012 to assess the efficacy of past and continuing AC placements 
in contributing to: human capacity development through the development of counterparts’ 
knowledge, skills, values and expertise and overall public sector capacity development. The research 
investigated the ways in which the AC placements have operated as ‘workplace learning’ contexts 
wherein advisers ‘teach’ through a range of strategies—such as mentoring, coaching and 
workshops—such that the skills, knowledge and workplace practices of counterparts are enhanced. 
The project did this through content and thematic analyses of placement reports, online surveys of 
and interviews of advisers and counterparts for placements completed between 2006 and 2012. In 
2013 all current AC placement participants were invited to participate in regular (individual and 
group) interviews regarding their work together. Additional capacity development modalities were 
also explored to understand their contributions to capacity development. These approaches 
provided data and analyses spanning ten years of AC placements. In addition the project team 
consulted with key staff from DFAT, both those based in Canberra and PNG, Coffey International 
staff and undertook a literature review and document analysis. 
To establish the efficacy of the AC placements and other capacity development modalities within 
their respective organisations, the data collected was analysed to identify the claims, evidence 
(artefacts, interview statements, etc.) of the outcomes, consequences, persistence, and 
sustainability of each of the AC placements and other capacity development modalities. The 
aggregated information was presented to, and considered by, a group of senior stakeholders of the 
EPSP program including GoPNG senior managers, DFAT staff with responsibility for EPSP, Coffey 
International managers, and experienced advisers and counterparts. The stakeholder group was 
asked to consider issues identified by the team that appeared to have contradictory evidence and 
merited further consideration. 
This report is organised in four sections, the first section sets up the background of the project, 
outlines relevant literature, details the research questions addressed by this report, and the 
methods used by the project team to address the research questions. The second section of the 
report presents the data from the research organised by the research questions. The third section of 
the report discusses the findings presented in section 3 and presents the considerations of the 
senior stakeholder group on a list of issues identified by the team as outlined above. Finally, the 
fourth section of the report brings together the major themes identified in the preceding sections 
and draws overall conclusions on these themes. It also contains recommendations for the 
consideration of the governments of PNG and Australia. In addition the report also contains an 
executive summary, appendices of key associated material and a list of abbreviations used in the 
report. 
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set up many of the meetings and provided the documents analysed in this work. Finally we would 
like to acknowledge colleagues in DFAT who provided advice and support both prior to and during 
the research. Without the support of all these people this important piece of research would not 
have been possible. 
2.2 Review of selected literature  
Capacity development, both as a process and an outcome of international development assistance 
(IDA), has received increasing attention since the turn of the century, particularly in relation to the 
pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This section reviews some of the most recent 
literature on capacity development—with an emphasis on its technical assistance component—
much of which has arisen from detailed study of experience in the field. In particular, the first part of 
this section seeks to address foundational questions such as ‘what is capacity?’, ‘how can capacity be 
developed?’ and ‘what are the links between capacity development and improved performance?’. 
The second part turns to the PNG context, looking at the most recent reports on PNG’s progress 
toward achieving the MDGs, as well as other aspects of the national and public administration 
environment relevant to the pursuit of capacity development. It also reviews some of the most 
recent findings of studies undertaken into the effectiveness of advisers as a mechanism for capacity 
development in PNG. 
2.2.1 The history of the capacity development model 
The use of the concept of ‘capacity building’ or ‘capacity development’ in IDA was initially heavily 
influenced by the successes wrought from the implementation of post-World War Two Marshall Plan 
reconstruction projects in Europe. Taking its cue from these successes, IDA during the 1950s focused 
on the building of public institutions in recipient countries, which would then act ‘to implement the 
investment programmes of major development aid organisations’ (Kuhl, 2009, p. 551). This focus 
changed in the 1960s to the strengthening and restructuring of existing institutions, primarily 
through the use of technical cooperation, with an emphasis on enabling local institutions to take 
responsibility for implementing complex development projects themselves (Kuhl, 2009). 
The 1970s saw development assistance aimed increasingly toward the individual, and the policy and 
practice of human resource development became its centrepiece (Kuhl, 2009). Disappointing results 
in terms of broader, sustainable outcomes led to a further change of direction during the 1980s, 
with attention increasingly directed to ‘the influence of economic and political conditions’ (part of 
what is referred to in modern discourse as the ‘enabling environment’) and ‘the interplay of 
organisations and institutions’ (Kuhl, 2009, p. 555) (the beginning of the application of systemic 
approaches to development thinking).  
In the early 1990s, these three levels of approach (the individual, the organisational and the enabling 
environment), and consideration of the interactions between them, were consolidated into one 
comprehensive development model known first as ‘capacity building’ and later ‘capacity 
development’. The assumption underpinning this model is that ‘when interventions are undertaken 
on one level only the effects will dissipate, so sustainable development requires simultaneous action 
at all of these levels’ (Kuhl, 2009, p. 555, emphasis added). Despite the widespread acceptance of 
capacity development as the model for sustainable development, throughout the 1990s little 
research was undertaken on either capacity development as an outcome or capacity development as 
a process (Baser & Morgan, 2008, p. 7). 
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The international community’s focus on capacity development began to grow after the turn of the 
century, and initial efforts culminated in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which 
called for capacity development to be ‘an explicit objective of national development and poverty 
reduction strategies’ (including the pursuit of the MDGs) in the context of ‘the need for significantly 
enhanced support for country efforts to strengthen governance and improve development 
performance’ (OECD/DAC, 2008, p. 243). In the Paris Declaration, capacity development was 
recognised as an essentially endogenous process, responsibility for which lay with recipient 
countries with donor countries playing a supporting role (Land, Hauck & Baser, 2007). Explicitly 
developed on the basis of ‘first-hand experience of what works and does not work with aid’ (OECD, 
n.d.) the Declaration was formulated around five central principles: 
1) Ownership—Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies, 
and strategies and coordinate development actions; 
2) Alignment—Donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national development 
strategies, institution and procedures; 
3) Harmonisation—Donors’ actions are more harmonised, transparent and collectively 
effective; 
4) Managing for Results—Managing resources and improving decision-making for results; and 
5) Mutual Accountability—Donors and partners are accountable for development results 
(OECD, 2005/2008, pp. 3-8). 
The Paris Declaration was followed in 2008 by the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) which again 
focused strongly on capacity development as the key to achieving development results. The AAA 
reinforced the need for country ownership, stating, ‘developing country governments will take 
stronger leadership of their own development policies, and will engage with their parliaments and 
citizens in shaping those policies. Donors will support them by respecting countries’ priorities, 
investing in their human resources and institutions, making greater use of their systems to deliver 
aid, and increasing the predictability of aid flows’ (OECD, 2005/2008, p. 15). 
The AAA also recognised increasing development activities on the part of ‘middle income countries, 
global funds, the private sector [and] civil society actors’ and declared that ‘all development actors 
will work in more inclusive partnerships so that all our efforts have greater impact on reducing 
poverty’ (p. 16). Finally, it reinforced the need to place development results at the heart of activities 
and to ‘demonstrate that our actions translate into positive impacts on people’s lives’ (p. 16). The 
AAA stresses that citizens and taxpayers need to see the tangible results of development efforts. 
2.2.2 Technical cooperation 
Technical cooperation—in the form of technical assistance (advisers, experts and consultants), 
training and education grants—has been a mainstay of development assistance for over five 
decades. Indeed, until relatively recently, ‘capacity development was viewed mainly as a technical 
process, involving the simple transfer of knowledge or organisational models from North to South’ 
(OECD/DAC, 2008, p. 239). In the early 1990s, criticisms of technical cooperation, and in particular 
technical assistance, began to emerge which highlighted its high cost, often limited impact, lack of 
alignment with national needs and lack of local management control (OECD/DAC, 2011). As 
indicated above, however, the traditional focus on supply-side ‘skills transfer’ shifted at the turn of 
the century to a more strategic and demand-driven concept of ‘capacity development’ and this 
created impetus for a change in the practice of technical cooperation. Technical cooperation began 
to be viewed as a means to an end (i.e. capacity development) and ‘good practice’ policies began to 
be rethought of in this light (OECD/DAC, 2011). 
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Morgan (2010) characterises this shift as that from the ‘first generation’ of technical assistance to 
the ‘second generation’. The first generation was characterised as supply- and donor-driven, two- to 
five-year projects that focused on gap-filling at the individual/task level and the transfer of 
knowledge and techniques based on ‘good practice’ from the industrialised world. It had an 
extensive focus on training and would tend to bypass country systems and rely on capacity 
substitution (Morgan, 2010 cited in OECD/DAC, 2011). 
The second generation, coming in at the turn of the century and continuing until the present, shifted 
the emphasis to country ownership and started to conceptualise technical assistance explicitly 
within the framework of capacity development. Operationally it favours strategies of planned 
change, with a focus on ‘good practice’ models. Here, most aspects of the management of technical 
assistance are delegated to outside management contractors, and donors fulfil the functions of 
processing, contracting and monitoring. The contours of this approach respond to demands from 
domestic constituencies for ‘control, clarity, efficiency, results and accountability’ (Morgan, 2010 
cited in OECD/DAC, 2011, p. 5). 
A comprehensive summary of the learning that has taken place around the use of technical 
cooperation in Official Development Assistance, undertaken by the OECD/DAC in 2011, shows how 
changes found at the operational level reflect the principles of the Paris Declaration and the 
integration of a capacity development perspective into the design of technical cooperation. On the 
part of donors these included changes, mostly with regard to technical assistance, to: emphasise 
local ownership and management; align with country system reforms; integrate strategically at the 
sector level; place experts physically in government office space; support regional efforts to build 
local capacity; use experts in advisory rather than implementation positions; and minimise the use of 
parallel implementation units (PIUs: units that are accountable to external development agencies 
rather than to country institutions, where ToRs for externally-appointed staff are determined by the 
development agency rather than the country agency and most of the professional staff are 
appointed by the development agency on a salary structure that often exceeds that of civil-service 
personnel [OECD/DAC, 2007]); amongst others. Some partner countries had also changed practices 
to: increase and promote the use of local expertise; play a greater role in the selection and use of 
experts; use aid effectiveness processes in the service of reform; and set-up programmes to build 
capacities of local experts and trainers (OECD/DAC, 2011). 
Morgan (2010, cited in OECD/DAC, 2011) also describes the current emergence of a third generation 
of technical assistance, which reflects an increased understanding of the complexities of 
development. Based on the expanding availability of experience-based learning and theory, and the 
needs of new initiatives such as Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAps), the third generation of technical 
assistance practice uses context as a starting point, ‘sees indigenous institutions, cultures and 
structures as key determinants’ in capacity development, and is ‘integrated with governance and 
political economy issues’ (p. 5). It is a flexible approach that uses ‘searching rather than planning’ (p. 
5) and concerns itself with the dynamics of change, including at the informal level. Deliberate effort 
is made to ‘shift control and decision making to local systems and actors’ and to ‘build on strengths 
rather than weaknesses’ (p. 5). Given the emphases listed above, this approach also recognises the 
need for long-term engagements.  
A summary of the design and operational features necessary for third-generation approaches to 
capacity development follows, however, these issues and others are considered in further detail in 
following sections. First, diagnosis of capacity development requirements needs to be undertaken 
systematically, taking into account the external context, including sector dynamics, readiness for 
reform and drivers of change, etc. (Land, Hauck & Baser, 2007). Iterative approaches are required 
and flexibility must be built into programme operations such that emergent needs and changing 
demands can be accommodated. This is noted as being of particular importance ‘in complex and 
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politically sensitive environments where the momentum and direction of reform can quickly change’ 
(Land, Hauck & Baser, 2007, p. 6). Again focusing on local conditions, care needs to be taken to 
ensure the right mix of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ approaches to capacity development, taking into 
account local capacities. Where capacities are stronger more indirect approaches may be warranted. 
Here, local actors are essentially in charge and technical assistance personnel act as facilitators of 
counterparts’ learning, adaptation and self-organisation. Such an approach must be based on a ‘full 
understanding of country processes, politics and culture’ (Land, Hauck & Baser, 2007, p. 6). Where 
capacity is weaker, technical assistance personnel may play a key role implementing activities 
jointly-agreed upon by donor and partner countries, while also engaging in capacity development via 
their interactions with national staff and country processes. It is generally accepted that technical 
assistance personnel ‘doing’ the role should only be applied where local systems or procedures are 
completely absent or very weak, or where skilled nationals are not available (Land, Hauck & Baser, 
2007). Each of these approaches lays on a continuum and can be applied progressively as 
engagement deepens. For example, in 2006 AusAID developed the Staged Capacity Building Model—
to be used in the assessment, planning and monitoring of capacity development activities—in which 
four stages are applied which ‘reflect the degree of reliance on and involvement of the adviser, and 
the degree of ‘ownership’ or responsibility by counterparts; namely, ‘dependent’, ‘guided’, ‘assisted’ 
and ‘independent’ (AusAID, 2006, p. 4). 
Despite criticisms, technical cooperation remains one of the most consistently applied and visible 
aspects of donor activities when it comes to capacity development, and a lot of attention is being 
paid to how to do it more efficiently (Land, Hauck & Baser, 2007). Furthermore, technical assistance 
personnel ‘remain the most obvious and significant element of technical cooperation, and will 
certainly remain a key input to capacity development in the future’ (p. 1). The key is in ensuring that 
a capacity development perspective is applied systematically throughout the design, implementation 
and review of interventions. 
2.2.3 Capacity and capacity development 
If technical assistance is to be designed, implemented and reviewed through a capacity development 
lens, the questions remain: What is ‘capacity’? How can it be ‘developed’? 
The following are a few examples of definitions of capacity and capacity development put forward 
by development agencies and academics: 
 ‘Capacity is the ability of individuals, institutions and societies to perform functions, solve 
problems and set and achieve objectives in a sustainable manner’ (UNDP, 2007a, p. 2). 
 ‘Capacity is the ability of people, organisations and society as a whole to manage their affairs 
successfully (OECD/DAC, 2006, cited in Baser & Morgan, 2008, p. 22). 
 ‘Capacity deals with the aptitudes, resources, relationships and facilitating conditions 
necessary to act effectively to achieve some intended purpose’ (Brinkerhoff, 2010, p. 66). 
 ‘Capacity development is the process whereby people, organisations and society as a whole 
unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity over time’ (OECD, 2008, p. 244). 
 ‘Capacity development is the process of developing competencies and capabilities in 
individuals, groups and organisations, sectors or countries which will lead to sustained and 
self-generating performance improvement’ (AusAID, 2004 cited in DFAT, 2009, p. 26). 
Although these definitions are very broad, it is possible to glean a few insights into the nature of 
capacity and capacity development from these examples. First, capacity is purposive, it is used to 
engage with real-life issues and achieve results (Baser & Morgan, 2008). Second, capacity is latent, 
its existence becomes manifest only in actual performance and outcomes. Third, capacity and 
capacity development are about sustainability, they are not simply about achieving specific outputs 
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but extend further into the ability to renew, adapt and develop and maintain a sense of purpose 
over time—in other words capacity is dynamic, it is a form of change that centres on improvements. 
Finally, capacity is about people, and thus involves not only knowledge but also the ability to relate, 
engage and interact as individuals and in collective action within the broader context of a whole 
society and polity.  
A problem arises, however, when operationalising these definitions to frame capacity development 
as an explicit practice or set of practices. The broad field of current practice in development 
cooperation usually focuses on achieving a set of outcomes in terms of performance or development 
results and coming to conclusions around what changes or reforms may need to be put in place to 
achieve those outcomes. It is then assumed that ‘those changes—organisational, institutional, 
political—add up to something in the aggregate that can be labelled as capacity’ (Baser & Morgan, 
2008, p. 21). This approach eludes explaining capacity, what kinds of capacity are needed or what 
they should look like in operation. It is, rather, based on the assumption that ‘certain mechanisms 
will automatically enhance capacity’ (OECD/DAC, 2011, p. 2). This makes conversations about 
capacity development difficult. To operationalise capacity development, it is critical for practitioners 
to understand what it is that is being sought in terms of capacity and ‘to use this as a basis for 
identifying activities which will help to encourage its development’ (p. 2).  
One of the first questions that arises when looking at the foregoing definitions of capacity and 
capacity development, then, is what are the ‘abilities’, ‘competencies’ and ‘capabilities’ that work 
together to create capacity? 
2.2.4 The five core capabilities 
In 2008, Baser and Morgan, under the auspices of the European Centre for Development Policy 
Management (ECDPM), completed a study ‘to understand better the processes of capacity 
development to provide some good practice to guide [International Development Agency] 
programming, particularly at the operational level’ (p. 7). Out of the analysis of sixteen 
comprehensive case studies, including interviews with participants from donor and recipient 
partners, the authors isolated five core capabilities that were present in all organisations that 
achieved successful capacity development. While these capabilities are formulated to apply at the 
organisational level, they can also be read as applying to the individual and institutional (enabling) 
levels. 
2.2.4.1 The core capability to commit and engage 
This capability encompasses, but also goes beyond, conventional notions of ownership and 
motivation. This capability is about the ‘human, social, organisational and institutional energy and 
agency’ that derives from, and is reflective of, an organisation’s ability ‘to be conscious and aware of 
its place in the world, to configure itself, to develop its own motivation and commitment and then to 
act’ (p. 26). To the same extent that the notion of ownership is extended, so too are its effects. In its 
limited formulation, ownership is seen as one essential element in the success of broader capacity 
building efforts. The expanded concept of ownership described here, which incorporates elements 
of attitude and self-perception, confers an energising impetus that enables actors and organisations 
to overcome a wide variety of internal and external constraints, such as lack of confidence, integrity, 
purpose, and resources.  
Baser and Morgan describe how the most obvious sign that this capability is lacking is when an 
organisation seems ‘stuck’ in a ‘low commitment, low capacity, low performance equilibrium’ (p. 
27). They cite PNG’s health sector and describe a situation where political and bureaucratic 
instability both causes and reinforces low commitment, which in turn renders capacity building 
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initiatives less effective, which reinforces the lack of ‘legitimacy’ of public sector agencies in popular 
perceptions and a concomitant ‘“weak demand, weak response” syndrome that further locks 
inaction in place’ (p. 27). 
Narrow, ‘technical’ approaches to capacity development will have limited usefulness where there is 
no capability to commit and engage. Further, conventional needs analyses and capacity diagnostics 
are generally not equipped to uncover the deeper political, cultural, psychological and social factors 
that underpin what is generically seen at the surface as ‘lack of commitment’ and/or ‘lack of political 
will’ (p. 28). 
2.2.4.2 The core capability to carry out technical, service delivery and logistical 
tasks 
This capability underpins conventional thinking about capacity building and is focused on 
performance and results, mostly for larger developmental ends. The emphasis here is on ‘functional, 
instrumental ways of meeting a set of objectives and fulfilling a mandate’ (p. 28). This focus 
conforms to the need for donors and agencies to be seen as achieving substantive developmental 
outcomes and it is often the most comfortable focus for recipient countries as it shifts attention 
from politics and power to more instrumental concerns. It is nevertheless a crucial component of 
capacity development. Within this realm the focus should be on understanding and bolstering the 
links between capacity and performance and, in particular, understanding ‘which technical and  
logistical capabilities are crucial to generating results over time’ (p. 29). Functions such as strategy 
and policy formulation, financial management, and monitoring and evaluation are also included 
here.  
2.2.4.3 The core capability to relate and to attract resources and support 
Another capability is related to the organisation’s ability to ‘craft, manage and sustain key 
relationships needed for the organisation to survive in the real world’ (p. 29). These relationships are 
necessary to create the legitimacy and operational conditions required to pursue mandated goals in 
the context of broader instability, and to create potential additional sources of funding, staff and 
learning. Organisations require, at least, the resources to protect the ‘technical core’ of the 
operation upon which performance relies. For relational issues such as legitimacy, they also require 
the ability ‘to manage symbolic appearances, to communicate effectively, to enter into productive 
partnerships and alliances, to manage political conflict and, in general, to secure the organisation’s 
operating space’ (p. 30). 
Baser and Morgan observe that there is also a political dimension to this capability, particularly in 
the public sector where capacity is often a function of power, bargaining and elite accommodation. 
In this sense, this capability is pursued as much, if not more, through informal and intangible 
channels as it is through formal and tangible. Excessive preoccupation with survival in this setting 
can result in efficiency being sacrificed for loyalty, and the loss of ability to innovate. Ultimately, 
whether by extending outward or having mechanisms that guard against total dependence on 
political support and alliances, ‘actors needed operating space if they were to have a real chance of 
building their capacity’ (p. 30). 
2.2.4.4 The core capability to adapt and self-renew 
Although all organisations require the ability to adapt and self-renew, Baser and Morgan note that 
almost all of the cases they studied were situated in contexts of rapid and sometimes destabilising 
change. This could be the result of external forces, such as policy and structural adjustments 
engendered by global developments or the constantly changing nature of donor initiatives, or 
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internal institutional upheaval. In the latter regard, they note of PNG that ‘ministers and senior 
officials rarely lasted in a job for more than two years [and] problems appeared in the form of 
complex, “wicked” patterns that were resistant to simple solutions’ (p. 31). In these contexts, 
‘windows of opportunity for capacity development opened and then closed’ (p. 31). 
Baser and Morgan list the capabilities associated with adaptation and change as including the 
capability to: ‘improve individual and organisational learning; to foster internal dialogue; to 
reposition and reconfigure the organisation; to incorporate new ideas; and to map out a growth 
path’ (p. 32). They also place a particular emphasis on the need to develop the capacity for strategic 
thinking. 
2.2.4.5 The core capability to balance diversity and coherence 
The capability of balancing diversity and coherence revolves around the need to foster both stability 
and innovation, by encouraging a sufficient array of differing abilities, perspectives and ways of 
thinking to support resilience, while ensuring that such an approach does not lead to excessive 
complexity and fragmentation. Achieving this difficult balance involves finding the right combination 
of: centralisation and decentralisation; organisation as ‘human community’ and organisation as 
technical value/service provider; internal and external focus; short-term and long-term focus, etc. 
(Baser & Morgan, 2008).  
Kaplan (2000) devised a similar formulation of the requisite elements of organisational capacity 
following his study of the successful capacity development of the Community Development 
Resource Association in South Africa. Kaplan isolated the following elements: 1) a conceptual 
framework (an organisation’s understanding of the world around it and its location within that 
world); 2) organisational ‘attitude’ (the ‘confidence to act in and on the world in a way that it 
believes can be effective and have an impact’ [p. 518]); 3) vision and strategy (a sense of purpose 
that enables the planning and implementation of a programme of action that can be adapted in a 
rational and considered manner); 4) organisational structure (clearly defined and differentiated roles 
and responsibilities, clear lines of communication and accountability, and transparent and functional 
decision-making procedures); 5) acquisition of skills (the individual skills, abilities and competencies 
to both devise and pursue agreed organisational vision, strategy and outcomes); and 6) material 
resources (finances, equipment, office space and so on). In general, Kaplan sees these features as 
forming a nested hierarchy, with the success of interventions on any level dependent, at least partly, 
on the existence of those features higher in the hierarchy. In practice they are interdependent, and 
the point of entry of any capacity development intervention depends on the particular needs that 
obtain at any particular juncture. 
The point here is not to prescribe or comprehensively describe a particular model or models of 
‘capacity’, but rather to demonstrate how current perspectives on capacity development have 
developed beyond a narrow, instrumental focus on technical cooperation, and the implications of 
this shift for both conceptualising and operationalising capacity development initiatives. 
Conceptually, this shift has involved the movement from a focus on tangible aspects of 
organisational life, toward inclusion of the more intangible features of organisations and the 
individuals they are made up of—such as culture, attitude and worldview— that are observable only 
through their effects (Kaplan, 2000). The failure to take into account these essential components of 
overall capacity, which are not typically the purview of conventional ‘needs assessments’ or ‘audits’, 
is often a strong explanatory factor in the failure of technical interventions to have their desired 
impacts (Kaplan, 2000). For example, if individuals are unaware of the broader purpose of a 
procedure they have been trained in—the ‘why?’—they are less likely to be able to adapt that 
procedure in the face of novel circumstances. Or if individuals are to develop commitment and 
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motivation in their work, it is important for them to be aware of the purpose of what they are doing 
and its impact on both the organisation and the world around them. 
The second conceptual shift is from a ‘static’ model of organisational life to a ‘developmental’ 
reading (Kaplan, 2000). This means that the needs of any organisation with regard to any of these 
elements will differ according to its level of development and that these needs will change (evolve) 
as further development occurs. Further, these models recognise the interdependence of the 
elements, and the need to work with a number of them simultaneously in certain situations in order 
to have an effect (Kaplan, 2000). These models also recognise explicitly that capacity building is 
essentially about change and change processes, and that these change processes occur in an 
emergent and organic, rather than a mechanical, way. 
2.2.5 Implications for capacity development practice 
The purpose of this section is to apply the literature to try to explore some of the elements of the 
operational definition of capacity development employed by EPSP. As stated earlier, EPSP applies 
the AusAID definition of capacity development as ‘the process of developing competencies and 
capabilities in individuals, groups, organisations and sectors or countries which will lead to sustained 
and self-generating performance improvement’. The following discussion adopts the insights 
provided by third-generation approaches to capacity development, the understanding of capacity 
that has been outlined above, and the fundamental principle of partner-country ownership 
contained in the Paris Declaration, and applies them particularly to the practice of technical 
assistance in the service of capacity development. 
The important questions are: What kind of process is necessary to create the capacity for achieving 
sustained and self-generating performance improvement? What is the link between capacity 
development and performance improvement? And what are some of the operational implications of 
this understanding of capacity development? 
2.2.5.1 The process 
Whereas capacity development was once considered a process of training and skills transfer, there is 
emerging agreement on the need to focus on the broader concepts of learning and learning 
practices when applying technical assistance for capacity development. Learning is a complex change 
process which occurs on each of the individual, organisational and institutional levels (OECD/DAC, 
2011).  
At the individual level, cognitive theory maintains that ‘individuals acquire knowledge and skills in 
purposeful interaction with their environment, and not as passive recipients in a straight transfer of 
prefabricated knowledge’ (Raab, 2008, p. 435, emphasis in original). When applying cognitive theory 
to development practice, Michaela Raab (2008) highlights the benefits that have arisen from 
process-centred approaches ‘which allow for constant redesign of plans as the participants’ 
knowledge evolves’ (p. 435). It is beyond the scope of this review to explore particular practical 
techniques; the general principle is, however, that process-centred, participatory, people-centred 
and iterative approaches are most likely to produce knowledge and outcomes that are truly ‘owned’ 
by participants and thus more able to be adapted and sustained in changing contexts.  
At the organisational level, similar principles of ‘action-learning’ are recommended (Johnson & 
Wilson, 1999). In essence, this approach again requires participatory approaches that involve the 
negotiation of shared meanings and agendas, and agreements as to performance assessment 
mechanisms that can then be used to facilitate learning and innovation. The intention here is not to 
prescribe an approach, but rather to indicate that learning, as opposed to knowledge or skills 
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transfer, involves iterative and participatory processes capable of providing feedback mechanisms 
that can then become the basis for further and sustained learning. It is in this way that ‘collective 
and purposeful norms of behaviour can be developed and changed over a sustained period of time, 
both in shared practices and in coordination and cooperation’ (Johnson & Wilson, 1999, p. 45). 
As discussed earlier, the individual, organisational and institutional levels are interdependent, and 
the issue of how individual learning can be translated into increased organisational capacity is an 
important one. Again it is dependent on context. A study by Johnson and Wilson (1999) suggests 
that individuals’ straightforward application of new knowledge, ways of understanding or techniques 
occurs in organisational settings where objectives are agreed, tasks and functions reasonably clear, 
and where both individual and organisational learning are aimed at improving performance. The 
whole organisation must provide both opportunities and support for the application of learning by 
the individual (Johnson & Wilson, 1999). Implied here is the broader vision of learning (and capacity) 
under discussion, which incorporates the capabilities to make decisions and to act. The fundamental 
importance of a supportive organisational environment means that often organisational and other 
contextual capacity constraints need to be addressed simultaneously with, or in some cases prior to, 
individual capacity development (OECD/DAC, 2011). 
The idea of purposeful interaction to promote learning is important at each of the levels discussed. 
Whatever the level at which technical assistance is provided, results frameworks with specific 
timeframes are required to be negotiated among all parties and used to track and discuss activity 
progress and change. Overall strategies are required that connect short-term activities to long-term 
goals in order to achieve continuous learning and sustainable capacity impact (OECD/DAC, 2011). 
The approach to learning and the learning practices described here are continuous, dynamic and 
take place over the course of a long-term engagement. The shift in focus from the tangible to the 
intangible features of capacity described earlier also precipitates the need for longer-term 
engagements, as it gives rise to the need to focus explicitly on the psychological, social and cultural 
aspects of capacity development. It takes time for practitioners to understand the local environment 
and to understand the patterns of behaviour and styles of thinking that generate and impact on 
performance. It also takes time to build constructive working relationships and to cultivate local 
ownership of programme activities (OECD/DAC, 2011). Finally, it takes a long time for new norms of 
thinking and being to be cultivated and embedded in any human system. As AusAID have 
recognised, ‘capacity development is about generational change’ (OECD/DAC, 2009, p. 1). 
An additional part of the recognition of capacity development as a long-term process stems from the 
conceptual shift outlined above, in which capacity is understood as a feature of a system that 
emerges organically, as opposed to one that can be constructed ‘mechanically’. The approach to 
capacity building in this framework is ‘systems searching and explorative, rather than prescriptive or 
formulaic’ (Morgan, 2005, p. 4). AusAID recognised the need to allow scope for ‘learning by trial and 
error’ and recommend a ‘fluid program design with room for experimentation and evolution’ 
(OECD/DAC, 2009, p. 1). This means, in practice, that a balance between planning and flexibility is 
required.  
It is now coming to be generally accepted that sustainable capacity development relies upon a long-
term commitment on the part of development assistance agencies and their country partners. While 
many elements of the capacity development process remain the subject of discussion, any 
articulation of fundamental principles will invariably include this requirement. For example, the 
UNDP’s default principles for capacity development include: ‘Don’t rush. Capacity development is a 
long-term process. It is not amenable to delivery pressures, quick fixes and short-term results 
seeking. Engagement for capacity development needs to have a long-term horizon and be flexible’ 
(UNDP, 2007b, p. 74). Also, in Capacity development for good governance in developing societies: 
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Lessons from the field, Hope (2009) includes as a fundamental principle of capacity development: 
‘Being addressed as a continuous, dynamic and long-term process. Fragmented short-term 
interventions have never been successful. A longer-term approach would have a greater potential to 
achieve sustainable capacity development’ (p. 83). 
2.2.5.2 What is the link between capacity development and performance 
improvement? 
If capacity is a latent and emerging phenomenon, performance is about the ‘execution and 
implementation, or the application and use of capacity’ in the service of achieving results, that is, 
‘substantive development outcomes that represent improvements to human welfare’ (Baser & 
Morgan, 2008, p. 85). As Baser and Morgan (2008) note: 
Years of experience with technical assistance [make clear that] all kinds of trade-offs, 
tensions and dilemmas can be found in the relationship between capacity, 
performance and results, especially when external interveners are part of the mix. 
Patterns of both capacity development and performance are uneven, with progress 
going at different speeds at different times. Investments in capacity can take years 
to yield significant results (p. 86). 
Monitoring and evaluation efforts have been inconsistently and intermittently applied, and in 
general efforts have been based on the assumption that ‘the aggregated condition called capacity 
would over time lead to improved performance and results at the project, programme and 
organisational levels’ (p. 86). 
In order to redress the dearth of knowledge in this area, Baser and Morgan (2008) analysed sixteen 
case studies in an attempt to isolate the conditions under which capacity development resulted in, 
or did not result in, performance improvement. In cases where improved capacity led relatively 
straightforwardly to improved results, they noted the following conditions: competencies and 
capabilities appropriate to the actual performance challenges faced were developed and 
maintained, and they were ‘good enough’ to actually make a difference to performance such that 
the organisation gained legitimacy and resources; all of the organisations had leaders with a sense of 
strategic management who were focused on strengthening the relationship between capacity and 
results; and all of the organisations had a set of potential outcomes that key stakeholders wanted, as 
well as relative control over their operating space and resources. 
In cases where improved capacity made little or no difference to results Baser and Morgan noted: 
capabilities were effectively developed, but they were the wrong capabilities for the performance 
challenges faced; new knowledge, structures, systems or strategies were formulated and applied but 
they were not embedded into daily performance; there was a ‘knowing-doing’ gap that impeded 
progress; or political instability created disincentives for change. 
The overall lesson derived from Baser and Morgan’s analyses was that ‘an imbalanced focus on 
either results or capacity eventually undermines both’ (p. 88). An undue preoccupation with 
outcomes and results led to declining capacity because participants—both technical assistance staff 
and their country participants—did not have the time or resources to invest in the required capacity 
development. This often related to the role of advisers and whether they were seen as 
predominantly there to ‘get things done’ or whether their primary purpose was to facilitate others 
to get things done. Alternatively, an undue preoccupation with capacity development meant losing 
track of the need to produce or deliver results. Organisations could find themselves engaged in 
meaningless reorganisations, or resources for capacity development could be diverted to other ends. 
This also occurred where a particular theory of capacity development was pursued for its own sake 
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and not tailored to performance needs. In these cases, capacity development both failed and 
impacted negatively on performance and results.  
This led the authors to conclude that, operationally, there is a need to ‘blend product and process’ 
(Baser & Morgan, 2008, p. 89). Crucial to this was ‘the ignition of a virtuous cycle in which capacity 
development and results reinforce and feed of each other in a rising spiral’ (p. 89). Capacity 
development needs to improve performance, which then, perhaps through increased demand for or 
recognition of services, leads to increased confidence, motivation and resources (capacity), which 
then lend themselves to further improved performance and results. Further, expectations of good 
performance can then become increasingly entrenched. 
Baser and Morgan noted that the relationship between capacity development and performance was 
in large part a function of both the quality of the assumptions underlying the goals of a programme 
(what performance challenges exist, what is needed to address them, what is required by end-users, 
etc.) and quality of the theory of change or capacity development that underpinned capacity 
development approaches and strategies. The authors isolate four possible consequences depending 
on the nature of each of these components and their interaction. Where assumptions underlying 
programme goals are strong but the theory of change is weak, only superficial change will result. 
Where programme goal assumptions are weak but the theory of change is strong, change will occur 
merely for the sake of change. Where both are weak, organisations will drift. However, where both 
are strong, deep change can occur. 
2.2.5.3 Some operational issues for practitioners 
Under this paradigm of capacity development, technical assistance personnel need to possess a 
much broader array of skills and abilities than simply high quality technical expertise (although this is 
still essential for success in capacity building). As is to be expected, these skills are those that are 
capable of drawing out and strengthening the intangible capabilities that constitute capacity, and 
that align with an emergent and organic understanding of capacity development.  
Kaplan (2000) compiled a list of the skills that would need to exist or be developed in technical 
assistance practitioners working within this paradigm of capacity development:  
 the ability to find the right question which may enable an organisation to take the next step 
on its path of development, and to hold a question so it functions as a stimulus to 
exploration rather than demanding an immediate solution, and to help organisations to do 
the same; 
 the ability to hold the tension generated by ambiguity and uncertainty, rather than seek 
immediate resolution; 
 the ability to observe accurately and objectively, to listen deeply, so that invisible realities of 
the organisation become manifest; 
 the ability to use metaphor and imagination to overcome the resistance to change, to enable 
an organisation to see itself afresh, and to stimulate creativity; 
 the ability to help others overcome cynicism and despair and to kindle enthusiasm;  
 integrity, and the ability to generate the trust which alone will allow the organisation and its 
members to really ‘speak’ and reveal themselves; 
 the ability to reflect honestly on one’s own interventions, and to enable others to do the 
same; 
 the ability to ‘feel’ into the ‘essence’ of a situation; 
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 the ability to empathise (not sympathise) so that both compassion and confrontation can be 
used with integrity in helping an organisation to become unstuck; and 
 the ability to conceptualise, and thus to analyse strategy with intelligence. 
How these skills are called upon in a concrete operational setting was taken up in Greenwell and 
Moore’s (2014) Capacity development in economic policy agencies. The paper addresses ‘issues that 
[the authors] grappled with in [their] roles as capacity development advisers in Papua New Guinea 
and Solomon Islands’ (p. 1). The authors make several interrelated offerings of advice for advisers 
working in the field, all of which can be traced to a fundamental need to think strategically, to 
understand the complexity of the context and the competing objectives that can drive placement 
activity, and to respect, respond to and develop the intangible elements of capacity that have been 
highlighted in this section.  
Many similar areas of concern elaborated by Greenwell and Moore will be covered by this 
research—for example the critical nature of effective relationships to adviser effectiveness (‘advice 
can only be influential if it is delivered to a receptive audience’ [p. 17]) and the difficulty in, yet 
importance of, measuring progress in capacity development—so in this section it will suffice to draw 
out one issue discussed by the authors which illuminates the way in which demands on advisers to 
work with the intangible elements of capacity and to ‘blend product and process’ can manifest 
themselves operationally. This issue revolves around the use of ‘failure’ in the learning process and 
judgements advisers must make about when to intervene and when to ‘let things fall over’ (or, in 
words preferred by the authors, when to allow work to ‘fall below acceptable standards’ [p. 19]).  
The idea of adviser intervention feeds into the doing/advising debate so often encountered in 
discussions around capacity development and refers in a broad sense to ‘situations where advisers 
identify the risk of a potential failure eventuating and then choose to contribute to the substantive 
work in some way in order to reduce that risk’ (p. 19). According to Greenfield and Moore these 
decisions are best made on a case-by-case basis taking into account the risk of creating dependency 
on advisers, the risk of damaging ongoing relationships through intervention and the overall risk of a 
poor outcome. Further, non-intervention is discussed as reaping less (or no) reward when there is 
little potential for management and staff ‘to recognise and learn from the consequences of 
substandard work’ (p. 20) or where there is the potential for significantly negative side effects on 
intangible capacities such as team morale, credibility, motivation and/or stakeholder relationships. 
As this single example illustrates, advisers need to be able to weigh up competing demands on the 
product and process elements of placement objectives and similarly consider strategically the 
various consequences, good or ill, for intangible capacity that can arise from any course of action. 
The broad range of skills and personal qualities required for capacity development practitioners to 
be successful in the field also has implications for the organisations/agencies responsible for locating 
and recruiting these professionals, as well as for how these agencies evaluate the performance of 
advisers working in the field (to be discussed further below).  
2.2.5.4 Some operational issues for donors/development agencies  
Technical assistance interventions that are intended for capacity development purposes should be 
designed, implemented and evaluated with a specific capacity development focus in mind. This 
means keeping in mind both the product and process elements described above, and providing 
realistic timeframes for capacity development objectives. As discussed earlier, the goal of EPSP’s 
capacity development activities is ‘sustained and generating performance improvement’. For 
Greenwell and Moore (2014) this means that ‘the point at which advisers are no longer needed is 
when organisations are “resilient” in the sense that they have the capacity to address any serious 
lack of capacity themselves’ (p. 14). This means ‘enhancing the organisation’s capacity for self-
 21 
regeneration—its ability to build capacity itself— [which] may be the most advanced stage of 
capacity development that can only be actively developed once other, more basic capacities, have 
already been entrenched’ (p. 14). In the authors’ experience it typically takes two to three years to 
achieve ‘significant, measurable progress against these objectives’ (p. 14) and the frequency of 
substantial program reviews should reflect this. The timeframe required to fully achieve these 
objectives, however, should more appropriately be measured in decades rather than years. Further, 
decisions to undertake capacity development programs should be based on funding commitments 
that acknowledge these timeframes. 
In terms of program delivery, many initiatives have already been undertaken to promote and 
strengthen the capacity building element of technical assistance. For example, AusAID introduced 
the ‘Making a Difference’ program (MaD), which brings advisers and counterparts together to learn 
about action-learning approaches and processes of capacity building and change management 
(OECD/DAC, 2009). While many agencies articulate and promote a capacity development focus, 
however, it is rare for aid organisations to focus on capacity development criteria when assessing 
the performance of technical assistance personnel (OECD/DAC, 2011). This is important because 
monitoring and evaluation can significantly influence how technical assistance personnel perform 
(OECD/DAC, 2011). Land, Hauck and Baser (2007) present guidelines for monitoring and evaluation, 
based upon the principle that personnel performance should be assessed in terms of the roles and 
functions that they are expected to perform. They stress that it is critical to avoid making technical 
assistance personnel responsible for overall results because this ‘encourages them to take over and 
disempowers country partners’ and ‘can also lead to an emphasis on achieving tangible and 
measurable results at the expense of investing in less tangible but equally important process and 
learning tasks’ (p. 7). For this reason, monitoring and evaluation systems should balance the 
demands for accountability (on the part of both donors and country partners) and learning. As a 
concrete example, referring to Greenwell and Moore’s (2014) discussion of adviser 
intervention/non-intervention outlined above, the authors agree that advisers have a strong 
incentive to intervene where capacity development activities are assessed largely on the basis of 
organisational outputs. As a practical measure they suggest that performance evaluators try to 
establish a mechanism for formally acknowledging decisions not to intervene, ‘evaluating the 
consequences and lessons learnt and then, where appropriate, reward[ing] advisers through their 
performance appraisals and otherwise’ (p. 21). Part of this suggestion also recognises that 
evaluation methodologies should also consider the need to reflect on and learn about processes of 
change and capacity development, such that donor programs themselves can become sites of 
action-learning and continuous improvement.  
In addition to integrating a capacity development perspective into design, implementation and 
assessment, donors also need to consider those design and operational aspects that encourage and 
support the three Paris Declaration principles of alignment with recipient country priorities, 
recipient country ownership and recipient country accountability. Land, Hauck and Baser (2007) 
outline a range of features and principles of placement design that align with and support these 
principles. The first is that the process of both identifying and formulating capacity building needs 
should be led by country stakeholders and these stakeholders should also decide whether technical 
assistance personnel are necessary and, if so, the kind of role they should perform. Second, while 
the ultimate goal should be the procurement of technical assistance personnel using national 
systems and procedures, country partners should at least, and ‘as a matter of principle, chair 
review/selection panels and be involved in developing criteria for selection and appraising 
performance’ (p. 4). Even if contracting remains the responsibility of the development agency, the 
selection of technical assistance personnel should be under recipient country leadership and, ‘once 
deployed, TA [technical assistance] personnel should be unambiguously accountable to the host 
organisation they serve’ (p. 4). This means coming to some arrangement that can ensure 
accountability to the host agency, whilst also recognising the legitimate need for accountability to 
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the managing contractor or development agency. The Perspectives Note on technical cooperation 
published by the OECD/DAC (2011) concurs that when the responsibilities for personnel 
management are not clearly defined and established, it limits the degree to which partner countries 
can play an active management role and thus can limit the effectiveness of capacity development 
activities. 
One of the thorniest issues for donors trying to identify the strategic and operational implications of 
current approaches to capacity development arises when attempting to grapple with the fact that 
development is political. Although dealing with development in general, Hudson and Leftwich’s 
(2014) From political economy to political analysis promotes a focus on the human, political and 
otherwise intangible elements of development contexts through the lens of interactions between 
‘agency’ and ‘structure’. The authors problematise the deterministic way in which institutions, and 
the incentives they give rise to, have been treated in the most recent generation of political 
economy analyses, and destabilise structure/institutions and the function of incentives by 
illuminating their contingency on the actions of agents working within them. In this way the 
interdependency of structure and agency is revealed: structure is a medium without which agents 
cannot act, yet without agents ‘structures cease to exist’ (p. 75). Structure, therefore, ‘is not just the 
context, it is also the outcome’ (p. 75). This formulation recognises that structures are not only 
material (or understandable in terms of know-how and resources etc.) but also social and 
‘constructed from shared ideas and understandings (p. 75). Agents are not automatons, but must 
rather ‘interpret the opportunities and risks facing them…as such, agents’ beliefs, values and other 
cognitive filters are central to understanding how they act (p. 75, emphasis added). These are the 
same realities, writ large, that individual advisers grapple with. 
Indeed, through Hudson and Leftwich it is possible to see parallels in the evolution of thinking 
around development contexts and the evolution of the delivery of technical assistance on the 
ground. In the former, ideas have shifted from those promoting the transplant of ‘best practice’ to 
recipient nations toward an understanding of the fundamental role that the interplay of context and 
individual agency (with all that those entail) plays in successful development. It has moved from a 
normative approach to a positive one, concerned not with what should be but with what actually is. 
In the latter, as discussed earlier, the third generation of technical assistance uses context as a 
starting point, ‘sees indigenous institutions, cultures and structures as key determinants’ in capacity 
development, is ‘integrated with governance and political economy issues’ (Morgan, 2010, cited in 
OECD/DAC, 2011, p. 5), is flexible and eschews planning in favour of searching, and concerns itself 
with the dynamics of change, including at the informal level. Deliberate effort is made to ‘shift 
control and decision making to local systems and actors’ and to ‘build on strengths rather than 
weaknesses’ (p. 5). Both reject the mechanical and formulaic in favour of the organic and emergent, 
and in doing so establish an entirely different—and more realistic—array of opportunities and 
constraints within which (capacity) development efforts must take place. 
It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that the operational implications applying to practitioners 
and discussed above, will also have their parallels with regard to donors and development agencies. 
These, too, must be able to accommodate an understanding of processes and, importantly, 
outcomes of development assistance as ‘emergent’ and ‘organic’, and ‘contingent’ and ‘contextual’ 
and integrate these into the design, implementation and evaluation of capacity development 
initiatives. This, of course, entails a somewhat radical departure from strategies of planned change 
that respond to needs for ‘control, clarity, efficiency, results and accountability’. 
2.2.6 Conditions in PNG 
This part of the literature review outlines some of the conditions in PNG that are relevant to the 
pursuit of local capacity development. It will first sketch out the general state of development in 
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PNG, as indicated by its progress toward achieving the MDGs, as well as its current state in terms of 
the UNDP’s Human Development Index. The MDGs are important because of the general 
international agreement, as expressed in both the Paris Declaration (2005) and the AAA (2008), that 
aid, including technical assistance, should be directed toward their attainment. The Human 
Development Indices are also useful in providing a generalised overview of the context for 
development in PNG, and both offer some insight into aspects of the broader ‘enabling 
environment’ for capacity development mentioned briefly earlier in this section. Some of the 
particulars of the environment in which capacity building occurs in PNG will be discussed in relation 
to a study undertaken of the deterioration of public administration in PNG. Finally, two recent 
evaluative studies of Australian technical assistance in PNG will be discussed, as a means of moving 
from the previously general discussion of capacity development into the particularities of the PNG 
case, and to provide some additional context for the issues that will be explored in later sections of 
this report.  
2.2.6.1 The Millennium Development Goals 
The first comprehensive appraisal of PNG’s progress toward the MDGs was completed in 2004 and 
covered the period from the MDGs’ base year of 1990, to 2003. This period was characterised as 
’mainly one of stagnation’ with ’limited progress made with regard to some of the MDGs’ but with 
the country not on track to meet any of them by 2015 (UNDP, 2009, p. 1). In 2003 the Department of 
National Planning and Monitoring (DNPM) created a set of national targets which were incorporated 
into PNG’s Medium Term Development Strategy (MTDS) 2005-2010. These targets were considered 
to be more realistic and achievable than the global, ‘aspirational’ goals set originally by the United 
Nations. 
A second national appraisal was completed in 2009 under the auspices of the DNPM (UNDP, 2009). 
The report concluded that PNG had not achieved any of the global targets, and had made, in the 
main, only limited progress toward the national targets. The main findings of the report in relation to 
each of the national MDG targets are set out below. 
MDG1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
In the absence of new information on income and consumption (the last Independent Household 
Survey had been completed in 1996) proxy indices (related to education and literacy, labour force 
participation, longevity, etc.) were used to measure the poverty component of this MDG. From these 
it was concluded that there had been a marginal decrease in ‘poverty of opportunity’, of an 
approximate value to that envisaged in the MTDS. Indirect measurement of the hunger component 
(again in the absence of up-to-date survey data) found that there had been little change since 1990. 
MDG2: Achieve universal primary education 
The appraisal found that the limited progress made with regard to access, retention and 
achievement was ‘disappointing’, in light of the fact that educational reforms had commenced in 
1994 and should have been completed in 2004. 
MDG3: Promote gender equality and empowerment of women 
While gender disparity in terms of education and literacy, employment and longevity was noted as 
‘not as large as often assumed’, women were noted as being at a disadvantage by virtue of 
widespread, culturally-sanctioned gender-based violence. This was also implicated in the spread of 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic, which of course poses a huge threat to future development. PNG’s high level 
of maternal mortality was also seen as an indication of a lack of empowerment of women. 
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MDG4: Reduce child mortality 
It was noted that child mortality decreased rapidly in the 1970s, started to level off in the 1980s and 
that ‘since 1990, further decrease has been slow’. Further reductions were seen as dependent on 
the successful implementation of the plan to introduce Community Health Posts throughout the 
rural sector. 
MDG 5: Improve maternal health 
Again, using proxy indicators in the absence of reliable data, it was concluded that maternal 
mortality had decreased only marginally since 1994 and remained at a very high level at the time of 
the 2009 report. Once more, the introduction of Community Health Posts to rural areas was seen as 
essential to improving this state of affairs. 
MDG6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
Evidence available at the time of the 2009 report suggested that there was no sign that the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, nor the spread of several closely associated opportunistic diseases, especially tuberculosis, 
pneumonia and malaria, had stabilised. 
MDG 7: Ensure environmental sustainability 
The 2009 report noted that most national targets remained ambiguous. While PNG had signed 46 
multilateral environmental agreements, most of the indicators for progress contained therein had 
‘never been measured and may never be measured’ and any monitoring carried out was 
‘fragmented and uncoordinated’. It was deemed essential that the Department of Environment and 
Conservation assume ‘a leading role with regard to the collection, processing, management and 
analysis of all the data required for the monitoring of MDG7’. 
MDG8: Develop a global partnership for development 
The results of attempts that had been made to localise this MDG were noted in the report as 
‘disappointing’, and the management and analysis of data with which to monitor the goal 
‘unsatisfactory’. It was suggested that a recommendation by the 2004 MDG Steering Committee to 
establish a Task Force to continuously monitor this MDG be implemented as soon as possible.  
2.2.6.2 The Human Development Index 
The Human Development Index is a composite statistic employed to measure long-term progress 
with regard to three basic dimensions of human development: 1) a long and healthy life, 2) access to 
knowledge and 3) a decent standard of living (UNDP, 2013). The first dimension is measured by life 
expectancy. The second is measured by the mean years of schooling for the adult population (≥25 
years) and the expected years of schooling for children of school-entrance age. The final dimension, 
standard of living, is measured by gross national income (GNI) per capita expressed in constant 2005 
international dollars converted by using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates. 
In 2012, PNG’s HDI value was 0.466 (the baseline being zero and the maximum one) which placed it 
in the ‘low human development’ category and as 156th of 187 countries and territories. Changes in 
the underlying data and methods in 2012 means that it is not useful to compare rankings from 
previous years. However, as can be seen in the table below, between 1980 and 2012, PNG’s HDI 
value increased from 0.324 to 0.466, an increase of 44 per cent, or an average annual increase of 
approximately 1.1 per cent. In the same period, GNI per capita increased by around 27 per cent 
(UNDP, 2013). 
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Table 2.2.6.1 Papua New Guinea’s HDI trends based on consistent time series data, new 
component indicators and new methodology 
Year 
Life expectancy at 
birth 
Expected 
years of 
schooling 
Mean 
years of 
schooling 
GNI per capita 
(2005 PPP$) 
HDI 
value 
1980 52.8 4.1 1.2 1,885 0.324 
1985 54.7 4.1 1.8 1,738 0.347 
1990 55.6 4.5 2.3 1,620 0.368 
1995 57.2 4.9 2.9 2,114 0.405 
2000 58.7 5.2 3.2 1,826 0.415 
2005 60.5 5.5 3.5 1,720 0.429 
2010 62.4 5.8 3.9 2,162 0.458 
2011 62.8 5.8 3.9 2,272 0.462 
2012 63.1 5.8 3.9 2,386 0.466 
 
Source: UNDP, 2013, p. 2 
In 2010, the Inequality Adjusted HDI (IHDI) was introduced to take into account inequality along all 
dimensions of the HDI (with each dimension’s average value being discounted according to the level 
of inequality). The loss in potential human development that results from inequality is then indicated 
in the difference between the HDI and IHDI. Unfortunately this figure is not available for PNG, due to 
a lack of relevant data. This difficulty in accessing relevant data similarly prevented the production of 
a figure for PNG for the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), which identifies multiple deprivations 
in the same households in education, health and standard of living. As can be seen here and in the 
previous section on the MDGs, data collection is itself a problem in PNG which can have 
ramifications for both understanding existing conditions and formulating needs, as well as assessing 
the impact of any development activities undertaken. 
The final statistic used to measure potential losses in human development is the Gender Inequality 
Index (GII), which reflects gender-based inequalities in reproductive health (measured by maternal 
mortality and adolescent fertility rates), empowerment (share of parliamentary seats and 
educational attainment by gender) and economic activity (labour market participation by gender). In 
2012, PNG had a GII value of 0.617, placing is 134th of 148 countries. At this time, 2.7 per cent of 
parliamentary seats were held by women, 6.8 per cent of women had reached a secondary or higher 
level of education compared to 14.1% of men, and female participation in the labour market was 
70.6 per cent compared to 74.1 per cent of men. 
2.2.6.3 The deterioration of public administration in PNG 
In 2004 a report was prepared for AusAID by Lynn Pieper which discussed the deterioration of public 
administration in PNG from the early 1980s, based upon the views of eminent long-term public 
servants. The report highlighted the factors that interviewees saw as driving the transformation of 
PNG’s public service from an efficient, professional, team-based, committed, independent and well-
educated corps of individuals in touch with the basic service needs in the provinces, to a highly 
politicised, inefficient and sometimes incompetent cadre of state employees, often motivated by 
narrow political or personal interests. 
The lion’s share of responsibility for this decline was directed toward changes in the structure and 
function of PNG’s political system as post-Independence internal reforms accelerated. For example, 
tight central control over budgets was shifted to sectoral, that is ministerial, control over budget 
allocations. As the report notes, ‘this was the first real move to political control of public sector 
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management, and to using public funds as slush funds’ (Pieper, 2004, p. 4). The increasing desire of 
politicians to control public resources coincided with a change in public service appointments from 
permanent to contract (the introduction of private sector culture into the public sector), with 
departmental head appointments being made by the cabinet rather than the Public Services 
Commission. Whilst the intention had been to strengthen the role of departmental heads, the result 
in practice was the changing of secretaries (and often other senior personnel) whenever a new 
minister was appointed. ‘This has seriously undermined the professionalism of the public service, 
causing departmental heads to focus only on the short-term, and to play political games in their own 
attempts at survival… it has enabled politicians to get too close to operational areas within the 
public service’ (p. 4). 
Interviewees also expressed the opinion that PNG’s decentralised, three-tier system of government 
was not functioning as intended. Revisions made to the 1995 Organic Law required over one 
hundred pieces of enabling legislation that were still being worked through in 2004. As Pieper’s 
report notes, ‘confusion over the roles of agencies at different levels of government means service 
delivery is declining rather than improving’ (p. 4). Further, all layers of government, public sector 
institutions and decision-making are ‘disaggregated and unfocused’, local governments are not 
empowered, and provincial governments cannot meet expectations (in part due to underfunding) 
which further hampers effective service delivery. These factors were compounded by the movement 
of less experienced people into key positions, and rapid recruitment to meet increasing demands for 
service delivery that was both inefficient and ultimately unsustainable in terms of PNG’s economic 
capacity.  
Along with these factors internal to PNG, the change in the nature of Australian government-funded 
technical assistance was also noted as a contributing factor. Due to its relevance to this study, the 
whole section will be reproduced here. 
[Previously] expatriate personnel were in contracted, line positions, subject to 
normal lines of command, discipline and public service ethics. The shift to off-line, 
advisory support in the 1980s, whilst a well-intentioned part of the localisation 
process, “was a step backwards” in the opinion of the interviewees. Apart from 
being much more expensive, it has created a feeling of condescension between 
‘advisers’ and their ‘counterparts’; reduced sustainability prospects by separating 
the work done by advisers from the ‘normal’ work of departments; created a 
dependency by Departmental Heads on using advisers to fix problems rather than 
training nationals to learn the job by doing it; destroyed the collegiate sense that 
previously existed (“we used to work and socialise together”); and eroded any sense 
of pride in achievements—counterparts do not have any sense of ownership of 
results, and advisers today “are not long-term stayers” (p. 3, emphasis in original). 
The particularities of PNG’s ‘enabling environment’ as mentioned here, as well as the features of AC 
relationships within it, will be discussed in further detail in the following section. 
2.2.6.4 Technical assistance in PNG 
This section considers two evaluative studies undertaken of technical assistance in PNG, each of 
which involved consultations with local participants and incorporated the findings of previous 
evaluations. The first is the PNG-Australia Joint Review of Technical Adviser Positions (AusAID, 
2010b; hereafter referred to as the ‘Joint Review’), a study completed in order to ‘confirm the 
priority attached to each adviser position and whether it is an effective response to mutually agreed 
development needs and priorities’ (p. 4). This was a broad study which reviewed adviser positions 
across all AusAID programs in PNG, including the Strongim Gavman Program (SGP) and the PNG-
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Australia Policing Partnership, in addition to the ASF. For this reason only the most general findings 
will be discussed here. The second is Morgan’s (2008) Improving Counterpart Relationships in Papua 
New Guinea: A Study for the Governments of Papua New Guinea and Australia, which looked more 
closely at the internal dynamics of AC relationships in light of the 2005 Paris Declaration principles. 
Although the two studies were conducted on different bases, there is often overlap in their findings, 
as well as some contradictions which may illuminate some of the difficulties in pursuing effective 
capacity development. 
The task of the Joint Review was to evaluate the 487 long-term (providing at least six months input 
per year) adviser placements that were operating in PNG in 2010-2011. Of these, 355 were held by 
international advisers and 132 by PNG advisers. The objective was to assess the value and 
effectiveness of each adviser position (not the performance of individuals in adviser positions) in 
terms of: value for money; the intended outcomes of the position (results) including how the 
position was building capacity in the host agency; whether there were alternative or more cost-
effective ways of achieving these outcomes; and the relative importance of the adviser position to 
the broader country program and bilateral relationships (p. 4). The Joint Review was conducted 
using ‘a combination of data collection, document review and stakeholder consultation’ (p. 41). 
Overall, the Joint Review gave 41 per cent of positions a ‘high’ rating with regard to the 
abovementioned criteria and recommended that they be continued. Twenty-two per cent of 
positions were rated as ‘medium,’ indicating that they provided ‘assistance in important areas but 
needed to be re-designed or reassessed subject to particular issues being addressed’ (pp. 31-32). 
Finally, 37 per cent of positions were given a rating of ‘low’ and recommended to be phased out. 
Some of the positions were given this rating because they were ‘deemed a success where objectives 
had been achieved’ (p. 32). 
While there were clearly many positions that were seen as being both valuable and effective in 
providing technical assistance and capacity development to PNG agencies, the Joint Review 
discussed a series of impediments to the efficient use of advisers across the programs. The 
diagnostic process that led to the decision to establish an adviser position was criticised as being 
‘insufficiently robust’ and often accompanied by the ‘assumption that an adviser can “fix the 
problem” without proper scrutiny of how realistic this is or even what the problem actually entails’ 
(p. 17). The overall perceived effectiveness of technical advisers is of course diminished when they 
are appointed in situations in which they are unlikely to achieve intended outcomes in a cost-
effective manner. A more comprehensive diagnostic process was recommended as a means to both 
accurately identify needs and the appropriate way to respond to them. In particular, the diagnostic 
process ‘should identify the specific capacity improvement outcomes expected that link directly to 
the agency’s service delivery role’ (p. 17). This formulation is emblematic of the Joint Review’s 
general position that capacity development activities should be oriented away from general systems 
strengthening and toward strengthening systems capacity for implementation.  
In its discussion of system capacity development, the Joint Review noted the successful case of the 
National Economic and Fiscal Commission, in which ‘the primary objective was to support the 
development of system capacity, rather than individual or organisational capacity’ (p. 20, emphasis 
in original). While individual and organisational capacity development followed from this process, it 
was seen as more important to work toward the sustainability of system capacity as the first goal, 
and develop individual/organisational capacity around this objective. Also pertinent here is the Joint 
Review’s noting of earlier criticisms of the ‘counterpart model’ for placing ‘too much emphasis on 
building the capacity of one individual’ (p. 20) who may subsequently, as was often the case, leave 
the organisation. Consequently, it was suggested that advisers work with ‘teams’ of people, or even 
across multiple teams. Morgan (2008) also supported the use of teams, with the additional reason 
that team approaches are more suited to PNG culture. 
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Morgan (2008) also mentioned the relationship between individual capacity development and 
broader, systemic capacity development, noting that ‘evidence about the contribution of 
counterpart relationships to bigger systems change in the public sector in PNG remains mixed at 
best’ (pp. 3-4). In general, according to Morgan, advisers seemed to be ‘much better at improving 
individual competencies than they were at developing collective competencies especially on a more 
sustainable basis’ (p. 4). While part of this comes down to approach, that is, the general tendency to 
focus on capacity building at the level of the individual, part of it may also be attributed to a general 
lack of in-depth awareness on the part of advisers as to how to bring about complex organisation 
change (discussed below). 
On the side of counterparts and host organisations, it was recognised in the Joint Review that 
adviser effectiveness is contingent upon their ‘commitment, willingness and motivation to 
participate in the proposed activity, reform or change’ (p. 19). The strength and quality of 
organisational leadership was noted as a key ingredient to the success of any adviser position, with 
ultimate responsibility and accountability for placement outcomes lying with the head of the host 
agency or organisation. To this end, it was recommended that the design of placements should 
include a joint agreement that outlines what is expected of all involved parties (the host agency 
including direct counterparts, managers and the agency head, the managing contractor and the 
adviser) and what the intended placement outcomes are. It was suggested that these agreements 
replace, or complement, advisers’ ToRs. In addition to specific placement outputs, the agreements 
should include ‘the specific “capacities” that are expected to be developed in counterpart staff, 
teams and the organisation more broadly or in a particular system’ (p. 22) with a framework such as 
the Staged Capacity Building Model (AusAID, 2006) used to guide the process. Specific review 
timetables, and the process through which progress will be monitored and assessed, should be 
made clear (and, where possible, led by the host agency) and assessment should include the 
performance of both adviser and counterpart(s). Further, joint agreements ‘should be reviewed 
semi-annually by the PNG agency, adviser and the managing contractor to track progress and 
address any issues arising’ (p. 23). Further, ‘where progress is severely hampered by issues that have 
arisen in the course of the assignment, the agency head (or senior delegate) should be responsible 
for taking appropriate actions including ending the assignment where there is no prospect for 
successful achievement of outcomes’ (p. 36). 
The focus on capacity development needs and suitable approaches/strategies in the early stages of 
placement design will then have implications for the kind of adviser sought for the role. As 
addressed earlier in the discussion of capacity building, capacity development roles require a 
combination of skills and attributes in advisers, and a balance between technical and interpersonal 
skills. The Joint Review noted that in some cases ‘advisers have simply been unclear on how to 
achieve change at any level’ and that ‘often relationships can be formed, but the ability to build on 
them, develop capabilities and then translate this into systemic capacity has eluded many’ (p. 26). 
This issue was also discussed by Morgan (2008), who wrote that technical advisers in general ‘had 
difficulty addressing capacity development effectively even at the level of individuals [and were] 
frequently unclear about how to bring about the evolution of complex organisational and 
institutional change’ (p. 3). The Joint Review noted that ‘skills in facilitation, mediation, negotiation, 
change management and especially cross-cultural competence make a big difference’ to adviser 
effectiveness (p. 26). Mention was made of the drawbacks of paying a fixed fee to managing 
contractors for adviser recruitment, as this could act as a disincentive to spending the amount of 
time and money required for high quality recruitment. 
In terms of the formal relationship between advisers and their agencies it was noted in the Joint 
Review, in accordance with the Paris Declaration principles, that ‘advisers should have clear 
accountabilities to the PNG government agency or organisation they work for’ (p. 23). Due to the 
fact that managing contractors have contractual responsibilities, the appropriate arrangements need 
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to be negotiated with host agencies to ensure that accountability and management lines are made 
clear. These recommended arrangements give additional weight to the recommendation included in 
the Joint Review—as well as the majority of sources consulted for this section—that recruitment 
processes should be jointly undertaken by the managing contractor and the PNG agency and that 
‘the agency should be represented at a senior level on selection panels’ (p. 23). 
In what could be considered an extension of the above arrangements, the Joint Review notes 
considerable support for ‘in-line’ placements of the sort discussed in Pieper’s 2004 report on public 
administration in PNG. The Joint Review agrees with the assessment made by Pieper that this style 
of placement may have been abandoned prematurely and noted that a majority of those consulted 
favoured the use of in-line positions for international advisers as this meant that they were truly 
‘part of a team’ rather than ‘outsiders’ or ‘external inspectors’ who exercised oversight but did not 
take personal responsibility. As indicated in the Joint Review, and in other sources consulted, this 
‘outsider’ approach is conducive neither to achieving effective outcomes, nor to capacity 
development: the issue of ‘ownership’ is clearly implicated here. The use of formal in-line 
placements also ‘recognises that many advisers already do perform many functions that would be 
considered ‘in-line’ and would remove the ambiguity of whether they should do or not’ (p. 24). 
In the arrangement suggested in the Joint Review, advisers would occupy an established position in 
the organisational structure of the host agency in in-line placements, while their ToRs would also 
include explicit responsibility for developing the capacity of their teams, including through 
mentoring, transferring skills, and identifying training and other opportunities. Further, ‘by 
modelling good practices and behaviour [advisers] are also influencing their staff, teams and others 
in the work environment’ (p. 24). However, it was recognised that the use of in-line placements 
should not have the effect of displacing local candidates with the requisite skills and abilities to fulfil 
these roles. 
Morgan (2008) pursued this issue in terms of the doing/advising debate that features in many 
discussions about capacity development. Morgan agreed with the Joint Review that advisers should 
not replace or disempower country capacity, but that ‘hybrid combinations of doing and advising, 
e.g. sequenced or concurrent, could work under certain circumstances’ and in some cases be ‘the 
only feasible option’ (p. 14). On an interpersonal level, ‘doing’ as a process through which 
counterparts observe and learn was considered effective in building capacity, and many 
counterparts did not respond well to advisers staying on the sidelines, offering only support and 
recommendations. ‘Doing’, therefore, does not always work against the interests of capacity 
development, however ‘gap filling that has no inclination or ability or even strategy to leave behind 
some kind of sustainable institutional legacy ultimately fails’ (p. 14). 
The issue of placement duration was discussed in both reports, with more concrete 
recommendations being made in the Joint Review. It noted that there was often ‘no strong rationale 
for the initial term of an advisory position’ (p. 22) nor a clear view of ‘what success looks like’ and an 
associated exit strategy. Initial contract terms of twelve months were ‘often insufficient to have any 
sustainable impact, given the time it takes for advisers to understand the complexity of the 
environment and build relationships’ (p. 22). Accordingly, it was recommended that, placement 
design should give realistic consideration to how long adviser support is likely to be required. The 
Joint Review suggested an initial contract period of two years, with an option to extend the contract 
for an additional year or two in order to maximise adviser productivity. Longer-term contracts would 
require the establishment of performance management procedures that could respond to any 
adviser performance issues that arose throughout the placement. The Joint Review also mentions 
short-term inputs, such as those provided through a twinning program, as a potential exit strategy 
from long-term placements. 
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Morgan’s (2008) study into ways to improve counterpart relationships also canvassed the issue of 
needing to understand ‘what success looks like’, as mentioned in the Joint Review. Gathering data 
primarily through interviews, Morgan noted that in the absence of ‘effective ways of assessing the 
outcomes of capacity development and coming to a shared understanding of what worked and what 
didn’t work… judgements about the effectiveness of [technical assistance] in general and 
counterpart relationships in particular remain mainly subjective’ (p. 2). Thus views expressed by 
both Morgan and the Joint Review lend support to the view expressed earlier in this section of the 
need to formally integrate an explicit capacity development element into program assessment, for 
the purpose of evaluating both progress and outcomes, as well as to contribute to further learning in 
the field of capacity development. 
While the Joint Review focused on broader measures of effectiveness, such as value for money and 
the achievement of intended outcomes, Morgan’s (2008) study instead focused on operational 
issues arising from the interpersonal and human dynamics at the heart of adviser/counterpart-style 
capacity development. The value in examining these reports together is that it illuminates some of 
the tensions that can arise between capacity-development-as-program and capacity-development-
as-practice. For example, as discussed above, the Joint Review recommends taking a highly 
structured approach to placement design, such that outcomes, and the means of achieving and 
reviewing progress toward them, are laid out in detail prior to placement commencement, albeit 
subject to periodic review. In contrast, Morgan (2008) warns of ‘the limits of any plan to structure 
counterpart relationships’ (p. 11). Even in cases where the relationship was well-positioned, 
technical assistance staff selected by and accountable to the host agency, where formal objectives 
had been set and reporting and appraisal functions agreed, Morgan found that ‘the real 
opportunities and constraints inherent in the relationship remained to be discovered during 
implementation…[w]hat then took over was a process of evolution and emergence during which the 
effects of personal relationships, hidden organisational agendas and outside events shifted and 
changed the relationship…[m]uch of this was unpredictable in advance and required adaptability’ (p. 
11). The contrast suggests that a compromise between planning and flexibility is required to ensure 
that programs designed at the donor/agency level can actually be implemented effectively on the 
ground. 
A second, and related, contrast concerns ownership of, and commitment to, placement activities. 
While the Joint Review promotes ownership at the organisational level (and Morgan’s report noted 
the increasing trend toward greater PNG management and control of technical assistance 
interventions in the form of: appointing advisers to PNG-selected initiatives; exercising greater 
control over the design of ToRs; increased participation in recruitment; and increased incidence of 
technical assistance staff reporting directly to and being appraised by GoPNG staff), it was noted by 
Morgan that ‘country staff at the mid-level [where most counterpart relationships actually function] 
would have different interests and viewpoints compared to top-down prescriptions championed by 
central agencies and donors’ (p. 7). This, in conjunction with the dynamics of the GoPNG public 
sector hierarchy which tends to ‘disempower staff at the middle levels of departments and agencies’ 
(p. 7) meant that middle-level counterparts needed ‘the prospect of some benefits from the 
counterpart relationship on their own terms’ (p. 7, emphasis in original). To induce this commitment, 
Morgan suggests that program design could start at the operational rather than the strategic level, 
that is, with an ‘inventory of the needs of the individual GoPNG officers who would actually 
implement’ the program and technical assistance interventions subsequently shaped around ‘a 
range of support measures intended to improve the individual competencies and collective 
capabilities of these individuals’ (p. 7). Once more this is in contrast with the highly structured, 
strategic approach recommended by the Joint Review, and suggests that an intervening approach is 
required that recognises the needs of both donors/agencies and advisers working with individual 
counterparts. 
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These two examples imply a tension between the second-generation approaches to technical 
assistance favoured by donors and agencies, and the emergence of third-generation approaches in 
response to the exigencies of actual practice in the field. Whether these two approaches are 
susceptible to some form of hybridisation or mutual accommodation would appear to be one of the 
more pressing questions arising from this review of the capacity development literature.  
The importance of the interpersonal relationships central to capacity development was noted in the 
Joint Review, in its discussion of the skills and attributes required in advisers and the realistic 
timeframes required for the establishment of sound relationships. Unsurprisingly, the issue of 
human relationships was treated in detail in Morgan’s (2008) report, which noted that almost all of 
the comments made by GoPNG staff about their advisers ‘centred on their personal qualities and 
ability to adapt to PNG constraints and opportunities’ (p. 11). According to Morgan, advisers (and 
managing contractors) needed a better understanding of the professional, political, financial and 
wantok pressures that shaped counterparts’ daily preferences and behaviour and which ‘could 
determine the way in which GoPNG staff could or would engage with their [advisers]’ (p. 11). GoPNG 
staff placed great emphasis on the adviser’s perceived loyalty or commitment to the 
counterpart’s/host agency’s agenda and advisers could lose credibility if they were perceived as 
working for their own or external causes. On a practical level, the separation of technical staff in an 
office away from counterparts was seen as counterproductive to the establishment of sound 
relationships. Once more, however, it was not sufficient for the adviser to simply work well with 
others, he/she ‘also had to have at least elements of a matching set of technical skills and the ability 
to think strategically in terms of change and capacity development’ (p. 12).  
In terms of capacity development strategies, Morgan noted that most discussion at the level of 
advisers/counterparts focused on the micro-level, that is, ‘on the job training, mentoring, the 
exchange of tacit knowledge, learning through doing, coaching, formal training, group formation, 
confidence building and awareness raising’ (p. 15). While learning outcomes at the individual level 
are often stressed as a means to improving capacity and results, Morgan noted a number of 
‘knowing-doing gaps’ where learning and knowledge was not applied due to a variety of personal, 
cultural or organisational reasons. These, and other external reasons such as broader reform and 
change, could affect the objective of capacity development to induce an organisational and 
behavioural change in GoPNG staff or systems that can lead to greater capacity, performance and 
results. Finally, Morgan noted that there was not much observed impact of formal training on 
counterpart relationships, with on-the-job group learning appearing far more relevant. 
Finally, the most difficult challenge facing sustainable capacity development is the nature of the 
‘enabling environment’. The features of this environment are often the most complex and 
intransigent obstacle to effective capacity building, as well as being the least amenable to adviser or 
donor intervention. Some of these obstacles to public sector reform in PNG arise directly from 
features of the enabling environment that were discussed in the earlier review of Pieper’s (2004) 
study of public administration in PNG. For example, such obstacles include: poorly-trained or 
inexperienced appointees to senior positions; political interference with due process; disrespect for 
the rule of law among politicians/senior public servants; the politicisation of the public service and 
concomitant erosion of professionalism; the lack of accountability and appropriate sanctions; and 
the loss of institutional credibility (AusAID, 2010b). Other obstacles noted in a GoPNG Review of the 
Public Sector Reform Program (2007) were: the absence of political and senior executive leadership; 
lack of genuine commitment to reform; the absence of clear strategy and ownership; and low levels 
of corporate knowledge as well as organisational leadership, capacity and knowledge (GoPNG, 2007 
cited in AusAID, 2010b). While both the Joint Review and Morgan’s study note many positive 
improvements with regard to many of the internal aspects of adviser/counterpart relationships, they 
also note that there has been slow progress dealing with broader reform, political and other 
contextual factors.  
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Despite the criticisms that have arisen around the use of advisers, and the questions around their 
actual impact on improving—or minimising the decline in—public sector capacity in PNG when there 
are so many other influences at play, the Joint Review notes that the ‘need to build up skills and 
capacity in PNG remains a high priority [which] will become even more prominent over the next 
decade as revenues expected from the LNG project (and the resources boom more generally) result 
in a growing economy that will demand a skilled workforce’ (p. 8). It also notes that there are ‘critical 
skills gaps in service delivery [for which] adviser support is in many cases the best way to meet them’ 
(p. 8). The key is to ensure that adviser placements support the objectives of both GoPNG and GoA 
to improve service delivery in key sectors in PNG and to support PNG’s progress toward the MDGs. 
Entailed here is a focus on the implementation of critical tasks, and a reduction in focus on corporate 
reform (AusAID, 2010b). Finally, it was noted in the Joint Review that there have been a range of 
studies and analyses conducted on the use of advisers in Australia’s aid program to PNG, many of 
which were drawn upon by the review team to examine adviser effectiveness. However, the Joint 
Review also noted that the wealth of ‘lessons learned’ contained in these studies and analyses have 
generally not been followed up by the agencies that commissioned them. Thus it would seem that 
another of the remaining challenges is to ensure that study findings actually have an impact on 
program conceptualisation and design, such that real improvements and change in capacity 
development practice can occur. 
2.3 Research design 
2.3.1 Introduction 
The research design was developed to answer the research questions within the context and 
circumstances in which the research had to be conducted. In particular, although a longitudinal 
study was favoured, the duration of the project was limited to two years. Furthermore, the research 
team (and several of the research participants and informants) were located in Australia (and the 
Pacific), whereas most participants were in PNG. Therefore, a research design was required that 
enabled some data collection to be undertaken remotely, whilst also including some personal 
encounters with research participants and informants in PNG and, to a lesser extent, Australia.  
Accordingly, a mixed method research design was developed and adopted for the study. Each 
method addressed one or more of the research questions with some overlap between them; this 
provided broader data to answer each question and, to some extent, validation. The research 
generated both quantitative and qualitative data which enabled both scale and detail to be 
reported.  
This section (2.3) presents the research questions and then the research methods that were 
adopted. The methods are presented in order of commencement; however, there was considerable 
overlap between the use of the methods over the data collection period. The data collection 
commenced in September 2012 and continued until May 2014. In accordance with normal ethical 
practice, and to encourage full and frank responses, it was agreed that individual respondent’s 
identities would not be revealed in any reporting related to this project. Therefore, appropriate 
means have been used in this report to anonymise reporting of disaggregated data. Aliases have 
been used to disguise the identities of advisers and counterparts whose views have been gathered 
via written reports, interviews, workshops and focus groups. Where comments made in the survey 
appear in this Report, they are not accompanied by aliases as the date entry was anonymous. 
2.3.2 Research questions 
The following research questions (RQs) were derived from the project brief and developed in 
negotiation with EPSP prior to commencement of the project. 
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RQ1 What are the advisers’ views of the success or otherwise of their partnerships with their 
counterpart(s) in achieving their placements’ stated aims? What evidence is there to support 
these views? 
RQ2  What are the counterparts’ views of the success or otherwise of their partnerships with their 
advisers in achieving their placements’ stated aims? What evidence is there to support these 
views? 
RQ3  What strategies were adopted by advisers to enable their counterpart(s) to learn what was 
required to fulfil their placements’ aims? How did the advisers learn about or develop such 
strategies? What do the advisers believe are the main things their counterparts learned? What 
evidence is there of such learning? What can be understood from these experiences and how 
might capacity development be improved through future AusAID programs? 
RQ4 What approaches were adopted by counterpart(s) to learn what was required to fulfil their 
placements’ aims? What do the counterparts believe are the main things they learned from 
their placement? What evidence is there of such learning? What can be understood from 
these experiences and how might capacity development be improved through future AusAID 
programs? 
RQ5  What have been the outcomes of the introduction by EPSP of other modalities of capacity 
development including short-term consultants, twinning arrangements, targeted training, 
grants and research? Do these modalities provide increased efficiencies and effectiveness 
compared to the use of long-term advisers? 
RQ6 What were the enablers of, and impediments to, the success (or ‘drivers of change’) of the AC 
placements? 
RQ7  What, if any, are the main improvements that can be made to ensure the success of future AC 
projects? 
RQ8  What do major stakeholders in PNG conclude from the evidence produced by this study about 
the impact and success of AC projects and other capacity development modalities in their 
areas of influence? 
RQ9 In general, what may be asserted from the evidence of the worth or otherwise of AC projects 
and other capacity development modalities undertaken since 2006? What suggestions or 
recommendations may be deduced for the future? 
2.3.3 Research methodology 
The research methodology incorporated a variety of research methods to collect and analyse both 
quantitative and qualitative data. These data were collected from: advisers’ final reports of their AC 
projects, counterparts’ progress reports on their AC projects, past and current advisers and 
counterparts, key informants and stakeholders in GoPNG, DFAT (Canberra and Port Moresby), EPSP, 
etc. The various methods employed, and the research questions they address, are presented below 
in a sequence of stages. The stages are outlined chronologically but they overlap such that there was 
often more than one stage active at any given time. 
STAGE 1 
1a EPSP provided final advisers’ Placement Completion Reports and counterparts’ Adviser 
Performance Appraisals on AC projects completed between 2006 and 2012. It was initially 
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envisaged that these would be matched and thus comparisons drawn between adviser and 
counterpart views of the same placement, and over the entire length of the placement. A 
spreadsheet was provided by EPSP of AC placements over this period and an attempt to match 
documents was made, however, not all reports were available for all placements. In addition, 
EPSP provided email and/or other contact information for relevant project participants where 
these were available.  
1b Seventy-eight Placement Completion Reports and ninety-one Adviser Performance Appraisals 
were entered into NVIVO (qualitative database and analysis software), coded and content 
analysed for data relating to RQs 1, 2, 5 and 6. 
1c Analyses occurred during Stage 1 to assist: 1) the identification of potential questions to 
include in the online surveys (Stage 2); 2) the identification of any particular matters to 
include in individual adviser and/or counterpart interviews (Stages 3 and 4); and 3) 
identification of matters and/or evidence for inclusion in the validation process (Stage 5) and 
report writing (Stage 6). 
1d A report detailing the outcome of the qualitative analysis in relation to RQs 1, 2 and 5 was 
produced.  
1e A database of advisers and counterparts was developed to record their involvement with the 
ASF and EPSP programs. The database also recorded their involvement with the project. 
STAGE 2  
2a A supplementary search was undertaken for email contacts for AC projects completed in the 
period 2006–2012 for which EPSP was unable to provide current contact details. This involved 
both general Internet searching and the use of the professional database LinkedIn. A 
spreadsheet of all contact details was prepared. 
2b Draft online surveys, one for advisers and one for counterparts, relating to RQs 1, 3, 6 and 7 
(advisers’ survey), RQs 2, 4, 6 and 7 (counterparts’ Survey) were formulated. Matters isolated 
in 1c (above) were incorporated at this point (See Appendices A and B for details of the survey 
instruments). 
2c Consultation on survey items and design occurred with DFAT (then AusAID) in Canberra and 
Port Moresby and EPSP. 
2d Detailed survey development using Opinio online survey software (Opinio enables the 
individual tailoring of a questionnaire to a respondent, therefore, where appropriate, matters 
identified specific reports in Stage 1 could be pursued with appropriate questions.) Testing of 
the survey within the project team was followed by trialling of survey with a pilot group and 
consultation with EPSP and others in PNG experienced in research. This was followed by the 
preparation of the survey email invitation and the merging of the participants’ data (that is, 
the individual tailoring mentioned above). 
2e The survey for the advisers was administered between April and June 2013. It was re-opened 
in 2014 to allow advisers who attended the Stage 6 workshop to participate. The invitation to 
participate in the survey was sent to advisers by email. Reminders were sent to advisers 
between two and four weeks after the initial invitation. 
The survey instrument for the counterparts (suitably modified from the advisers’ survey) was 
initially administered in a similar manner to the advisers’ with the initial invitation sent by 
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email in May 2013. However, the response rate was low and a considerable number of email 
addresses proved to be out of date. The project team passed on the list of problematic email 
addresses and contact details to EPSP in August 2013 to determine if they could find more up 
to date contacts; this resulted in only one or two more responses. EPSP then attempted in 
September 2013 to contact possible participants by telephone to encourage further 
participation, this proved to be unsuccessful. Next, in December 2013, at the suggestion of a 
counterpart during a focus group, past advisers who had completed the survey were asked to 
contact their counterparts and request they participate in the survey; this resulted in one or 
two more participations. Finally, counterparts who attended the Stage 6 workshop in April 
2104 who had not completed the survey were asked to participate in it, this resulted in two or 
three more responses. 
The survey data for both the advisers and counterparts were downloaded into MSExcel for 
analysis to produce descriptive statistics. Qualitative data was analysed using a grounded 
approach to identify any trends or themes in the data. 
2f Analyses of the data were undertaken for matters to be included in interviews (Stages 3 and 4) 
and for evidence to be included in the validation process (Stage 5). The comprehensive survey 
analyses, and the development and design of tables, graphs etc., were conducted for the final 
report (Stage 6). 
STAGE 3  
3a Based on RQs 1, 3, 6 and 7 (advisers), RQs 2, 4, 6 and 7 (counterparts) the questions for semi-
structured interviews were developed for those who had completed their AC placements by 
2012. This process also incorporated matters from 1c and 2f above as subsidiary questions for 
particular interviews (See Appendix C for interview structure). 
3b The interviews were conducted, usually by Skype or telephone, between May 2013 and 
September 2013. Some were conducted in person in Port Moresby, and a few counterparts’ 
interviews were conducted in small groups due to difficulties in arranging telephone 
interviews. 
3c The interview notes were entered into NVIVO for coding and analysis. 
3d The interview data were analysed initially for matters to be included in interviews of current 
advisers and counterparts (Stage 4) and later for evidence to be included in the validation 
process (Stage 5). The final interview analyses were prepared for inclusion in the final report. 
STAGE 4 
4a This stage was based on focus group work with advisers and counterparts who were active on 
AC projects during 2013. In May and November focus group interviews with advisers and, 
separately, counterparts were held. These interviews addressed RQs 1–5 for the May focus 
group interviews and 1–7 for the November group interviews, and incorporated relevant 
matters from 1c, 2f and 3d (see Appendices D and E for interview structure).  
4b  Between the May and November focus groups, the project team conducted individual 
interviews with advisers by Skype or telephone. These interviews were focused on further 
responses to the initial interview questions based on their subsequent experience in their AC 
projects. Also, opportunity was given for other relevant matters to be raised. The interviews 
addressed RQs 1, 3, 6 and 7 and incorporated relevant matters from 1c, 2f and 3d. It was 
intended to interview counterparts, but it proved impossible to do so 
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4c All focus group and interview notes were entered into NVIVO for coding and analysis. The data 
were analysed initially for matters to be included in the validation processes (Stage 5) and 
then for the final report (Stage 6). 
STAGE 5  
5a In April 2014, in consultation and collaboration with EPSP, this stage comprised a validation 
workshop held in Port Moresby comprising key stakeholders from GoPNG, DFAT, EPSP and 
other programs to consider key issues arising from the available data and evidence from the 
study. The participants were presented with a summary of the research and some selected 
data around five key themes that arose from the analyses which contained contradictions, 
dilemmas etc. Using a group process, each theme was addressed by the participants and 
matters to do with evidence, conclusions and recommendations. A plenary discussion was 
held of each group’s outcomes. This process addressed RQs 7, 8 and 9 (See Appendix G and H 
for details of the workshop).  
5b The groups provided their notes of their views on their particular issue which were then typed 
and entered into NVIVO for analysis. Notes were taken of the plenary discussion which were 
then typed and entered into NVIVO for analysis. These analyses were incorporated into the 
final report. 
5c Focus groups and interviews were held with senior PNG government staff to determine their 
views on the usefulness of adviser-counterpart placements. (See Appendix F for details of the 
interviews). 
5d A meeting was held with DFAT in Port Moresby (teleconferenced to DFAT Canberra) to discuss 
the key issues. The participants were presented with a summary of the research and some 
selected data around five key themes that arose from the analyses which contained 
contradictions, dilemmas etc. Notes were taken on the meeting and incorporated into the 
final stage (Stage 6) of the project. 
5e Meetings were held with EPSP staff to discuss the selected data around the five key themes 
that arose from the analyses which contained contradictions, dilemmas etc. Notes were taken 
on the meetings and incorporated into the final stage (Stage 6) of the project. 
5f A later meeting was held with DFAT in Canberra to discuss the key issues. The participants 
were presented with a summary of the research and some selected data around five key 
themes that arose from the analyses which contained contradictions, dilemmas etc. Notes 
were taken on the meeting and incorporated into the final stage (Stage 6) of the project. 
STAGE 6  
6a Final analyses of all data were undertaken in terms of the RQs. A draft report was prepared by 
September 2014 and sent for checking for accuracy, etc. 
6b This final report was completed in November 2014, and launched in Port Moresby and 
otherwise disseminated thereafter. 
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3 Analysis of data 
Section 3 presents data from the research and analyses related to the main sets of research 
questions as discussed in section 2.3 above. Data from each of the research methods and stages are 
marshalled together to address the questions and provide the evidence for answers thereto. Section 
4 draws on the evidence and analyses here to discuss the implications of the findings and to elicit 
recommendations for improvement. 
3.1 Advisers’ views of their placements’ success 
3.1.1 Introduction 
This section addresses two main questions from the research:  
 What are the advisers’ views of the success or otherwise of their partnerships with their 
counterpart(s) in achieving their placements’ stated aims? 
 What evidence is there to support these views? 
Evidence from the online survey—both quantitative and qualitative data—the Placement 
Completion Reports (PCRs) and the interviews and focus group data is used to answer these 
questions. The survey quantitative data have been aggregated and analysed. These data and 
analyses are presented in tables and graphs, along with extracts of text (with some editing for clarity 
and to preserve anonymity) in the written text. Seventy-eight PCRs (submitted between 2006 and 
2012) were searched for advisers’ views contained in their responses to the PCR question ‘Would 
you rate your placement as very successful, successful or limited in terms of achieving its planned 
outcomes?’ In addition, other statements in the advisers’ reports, interviews and focus groups 
reflecting their effectiveness or success in specific areas of activity are reported here. 
Section 3.1.2 presents the advisers’ ratings on various measures (such as Terms of Reference [ToRs]) 
related to the success or otherwise of their placements, followed by their comments in the survey, 
the PCRs, interviews and focus groups.  
Section 3.1.3 considers the various kinds of evidence reported by advisers across the 
aforementioned data sources as supporting their ratings; this evidence was also used to incorporate 
in the research activity reported later in Section 4.6. 
3.1.2 Views about success 
The online survey of the 2006–2012 completed AC placements contained questions concerning the 
success or otherwise of these placements. The ToRs for a placement are fundamental to assessing its 
success as it is the ToRs that underpin each placement’s aims and outcomes. Table 3.1.2.1 presents 
the advisers’ ratings of the appropriateness of the ToRs at the beginning and end of their 
placements. They scored their responses on a five-point scale from 1 (highly inappropriate) to 5 
(highly appropriate). It shows a high mean rating (4.18) at commencement, dropping noticeably by 
completion to a mean of 3.65.  
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Table 3.1.2.1 Advisers’ rating of the appropriateness of their ToRs on commencement and 
completion 
Item Mean 
Highly 
appropriate 
or 
appropriate 
N 
At the time you accepted the placement 4.18 97% 33 
Upon completion of the placement 3.64 67% 33 
 
Figure 3.1.2.1 Percentage of advisers who felt their ToRs were appropriate or highly appropriate at 
commencement and completion of their placement 
    
Figure 3.1.2.1 shows the percentages of advisers who rated their ToRs with the top two scores (4, 
appropriate; 5, highly appropriate) at commencement (97%) and completion (67%). This evidences 
that there was a 30-percentage point drop between commencement and completion for those 
advisers using these two highest scores.  
The survey provided the opportunity for respondents to comment on their ratings and on any 
changes in their ratings between commencement and completion. Their comments fell broadly into 
three groupings. The first, largest (67%), grouping related to those who rated their ToRs as 
‘appropriate’ or ‘highly appropriate’ at the end of the placement. Typically, these respondents noted 
that the ToRs were well-developed within the agency and with the EPSP or ASF managing 
contractors, and all parties subscribed to what was to be achieved and contributed and/or 
supported the placement. As one such respondent wrote: 
The terms of reference were developed in close consultation with the primary agency 
Counterpart, ensuring ownership from the beginning of the capacity development 
process. This provided a very strong foundation for partnership which was sustained 
throughout the placement. 
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A more common response within this category was that the original ToRs were fine but that, as 
circumstances developed, the ToRs were modified to keep them attuned. A selection of comments 
of this kind follows. 
The terms of reference could be adjusted to reflect more accurately the assistance that 
was required. 
The Terms of Reference were appropriately drafted to facilitate my initial placement, but 
also broad enough to accommodate the additional priorities identified within the 
placement extension. 
My ToRs were refined in my contract extension to reflect other capacity development 
priorities 
The ToRs were adjusted to allow a different model of engagement for my role. 
The next grouping comprised those whose ratings dropped from ‘appropriate’ or ‘highly appropriate’ 
to a lower rating. The reasons given spanned those that related to ToRs that initially appeared to be 
appropriate for the context proving not to be so once the placement had commenced, through to 
changes in circumstances, and lack of cooperation from some parties. A selection of such comments 
follows. 
ToRs should've been changed regularly due to changes in the personnel in the agency 
and also position requirements, but overall the ToRs were sufficient when I started.  
As with any job, the requirements change throughout the duration of the placement. 
Once I got into the department & better understood its capabilities and requirements, 
and had built relationships with staff and management, it was evident that some 
aspects of the ToR were lower priority for attention than others 
While the original ToRs may have been appropriate for my initial entry on duty, the 
whole ball game changed the day before I arrived in that my intended Counterpart, the 
(HoD), who had commissioned the project, was sacked and there followed a succession 
of Acting (HoDs) who had diametrically opposing agenda and, usually, different 
allegiances. 
My original ToRs encompassed the key capacity development needs in relation to 
agency management and the need for effective coordination between the Advisers and 
(senior) officer. The 2nd objective in my ToRs related to providing advice and assistance 
to the agency in implementation of the strategic and operational plans. In reality, there 
was no agency management ownership of the existing strategic plan and there was no 
operational plan. The more immediate priority was, therefore, to assist the agency to 
develop an operational plan for the initial six months. 
The final, relatively small, grouping comprised those who did not think that their ToRs (and often 
their placement) were appropriate from commencement and throughout their placement. For 
example, one respondent stated that: 
The Counterpart for the position was rarely in place in the office, therefore it was 
difficult for the ToRs to be (addressed and fulfilled).  
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Another respondent explained that: 
There were no terms of reference. Just a generic (managing agent’s) description of 
advisory roles which were not appropriate to the role in question. 
Respondents commented that the department was unrealistic about its capacities or unwilling to 
perform its part of the placement. 
There was a belief within the agency about their baseline skills and abilities that was 
probably inaccurate.  
The department did not commit to the model for development and PNG Counterparts 
were not made available. An international private company was engaged to undertake 
the work. 
In one case the enabling legislation was not passed by the PNG parliament for the duration of the 
project. 
The project had no legs at the time (of recruitment) as the legislation had not passed 
parliament.  
The above data show that, by completion, one-third of the placements had ToRs that were seen by 
their advisers to be inappropriate given the circumstances at the time. In some instances (3% of 
placements), the ToRs were seen as inappropriate at commencement, but generally the difficulties 
arose during each placement; there is some evidence that some of these difficulties could have been 
foreseen or known by the agency or the managing contractor.  
The focus group data on the ToRs reflect a similar position. Three separate adviser and three 
counterpart focus groups were held on two occasions, once in March and again in November 2013. 
Generally, the AC placements involved were in their first three months for the first focus groups and 
in their last two months for the second focus groups. In the first focus group participants were 
asked: ‘To what extent are the goals and intended outcomes of your placement realistic and 
achievable?’  
Most of the thirteen advisers involved in the focus groups were previously involved in AC 
placements. Indeed, some were now involved in AC placements that were extensions of, or derived 
from, previous placements. It was remarkable that, at this early stage of their current placements, 
none was fully convinced of the appropriateness of their ToRs. Three advisers thought that their 
ToRs were ‘doable’, but contextually limited.  
My ToRs are OK, but the context in which they operate doesn’t really fit. (A96) 
They are doable, but whether they are sustainable is another matter. There are 
problems in that ToRs are dependent on other things being done or available in the 
organisation that are not part of the ToRs. (A60) 
The ToRs are OK and doable in their own terms, if tight in terms of time. But the systems 
do not exist in the agency to support achieving the ToRs. It will cost money and 
resources to establish the systems and these are not part of the project so the ToRs are 
unlikely to be achieved. (A31) 
ToRs need to be assessed against the time available. Some of their ToRs are not realistic 
within the schedule, but are appropriate for the organisation’s needs. (A50) 
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Another, highly experienced adviser, said that he wrote his own ToRs but that, 
[i]n retrospect, given AusAID’s/Coffey’s support over the years, the ToRs could have been 
extended. (A95) 
Several advisers’ ToRs had already been modified since the commencement of their placements. 
The original ToRs were realistic but too simplistic for the complexity of the environment 
and circumstances. The ToRs have been revised subsequently. (A77) 
Some ToRs were unrealistic and infeasible. [They] were founded on two local agencies 
collaborating, but they disliked and distrusted each other so much that this could not 
occur. Eventually, a reorganisation meant that the need to collaborate was removed. 
More recently, the ToRs have evolved to be realistic. (A73) 
My ToRs changed within two weeks of commencement about four years ago, and have 
changed slightly every year with extensions and new contracts. These changes have 
reflected the prevailing circumstances and needs, and generally been mutually 
determined with agency, Coffey etc. (A62) 
There was a common view amongst the advisers that ToRs were almost always unrealistic for the 
time and circumstances. 
Some of their ToRs are good, but others are ‘big projects’ in themselves and were never 
achievable in the time. This was mentioned in the performance review and the ToRs 
were modified to be more realistic. Even the good ToRs were not fully achievable within 
twelve months. (A98) 
My ToRs are ‘pretty good’, but they were designed to save money, whereas they should 
have been aligned with providing public services effectively. At the time of my interview I 
thought the ToRs were unlikely to be achievable, but I didn’t say so…as I had not had any 
exposure to the actual conditions and management on the ground at that time, and 
perhaps also in order not to jeopardise getting the position. Following completion of my 
Baseline Analysis, my initial impressions were confirmed. I advised Coffey of my concerns 
and the financial focus was reduced, and the main aims were adjusted to a more 
appropriate strategic focus. However, some of the ToRs will take years to implement. 
(A97) 
It is naïve to assume you can turn someone into a good finance manager or whatever in one 
year when they can never be such without the systems, infrastructure and resources. (A60)  
How can I change twenty years of embedded out-dated practices?…It is hoped that shifting to 
computer-based processes may help to bring about a major shift. (A50) 
One adviser (A99) was engaged for a shorter term of less than one year, but his ToRs contained ‘a 
long list of placement outcomes’. In his view: 
…it would take several years, at least one and a half years to achieve them all. So 
basically, the intended outcomes under this placement are unachievable. (A99) 
 42 
An adviser (A100) argued that ToRs are:  
…always problematic and need to be changed or refocused after commencement. Once 
the context and circumstances are understood one tends to foreground some ToRs over 
others. 
It was believed that there was pressure on advisers to do the work for which they are expected to 
develop their counterparts’ capacities to do for themselves. 
The agency’s expectations are often that the advisers will do the work, but they are supposed 
to work alongside to advise the counterpart. My ToRs were not realistic, and they were 
interpreted differently between the agency and its counterparts, EPSP and the adviser. There 
are cultural differences in understanding what some ToRs mean. (A101) 
The ToRs provide the basis upon which the stated aims are specified for the placements. Table 
3.1.2.2 shows the advisers’ survey ratings of the extent to which the aims were met, from 1 ‘not at 
all’ to 5 ‘completely’. Commensurate with the responses on ToRs, more than two-thirds of 
respondents stated that the overall aims of the placement were fulfilled, with slightly lower 
percentages being reported for the questions about capacity development aims.  
Table 3.1.2.2 Advisers’ ratings of the extent to which their placements met the aims 
Item Mean 
Fully or 
mostly 
N 
The capacity development aims for the counterpart(s) were met 3.45 58% 33 
The capacity development aims for the 
counterpart's/counterparts' department/agency were met 
3.39 45% 33 
The placement's overall aims were met 3.78 69% 32 
 
Figure 3.1.2.2 shows the percentage responses graphically. The ratings ranged from 1 ‘not at all’ to 5 
‘fully’. It is notable that the two capacity development aims have lower scores and percentages than 
the overall aims for the projects. The capacity development aims may be understood as common 
aims for most, if not all, placements, whereas each placement also will have its own specific aims, 
for example, to develop a strategic plan or to introduce a new system or software. These aims may 
well have higher success rates because they are specific tasks to be done, which advisers may have 
largely undertaken themselves or contributed to substantially, thus increasing their likelihood of 
being fulfilled. 
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Figure 3.1.2.2 Percentages of aims met by type 
 
In order to address the ToRs and fulfil their aims, advisers were required to provide capacity 
development for counterparts, and their key agency staff (KAS) more broadly. Table 3.1.2.3 shows 
the advisers’ ratings (from 1 ‘highly effectively’ to 5 ‘highly ineffectively’) of the extent to which they 
worked effectively with their counterpart(s) and Table 3.1.2.4 shows the advisers’ ratings (from 1 
‘none at all’ to 5 ‘considerable’ a lot) of the extent to which their counterparts’ capacities were 
developed. 
Table 3.1.2.3 Advisers’ ratings of the effectiveness of working with their counterpart(s) 
Item Mean 
Highly 
effectively 
or 
effectively 
N 
How effectively were you able to work with 
counterpart(s) during the placement? 
4.34 91% 35 
 
Clearly, a high proportion (91%) of advisers rated the effectiveness of their working relationship with 
their counterparts as effective or better. Given the evidence reported in previous comments, it is 
clear that in a few instances counterparts were not appointed, or were changed, or were frequently 
absent. These circumstances are likely to contribute substantially to the nine per cent of advisers 
who rated their relationship with their counterparts as less than effective. Table 3.1.2.4 illustrates 
that the capacity development was evenly spread across several aspects of capacity development, 
with ‘knowledge’ attracting the greatest proportion (64%) of advisers’ ratings as being developed 
‘considerably’ or ‘a lot’.  
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Table 3.1.2.4 Advisers’ ratings of their counterparts’ capacity development 
Item Mean 
Considerably 
or a lot 
N 
Knowledge 3.79 64% 33 
Overall capacity to fulfil role 3.64 58% 33 
Administrative skills 3.56 50% 32 
Leadership skills 3.44 50% 32 
Professionalism 3.44 50% 32 
Other 3.33 50% 6 
 
Figure 3.1.2.3 below illustrates the data from Table 3.1.2.4 graphically. 
Figure 3.1.2.3 Percentages of counterparts’ aspects of development that were developed 
‘considerably or ‘a lot’ 
 
The above data are substantially based on the advisers’ ratings or views about the matters in 
question. The advisers were also were asked to identify any evidence to support their ratings. The 
intention was to identify any evidence that may be appropriate to incorporate in the research 
activity reported in section 4.6 below. The evidence identified is discussed in the next section, 3.1.3.  
3.1.3 Evidence of success 
It was important to establish what evidence was used by advisers to make their ratings in the online 
survey and to complete theirs PCRs. The intention was to use appropriate evidence for the fifth 
stage of the research project where key GoPNG and other informants would be used to verify 
selected evidence of capacity development. In the online survey several areas were identified in 
which capacity development was typically required in AC projects and participants were asked to 
rate the extent to which there was identifiable evidence of success in each area. Table 3.1.2.4 lists 
these areas and shows the mean rating (1= no evidence, 5=considerable evidence), and also the 
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percentages of advisers who identified ‘considerable’ or ‘substantial’ evidence in the nominated 
areas. Figure 3.1.3.1 shows this latter feature graphically. 
Table 3.1.3.1 The extent to which advisers identified evidence of success by area 
Area Mean 
Considerable 
or 
Substantial 
N 
Planning 3.87 68% 31 
Training and mentoring of your counterpart(s) 3.81 65% 31 
Improved understanding of role and function 3.75 59% 32 
Improved collaboration 3.61 58% 31 
Improved procedures and processes 3.65 58% 31 
Restructuring 3.46 54% 31 
Manuals and/or checklists produced 3.50 53% 31 
Reporting 3.50 50% 32 
Systems improvement 3.43 50% 31 
Stakeholder relations 3.58 48% 31 
Policy 3.47 43% 31 
Transparency 3.00 43% 30 
Management 3.45 42% 31 
Information dissemination 3.40 40% 31 
Change in work culture 3.16 39% 31 
Service delivery 3.21 36% 30 
Sustainability 3.20 27% 30 
Accountability 3.10 26% 31 
Budgeting 3.04 26% 3030 
Public service ethic 2.83 23% 30 
Performance management 2.72 21% 31 
Impartiality 2.67 17% 30 
Other, please specify 3.00 0% 4 
 
Table 3.1.3.1 shows that planning (68%), training and mentoring (65%) and improved understanding 
of role and function (58%) were the areas where the highest percentages of advisers were able to 
identify evidence of success. In contrast, impartiality (17%), performance management (21%) and 
public service ethic (23%) were the areas where the lowest percentages of advisers were able to 
identify evidence of success. It is likely that these latter areas may be the lowest because they were 
areas of least success (hence, there was less evidence) or that they were areas in which evidence 
was difficult to obtain due to the subjectivity of the matters, such as ‘impartiality’. Sustainability was 
also an area that was rated low (27%) for the identification of evidence. This is likely to be because 
the nature of sustainability may be evidenced over a long period of time, and the advisers did not 
have such time to identify the evidence (which is likely to have gone beyond their placement). 
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Figure 3.1.3.1 Areas in which advisers identified evidence of success 
 
The data presented above were complemented by the evidence collected from the PCRs (they are 
also complemented by evidence obtained in the adviser interviews and the focus groups). In these 
reports, 57 advisers (73%) rated their placements as ‘successful’ or ‘very successful’, eleven advisers 
(14%) rated some of the aspects as successful and others less so, nine advisers (12%) rated their 
placements as of limited success, and only one adviser rated their placement as ‘unsuccessful’. 
Those advisers (73%) that rated their placements as successful or better fell into three 
approximately equal-sized groups: 
The first group expressed the view that their placements achieved positive outcomes with regard to 
at least 75 per cent of their ToRs (alternatively expressed as ‘planned outcomes’ or ‘deliverables’). 
Typical comments from these advisers were as follows.  
Very successful as I have achieved all objectives set out in my ToRs and also considering 
the Counterparts’ positive and encouraging feedback. (A22, 2012) 
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Largely, very successful as the ToRs have been completed to a large extent. (A14, 2007) 
The second group rated their placements as successful or very successful for similar reasons as those 
above, but expressed concern about the sustainability of the success following their departure. 
Sustainability was questioned for various reasons, predominant amongst them: the inability for 
changes to be embedded into organisational practice prior to the completion of the placement; the 
fact that plans, policies or procedures formalised throughout the placement had not yet been 
implemented upon the departure of the adviser; and, the fact that, for operations occurring on an 
annual basis there had only been time to complete one cycle within the timeframe of the placement. 
Typical comments from this group follow.  
Overall, I would rate the placement as successful in terms of achieving its planned 
outcomes. There are significant achievements, but the achievements are fragile. (A19, 
2007) 
I would rate it as successful, however much more work would have been required to 
institutionalize it. (A10, 2006) 
On some matters, such as the Three Year Training Plan, they were heavily involved in the 
development of the plan, gathering data and identifying key training priorities. They still 
lacked ownership of the completed plan and have yet to commence working towards the 
activities identified. (A13, 2006) 
The third group rated their placements as successful to varying degrees, given the ‘limits and 
constraints’ faced in the agency. Their typical comments were as follows.  
 I think that I would describe my placement as reasonably successful, given the 
constraints facing the Division. In view of those constraints I don’t think I could have 
achieved much more. (A63, 2012) 
Successful given these constraints: significant skill/knowledge gap between the existing 
and the requisite level, especially in terms of rational thinking and analytical ability; 
unwillingness of key Counterpart to engage in activities; lack of staff commitment; high 
staff absenteeism; high staff turnover; and lack of support from the Deputy Secretary 
and Secretary. (A67, 2012) 
Despite being described tentatively as successful by this final group of advisers, the rationales they 
provide are similar to the nine advisers (12%) who rated their success as ‘limited.’ They typically 
distinguished between achieving their placements’ stated aims and the broader goal of capacity 
building.  
I would critically rate the placement as ‘limited’ in terms of achieving the planned 
objectives and outcomes primarily because they (outcomes and objectives) were created 
based on an inaccurate assessment of existing capacity and achievement in the agency 
and because their ultimate delivery was heavily dependent on a reasonable level of 
support from the Secretary, which was never realised. (A3, 2006) 
In terms of the planned outcomes specifically aligned to the work plan I’d rate my 
placement as limited to successful. In terms of the broader requirement to increase 
overall capacity to understand and undertake public sector procurement for GoPNG, for 
those groups that I managed to reach, I’d rate the placement as very successful. (A18, 
2007)  
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From the 2006–12 PCRs, it appears that approximately 50 per cent of advisers viewed their 
placements as achieving their placements’ stated aims, while the remainder reported limited success 
when ‘success’ is measured solely as achieving the explicit placement outcomes, with one adviser 
rating their placement as unsuccessful. 
Table 3.1.3.1 and Figure 3.1.3.1 showed specific areas where advisers were able to identify evidence 
of success. Analysis of the 2006–12 PCRs provides further data on some of these areas, such as 
policy development or service delivery. These provide nuanced interpretations of the achievement 
of ToRs and the success of placements from the advisers’ supporting evidence. The remaining 
discussion focuses on evidence of success in specific areas of activity for those advisers who rated 
their placements as of limited success or better. These areas are: planning; policy development; 
systems development/improvement; service delivery; improving procedures and processes; training 
and mentoring; and human and organisational capacity building.  
3.1.3.1 Planning  
A total of 67 advisers recorded success in improving planning within their agencies, while 14 
indicated that they had achieved limited success in this area. The combined total is 81 (from the 78 
reports analysed) because a few advisers indicated success in one area of planning and limited 
success in another. In their comments advisers focused on two aspects of success in planning: the 
formulation and/or implementation of specific plans and improvements in planning processes more 
generally.  
The most straightforward evidence provided by advisers was the listing of specific plans that had 
been developed and/or implemented throughout the course of the placement: corporate, strategic, 
operational and annual plans. In some cases, evidence of successful plan formulation was buttressed 
by the ratification or endorsement by the relevant authority, or by the plans contributing to agency 
success in securing additional funding for projects or achieving on-time budget submissions and 
appropriations. Some advisers were concerned that while plans had been successfully formulated 
they were yet to be implemented. 
With regard to improvements in planning processes, the evidence offered by advisers was largely 
anecdotal. Further, the advisers’ ratings of success covered a range of achievements, reflecting the 
differing levels of agency planning capacity at the commencement of their placements. For agencies 
in which planning processes were non-existent, the observation that staff now formulate and use 
plans to guide their own and/or organisational activity, or place more emphasis on planning, was 
used as evidence of success. Where minimal planning was occurring, staff periodically reporting 
against projected outcomes or incorporating performance indicators into their plans constituted 
evidence of success. The next stage of success was evidenced by observations that staff members 
achieve projected outcomes as a result of improvements in planning processes. The lower the initial 
level of planning capacity the greater the concern on the part of advisers that improvements in 
planning activity would not be sustainable beyond the placement period. This was particularly the 
case for one-year placements, where new activities, such as annual planning, were not open to 
iteration and advisers were unable to observe whether agency staff could repeat the activities with 
minimal adviser assistance. 
When commenting on the potential sustainability of improvements in planning capacity, advisers 
tended to link positive forecasts of sustainability (i.e., ‘success’) with: 1) the institution of planning 
processes that were as broadly collaborative as possible; 2) the creation of manuals and templates 
to guide future planning activities; 3) observations that staff were able to complete planning 
activities with minimal adviser assistance; and 4) observations that staff understood the rationale for 
planning in terms of achieving organisational goals and implementing strategies. 
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3.1.3.2 Policy development 
Fifty-five advisers recorded success in policy development, while twelve recorded limited success. 
Similarly to planning, advisers focused predominantly on the successful formulation of specific 
policies throughout the placement and improvements in policy development processes more 
generally.  
As with planning, the most straightforward evidence offered was the enumeration of specific 
policies formulated throughout the placement or, alternatively, the realms of activity for which 
policies had been created where previously no policy had been in place. Seventy-five per cent of 
advisers reporting success in policy development listed the specific policies to support their claims. 
Fifteen per cent of advisers also reported success in the review and improvement of existing policies. 
A number of advisers (about 15%) offered additional evidence as to the effectiveness of the policies, 
by noting that they had resulted in cost savings or improvements in service delivery, transparency in 
general, or in specific tasks such as recruitment or financial management. A further 10 per cent of 
advisers noted success in undertaking comprehensive needs analyses where activities in the 
placement period had not progressed to the actual drafting of policy. 
In terms of reported improvements in policy development processes more generally, just over 20 
per cent of advisers reported the successful development and implementation of robust and 
comprehensive policy development frameworks (including standardised processes and procedures), 
often noting the concurrent development of manuals, guidelines and templates to support the policy 
development process and ensure consistency and sustainability. A similar number reported 
successes in improving processes for the implementation of policy, including as evidence the 
establishment of monitoring and evaluation frameworks, the establishment of committees, the 
institution of appropriate planning methodologies and the successful pursuit of legislative changes 
to support policy initiatives. 
A comprehensive statement of policy development within a placement follows. 
Volunteers from within either the KAS team or other Branch staff, formed working 
parties made up of [Agency] staff from throughout the agency, to examine the policy 
issue from the various [Agency] perspectives. KAS or Branch staff drafted the policies 
and circulated them throughout the agency, often several times, to receive feedback on 
them. This feedback was then incorporated into the documents until a final version was 
produced. Endorsement from all senior executives was obtained before the policy being 
signed off by the agency head. This same process has been used for all policies and has 
worked extremely well. [Branch] staff now know how to use working parties, how to 
research and draft policies and get policies to the point of executive endorsement. They 
have also learnt about the implementation of such policies in terms of dissemination of 
them, the conduct of awareness sessions or training and how there is also a need to 
determine whether any systems or processes need to be revised or developed to support 
the policy. 
Evidence of this is recorded in weekly minutes recorded during the meetings, e.g., 
increase in the number and expediency of disciplinary actions, policing of bonded staff 
on external studies and the development of stringent guidelines for the determination of 
sponsored external studies. Further evidence is shown in the final entitlements 
determination for contract staff who fail to comply with their contracts. Policy guidelines 
were used to update records in relation to dependants’ airfare entitlements. (A35, 2008) 
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From a capacity building perspective, approximately 15 per cent of advisers reported that 
the KAS could now undertake policy development independently, by virtue of their having 
participated in a comprehensive and sustained policy development process, such as that 
described above. In addition to skills acquisition, advisers noted attitudinal changes in 
counterparts to the effect that they: appreciated the role of broad consultation and 
collaboration in the policy development process; understood the role of policy in 
implementing legislation; and accepted the need for the critical assessment of current 
practices and monitoring and evaluation to support policy implementation. These advisers 
believed that KAS had gained sufficient and sustainable skills in policy development via 
their participation in tailored training and mentoring exercises. 
Similarly to planning, some advisers expressed concern that policies created throughout 
the placement had not yet been formally adopted or implemented, or noted limited 
success in terms of compliance and/or enforcement of compliance. Time was also a 
concern, to the effect that processes had not yet been ‘embedded’ prior to placement 
completion and remained in a fragile state of development.  
3.1.3.3 Service delivery 
Fifty-five advisers reported success in improving service delivery, whereas 17 advisers reported 
limited to no success in this area. Some of the strongest evidence in support of advisers’ views of 
success was provided in this area, given that it is an activity open to quantitative measurement 
(turnaround times etc.) and with finite measurable outcomes, the beneficiaries of which are often 
external to the agency. 
A very strong example of externally-sourced evidence for improvement in service delivery was 
provided in the following example: 
An independent review provided to AusAID in 2007 confirmed improved service 
performance of the Agency as part of a case study undertaken during the review of the 
ASF program. A report to the Central Agencies Coordinating Committee in 2007 (as 
relayed by Deputy Secretary Corporate Services) noted that over the last five years the 
Agency had moved from having one of the worst financial administration service 
performance records to now being ‘in the top 5’. (A36, 2008) 
In addition to formal measures, such as those mentioned above or, for example, feedback 
surveys completed by end-users, many advisers noted informal measures of improvement 
in service delivery, such as, general positive feedback or acknowledgement from 
customers, increases in client numbers, and/or increases in requests for assistance from 
associated agencies. 
In terms of quantitative measures, the most often mentioned metric was improvement in 
turnaround times in fundamental departmental activities, for example, recruitment, often to the 
point where service delivery standards were now being consistently met. This kind of improvement 
was occasionally expressed indirectly as a marked reduction in backlogs. In other cases advisers 
noted an increase in the quantity of services being delivered (for example, courses or condoms) 
and/or an increase in the quality of services provided (for example, ‘now in line with international 
humanitarian standards’).  
Anecdotal evidence was also offered for improvements in service delivery, with advisers noting the 
success of training in enhancing client service skills and/or the customer-focus of agency staff. 
Where the baseline level of customer-focus was non-existent or low, improvement was noted in the 
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form of a developing responsiveness to customer and/or stakeholder requirements. Occasionally, 
this involved increasing the awareness of support staff of their roles as ‘internal service providers’ 
supporting the core business of the agency. Again, where baseline levels were low, the caveat was 
often added that advisers could not attest to whether improved skills/awareness on the part of 
agency staff, or improved policies and procedures, would actually translate into sustained improved 
service delivery.  
Just as the evidence in support of substantial improvements in service delivery was some of the 
strongest provided, this category also elicited some of the strongest statements with regard to 
limited or no success. In these cases, reference was often made to factors outside of the adviser’s 
control, such as inadequate information systems or the withholding of approval from higher 
authorities with regard to reforms or actions on individual cases. For example: 
The simple answer is ‘no’. Service delivery is closely linked to the information available in 
the [Agency Information System], and investigations have found that data to be at least 
60% incorrect and the system open to error and illegal activity. Until GoPNG treats the 
replacement of [this system] as a priority very little can be done in this regard although 
there has been some discussion relating to redesign of customer service areas and 
functions nothing has yet emerged. (A3, 2006) 
Where advisers had been unable to personally witness improvements in service delivery standards, 
the majority remained sceptical that such improvements would occur subsequent to their departure. 
3.1.3.4 Systems development/improvement/implementation 
In terms of improvement in systems, 65 advisers reported successful outcomes, while 12 advisers 
reported limited success. Again, due to differing baseline levels of existing capacity, evidence of 
success ranged from the successful completion of comprehensive systems needs analyses and 
reviews of existing policies and procedures, to the complete development and implementation of 
integrated, agency-wide, ICT systems, including hardware, software and the completion of relevant 
staff training.  
Where success involved the establishment of comprehensive information management, sharing and 
reporting systems (approximately 30% of advisers recording successful outcomes), including the 
relevant infrastructure and training, evidence of success—in addition to the existence of the ICT 
system itself where previously there was none—was presented in the form of: 
1) The improved integration of agency activities resulting from improved communication 
capacities and information-sharing systems, and the associated improvements in efficiency 
and intra-agency processes whereby outputs from one division serve as inputs to others, 
including the systematisation of relevant agency-wide processes and procedures. For 
example: 
The [Agency] has significantly enhanced its administrative capacity over the 
past 12 months with the implementation of a calendar for planning 
meetings and other workplace activities. All of the [Agency’s] electronic files 
are now on a common network and all staff have been working to 
progressively move files onto this network and organise them into a 
commonly agreed structure. More systematic processes were introduced for 
storing and sharing data on our computer network. (A11, 2006)  
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2) Demonstrated improvements in functions reliant upon effective information management 
systems, such as, the production of timely quarterly reports and bank reconciliations, 
improvements in planning and related outcomes, the successful integration of previously 
disparate activities (for example, planning and budgeting or planning and implementation), 
and improvements in operational response times, turnaround times, etc. For example:  
The previous accounts system was obsolete, supplier and invoice info not 
maintained, journals and adjustments (cancelled cheques, credit notes, vote 
corrections, etc) unable to be processed, expenditure reporting not possible 
until an end-of-month update was completed, cheque printing regularly 
failed, financial delegation and certification of claims poorly exercised, and 
poor supporting documentation for payments. Supplier payments are now 
processed effectively and efficiently. Supplier information and payment 
history available online, reports available when required, posting to the 
general ledger undertaken effectively, reconciliation of accounts (e.g. 
suspense and clearing accounts) cost centres and votes undertaken and 
journals and adjustments completed as required. Delegations are exercised 
appropriately and supporting documentation is held for payments. Work 
Instructions for supplier payments, cheque cancellations and credit note 
processing are available on the desktop, and the Account Officer can 
undertake all accounts payable tasks competently. (A31, 2008) 
3) Demonstrated improvements in monitoring and evaluation capacities in the form of, 
transparent audit trails, increased transparency of processes and procedures in general, 
increased accountability resulting from electronic records tracking user activities and the 
clearer articulation of roles and responsibilities, and increased capacity for performance 
management due to the institutionalisation of centralised record-keeping. For example: 
The processing of the payroll has become efficient and transparent with the 
inclusion of batching systems and audit systems as part of the fortnightly 
payroll process. (A36, 2008) 
Where advisers did not specifically note that system-dependent functions or maintenance were now 
able to be fulfilled independently by KAS (few advisers noted this explicitly), the predicted 
sustainability of efficient system utilisation was supported by noting the existence of manuals, 
templates and guidelines relating to policies, processes and procedures.  
A smaller number of advisers (approximately 25%) working at the division level, noted similar 
improvements to those mentioned above, albeit on a smaller scale. In these cases, rather than 
agency-wide ICT systems, advisers noted the successful development and implementation of division 
databases, and presented evidence for their usefulness of a similar nature to that presented above. 
This was also the case where advisers noted success in improving or modifying existing systems 
(approximately 15%). On occasion the effectiveness of improvements was supported by anecdotal 
evidence to the effect that KAS and other staff were simply more inclined to use the system than 
had previously been the case. 
Other measures of success were offered in the form of simple statements to the effect that business 
processes had been successfully reviewed as a preliminary step toward the development of new or 
improved systems (in one case the success of this process was specifically quantified in the form of 
the statement:  
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The business process review has been undertaken and the true number and complexity 
of [Agency] process has begun to be documented, in particular to support the 
implementation of new systems. A simple set of 13 process maps existed when the 
placement began. Now 65+ processes have been identified, some with up to 50–60 sub-
processes, and many are now properly documented at 100+ pages each. (A43, 2010) 
Sometimes statements named the systems that were successfully planned and developed 
and were awaiting implementation.  
Where advisers reported ‘limited success’ in the realm of system improvement, the fundamental 
concerns expressed were that: proposals or improvement initiatives lacked either funding or the 
support of senior management or had failed to gain final authorisation; and/or that the sustainability 
of improvements was vulnerable due to inconsistency in implementation by staff and the absence of 
an adviser to ensure compliance and the embedding of reforms.  
3.1.3.5 Training and mentoring 
While the vast majority of advisers indicated at least some level of success in the training and 
mentoring activities undertaken throughout the course of their placements, this category was the 
most variable (almost one-third of advisers reported views of both ‘success’ and ‘limited success’ in 
this category). The primary reason was that training and mentoring activities were often spread over 
a range of KAS and other agency staff and, due to individual styles, propensities, abilities and levels 
of interest, often achieved mixed results. This category was also one of the least amenable to the 
provision of evidence of success when viewed in a general sense (although much can be gleaned by 
noting improvements in the other areas of activity outlined previously in this report, each of which 
entailed at least some level of training and mentoring).  
Consequently, the bulk of the evidence offered for general successes in training and mentoring was 
anecdotal, based largely on observations made by advisers with regard to the developing abilities of 
KAS and other agency staff. In the cases where verifiable data were offered, these invariably related 
to training successes only. For example, advisers were able to list specific training programs or 
workshops that had been undertaken in direct fulfilment of specific ToRs (almost 50% of advisers 
reporting success in training). Where the effectiveness of training was the subject of comment, only 
a few advisers were able to offer hard evidence, for example, by reference to the results of a 
periodically undertaken “Skills and Abilities Audit” (A33, 2008) or other measurable results, for 
example: 
The pass rate for staff undertaking CPA exams in first semester 2008 was 60% - a 
significant increase on the pass rate for semester 2, 2007 (39%) which can be directly 
attributed to the training and study support initiatives. (A41, 2008) 
With regard to demonstrating that training and mentoring occurred in line with ToRs, the bulk of 
advisers’ comments revolved around the enumeration (in part or in full) of the specific kinds of skills 
and knowledge that was imparted during training (around 75% of advisers reporting success in 
training) and mentoring (around 80% of advisers reporting success in mentoring) activities. 
Approximately 25 per cent of advisers reporting success in training referred to training activities that 
had occurred in conjunction with the implementation of new systems and policies within the 
placement period, with a handful referring to the concomitant production of manuals and/or 
templates. 
In terms of the anecdotal evidence of the effectiveness of training and mentoring, there is some 
qualitative difference that appears to reflect the difference in the form of the interpersonal 
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relationships underpinning the two activities. For example, almost 30 per cent of advisers reporting 
success in mentoring noted observed changes in counterparts’ overall attitudes, behaviour and 
confidence as evidence of success (as opposed to 10% with training). Almost 25 per cent of advisers 
noted the counterparts’ willingness to approach them independently for advice as a measure of 
mentoring success (as compared with one adviser with regard to training). Almost 20 per cent of 
advisers reported that counterparts were now able to independently complete specific work 
functions as a result of mentoring, as opposed to 10 per cent of advisers commenting on the 
effectiveness of training. Nevertheless similar numbers of advisers (around one-third for both 
training and mentoring) reported observing their counterparts apply the skills and knowledge 
imparted to their work activities, and increase their functional effectiveness thereby, as evidence of 
success in training and mentoring activities. A smaller number (around 10%) reported positive 
counterpart or staff feedback as anecdotal evidence of success in both training and mentoring.  
As stated earlier, approximately one-third of advisers reported mixed results arising from training 
and mentoring activities. Generally speaking, the reasons given for limited success arose from either 
the unavailability of staff to attend training/mentoring sessions (due to prolonged absences, poor 
attendance, difficulty fitting in additional activities on top of existing workloads, or a lack of qualified 
appointments) or the failure of trained staff to subsequently apply their training in the workplace 
(due to lack of willingness, lack of support from senior management, or a generally unsupportive 
work environment). The constraint of available time given low baseline abilities was also mentioned. 
These factors will be considered in further detail when discussing impediments to success in section 
3.5 below. 
3.1.3.6 Human capacity building 
As there is a significant human capacity building component in all of the areas of activity treated 
thus far, this section focuses primarily on the qualitative nature of comments made by advisers 
when indicating success specifically in this area. There are, not surprisingly, significant similarities 
between advisers’ views regarding success in training and mentoring and in capacity building more 
generally. In total, 68 advisers reported some level of success in capacity building in terms of 
imparting ‘soft’ skills, while 57 reported successes in terms of ‘hard’ skills acquisition. Further, as 
with training and mentoring, while most advisers indicated some level of success in capacity 
building, the evidence offered in support of their views was largely anecdotal.  
Nevertheless, the broader goals of capacity building, which tend to encompass the ‘whole person’ 
rather than merely the skills the person acquires, are reflected in the comments accompanying 
advisers’ views of success. It appears that in capacity building (as distinct from skills/knowledge 
transfer) advisers are looking for a perceptible transformation in the way counterparts act in and 
respond to their work situations. This view is typified in the following adviser statement. 
For me success as a trainer/mentor is not simply the imparting of skill and knowledge – 
true success comes when the learner can adapt the learning across a wide variety of 
situations. While I am unable and would not presume to claim the total person [my 
Counterpart] as a personal success, because there was so much potential already in 
place, I can confidently state that under my influence I have seen, and had others state 
that they have seen, [my Counterpart] grow into a most impressive, respected leader 
and role model. [My Counterpart] has grown to the point where I am now learning from 
him how to better adapt the principles demonstrated to many different and confronting 
PNG situations. (A3, 2006) 
Reflecting this broader view, advisers tended to place additional emphasis on attitudinal factors 
when assessing successes in capacity development. Indeed, approximately two-thirds of advisers 
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specifically commented on their counterparts’ or other agency staff’s improvement in terms of 
confidence, commitment and professionalism in the discharge of their daily duties when reporting 
capacity building successes. Taking the initiative, presenting confidently in organisational or broader 
public forums, seeking out additional responsibility, or even challenging senior management were all 
seen as indicators of success. For example: 
Through networking with other government agencies and IT vendors, [my Counterpart] 
has also established himself as a competent and confident manager who is proud of his 
work and his team. His staff respect him for his knowledge and assertiveness. He is able 
to deal with IT vendors with confidence and courage, and can demand and articulate 
arguments for quality service. (A22, 2007) 
This more encompassing view is also reflected in advisers’ focus on more expansive areas of 
knowledge transfer, most commonly articulated in terms of counterparts’ greater ‘awareness’ 
and/or ‘understanding’ of the larger context of their activities. Again, almost two-thirds of advisers 
linked counterparts’ greater understanding of the broader organisational context and objectives, 
how their roles and the roles of other divisions contributed to the functioning of the organisation as 
a whole, and how organisational activities fit into the broader objectives of the government with 
successes in capacity building. For example:  
Middle managers have improved their awareness of the linkages between planning, 
implementation and monitoring although this awareness has yet to be applied 
consistently. The Secretariat has a much broader understanding of how monitoring and 
evaluation can be used to improve public service performance at a whole-of-government 
level as well as at an agency level. (A5, 2007)  
In another vein, an adviser speaks of: 
Building an awareness, especially at Council level, but also across a critical mass of 
senior staff, of the importance of both systemic and interpersonal relationships to the 
effective performance of organisations, and the need to manage for these two driving 
attributes, not allow them to simply drift as by-products of daily management. (A29, 
2008) 
As stated above, capacity building successes were often linked with the acquisition of specific skills 
via targeted training and mentoring. There was a pronounced tendency with advisers to link 
successes in this area with specifically process-driven forms of skill and knowledge acquisition (50 
per cent of advisers reporting such success in capacity building). While this has been the case in 
other areas discussed (see 3.1.3.2 for a discussion of policy development process-driven skills and 
knowledge transfer), when mentioned in a capacity building context these examples are often 
supplemented with observations as to: the positive team-building effects arising from participation 
in these processes; the increased appreciation for both consultation and the need to review existing 
practices; the positive effects of ensuring counterpart ‘ownership’ of outcomes, and of enhancing 
transparency and accountability. For example: 
A multidisciplinary team was formed for the implementation of the payroll and members 
researched and prepared a proposal for the implementation of a computerised payroll 
system. This team process lead to significant capacity building in terms of consultation, 
inclusion of peers, learning of systems and review of internal processes. (A46, 2010) 
Indeed, if capacity building objectives are to be achieved, such forms of process-driven learning are 
considered fundamental:  
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…the restructure initiative was approached and supported entirely from a capacity 
building perspective. This often led to timelines not being achieved but ensured 
ownership, accountability, and understanding; allowing for the [Department] Manager 
to play a key leadership role. (A46, 2010)  
Moreover, over a third of advisers who saw process-driven learning as fundamental to capacity 
building focused specifically on the process of organisational or systems/processes review. For 
example: 
The administration and ground staff group have had capacity built by becoming involved 
in the organizational review. They were exposed to the review process and asked to 
contribute their thoughts on the various Human Resource processes existent at [the 
Agency]. Their capacity was clearly built in understanding how the review was being 
undertaken and how the organizational structure must support the goals and mission of 
[the Agency]. (A54, 2010) 
Clearly, this is linked to the generation of a broader awareness among staff as to how the 
organisation operates and the role of each staff member and each department. Approximately one-
third of advisers stated that KAS were now able to fulfil their roles independently or with minimal 
adviser assistance, while over half noted an increased ability in KAS to fulfil their organisational 
roles. For example,  
Improvement of staff skills is clearly evidenced by the quality of their audit work and 
documentation produced following my CD activities since August 2010. (A67, 2012)  
Productivity has improved. The reorganization of roles and responsibilities, the 
separation of duties and the initiation of performance and development plans has given 
each officer a better understanding of their role and the impact that delays or errors can 
have on other staff and the organization. There is a concerted effort to help each other. 
(A29, 2008)  
Occasionally, it was noted that significant promotions or advancements of KAS, or their successful 
application for private sector jobs, were evidence of successful capacity building.  
3.1.3.7 Organisational capacity building 
In a similar fashion to human capacity building, success in any or all of the previous categories could 
be used to underpin an assessment of success in building organisational capacity. As the PCRs did 
not contain a question that specifically addressed organisational capacity (they asked about ‘capacity 
building’ more generally) this subject is not addressed directly by all advisers. Of the advisers who 
did comment in some way on organisational capacity building, 41 indicated that they had achieved 
successful outcomes, while four reported limited success.  
The variety of successful activities that could form the basis for assertions of success in 
organisational capacity building is reflected in the variety of reasons given for these assertions. 
Around 20 per cent of advisers cited the successful development and implementation of information 
management systems as the basis (or one of the bases) for improvement in organisational capacity 
more generally. Around 15 per cent cited the production of manuals, guidelines and standardised 
templates as one of the bases for their assessments of improved organisational capacity. Following 
this, around 10 per cent of advisers listed one or more of the following reasons as one of the bases 
for their positive assessments: the implementation of a long-term training plan or program; the 
improvement in procedures and processes within the agency/department; and the successful 
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creation of intra- or cross-agency networks for information sharing. Just under 10 per cent cited: 
agency staff’s improved understanding or awareness of the context of their role; an increase in 
budget appropriations resulting from improvement in budget processes; and the introduction of 
strategic management plans or other operational frameworks. Despite the divisions made here, 
statements made by advisers were often quite comprehensive, incorporating a number of the 
factors outlined above. 
Two examples of adviser statements that encompass many of these individual factors follow. 
[The Department] now has a detailed Plan in place which is being actively implemented 
to ensure the management of its newly devolved powers are in compliance with the 
legislation. It is has a dedicated team that is across all areas of Devolution and is 
charged with managing all matters arising therefrom. It has trained its managers in the 
requirements of this new environment. It has sought its own legal advice to ascertain its 
true legal position and developed a strategy to manage any potential ramifications. It 
has developed guidelines and procedures to assist its managers comply with the new 
provisions. It is establishing Committees (e.g., Recruitment and Selection, Discipline, 
Training) to ensure transparency and compliance in practices. [The Department] is well 
placed in successfully managing the change to a devolved environment and in ensuring 
this success is sustainable – as long as support and leadership from the most senior 
levels of the organisation continues. (A48, 2009) 
Organisational capacity development: Project and program management templates, 
manual, methodologies and model; Improving purchasing approaches and 
contract/price negotiation skills; Improved understanding of [Agency] and Government 
purchasing process; Improving vendor and contract management skills; Enhanced 
understanding of project & program management concepts including project 
management disciplines and documentation requirements; Improved ability to work 
together as organizational representatives in identifying and delivering on corporate 
goals; Improving understanding of the need to develop a project ownership and work 
culture improvement amongst all staff; Improved understanding for the need to ‘know 
our business’ and of the role of information technology as an enabler of business 
improvement not an owner. (A43, 2010) 
As indicated in the previous quotes, building organisational capacity necessitates changes in 
organisational culture incorporating the kinds of attitudinal shifts discussed in section 3.1.3.6 above, 
yet extended throughout the whole department or agency. Of the four advisers who specifically 
reported on limited successes in organisational capacity building, two based their comments around 
the lack of success (often due to time constraints) in promoting this systematic change. 
In the placement period, the Adviser considered it necessary to get a few structural 
issues attended to, like the development and introduction essential policies and 
procedures, conducting training and attempting to create a cultural shift towards 
complying with procedures, especially on procurement, when none had been followed, 
as there were none to follow. This culture shift was bigger than developing KAS capacity, 
as it related to developing the Agency’s capacity to do it. While the seeds of this shift 
have been planted, and has had some success, the lack of leadership and support from 
senior management has resulted in bringing limited success to the broader culture shift. 
(A37, 2008) 
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In addition, the limited impact an adviser is able to have at the purely Branch level and the low 
level of baseline capacity met upon commencement of the placement were mentioned. These 
aspects will be discussed more fully when addressing the impediments to project success. 
Advisers were asked in their interviews what they believed their counterparts learned during the 
placement. In particular, they were asked: what are the three most significant examples/pieces of 
evidence of success from your placement(s)? Given that capacity development was a strong part of 
almost all the placements, one may expect that some of the examples were about what 
counterparts learned to do. Due to confidentiality concerns, it is not possible to provide some of the 
best examples of learning as they readily identify the people and agencies involved. What follows 
are some examples that are more general in nature or that have been de-identified. 
An adviser (A75, 2008) believed that she and the other two advisers achieved a lot in the 
eighteen months when she was there. There was big shift from technical process 
training in financial management of people and to a competency-based training 
approach in the agency. In the last nine months they developed a CBT-based capacity 
development plan that was endorsed by the Executive, they established an advisory 
committee to monitor and advise on the plan, and they developed one CBT module. They 
recruited staff, moved to another office (which took a lot of Adviser action). The agency 
was reorganised so that it was aligned better with its functions (A75 2008) 
Another adviser (A39, 2008) believed his biggest evidence of success occurred the day he saw the 
counterpart ‘dressing down an angry highlander’ which he saw a ‘quantum leap’ for such a mild-
mannered man. He also noted improvements in the administration of training, reports were 
submitted on time, as were other documents, certificates, etc. Furthermore, ‘the administration of 
training was hugely improved over the two or three years and this had still been the case as of last 
year’ (A39, 2008). 
Some advisers pointed to an array of changes. 
1) The development of the national (specified) framework which has been implemented 
across a number of government departments, to the point that it might be called 
institutionalised. 2) The director was moving along with all the changes. (A70, 2008) 
1) The recruitment training, while I’m unsure how sustainable it will be they had 
received a lot of positive feedback around moving to merit-based recruitment and 
opening people’s eyes to various recruitment techniques. 2) General team-building skills 
have changed with weekly meetings and broadening out the way the department sees 
and structures their work planning. (A50, 2010)  
The next Section (3.2) deals with the counterparts’ experiences of the matters addressed in 
this section. 
3.2  Counterparts’ views of their placements’ success 
3.2.1 Introduction 
This section addresses two main questions from the research:  
 What are the counterparts’ views of the success or otherwise of their partnerships with their 
advisers in achieving their placements’ stated aims? 
 What evidence is there to support these views? 
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Evidence from the online survey—both quantitative and qualitative data—and the Adviser 
Performance Appraisals (undertaken by counterparts) is used to answer these questions. The survey 
quantitative data have been aggregated and analysed. These data and analyses are presented in 
tables and graphs, along with extracts of text (with some editing for clarity and to preserve 
anonymity) in the written text.  
Data were obtained and analysed from 91 counterparts’ Adviser Performance Appraisals (APAs) for 
placements completed between 2006 and 2011 (no such appraisals were available for 2012). 
Seventy-four counterparts completed a total of 91 reports as some completed two or more 
placements. Each report is treated as a single counterpart’s report. The APAs differed from the PCRs 
completed by the advisers. The APAs were not completion reports but rather were administered 
during the placement. They are not, therefore, necessarily the final views of counterparts reflecting 
on the entirety of their partnerships with advisers. They are also less comprehensive than the PCRs, 
comprising either four or five questions, depending on the year they were administered. Also the 
APAs do not enumerate, nor do they specifically ask for, counterparts’ views of progress towards the 
placement’s stated aims or for any evidence of such achievements. 
Data are also included from the focus groups with counterparts. 
3.2.2 Views about success 
The online survey of the 2006–2012 completed AC placements contained questions concerning the 
success or otherwise of these placements. As noted in 2.1.2, a placement’s ToRs are fundamental to 
assessing its success because the ToRs underpin each placement’s aims and outcomes. Table 3.2.2.1 
presents the counterparts’ ratings of the appropriateness of their ToRs at the beginning and end of 
the advisers’ placements. As with the advisers, they scored their responses on a five-point scale from 
1 (highly inappropriate) to 5 (highly appropriate). The data show a high mean rating of 3.9 at 
commencement, dropping slightly by completion to a mean of 3.7, in comparison with the greater 
reduction in the advisers’ equivalent ratings from 4.18 to 3.64. 
Table 3.2.2.1 Counterparts’ ratings of the appropriateness of their ToRs at commencement and 
completion 
Point in placement Mean 
Highly appropriate or 
appropriate 
N 
Beginning of placement 3.9 64% 14 
End of placement 3.7 62% 13 
 
Figure 3.2.2.1 below shows the percentages of counterparts who rated their ToRs with the top two 
scores (4, appropriate; 5, highly appropriate) at commencement (64%) and completion (62%). This 
shows that there was only a two-percentage point drop between commencement and completion, 
whereas in Section 3.1.2 it was reported that advisers had a thirty-percentage point reduction, 
although from a much higher commencement percentage of 97%. It is notable that on completion 
counterparts (62%) and advisers (67%) had fairly close agreement in their use of these two highest 
ratings. The explanations are discussed further below in section 3.2.3. 
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Figure 3.2.2.1 Percentages of counterparts who rated their ToRs as highly appropriate or 
appropriate 
 
The survey provided the opportunity for respondents to comment on their ratings and on any 
changes in their ratings between commencement and completion. Most respondents’ comments 
were that their views about the ToRs were unchanged: 
My opinion about the Terms of Reference did not change from the beginning to the end.  
My opinion about the Terms of Reference did not change.  
The ToRs were consistent throughout the period. 
One counterpart noted that there had been change to the ToRs during the period (which, 
presumably, meant that his rating did not change): 
The ToRs were changed to suit the inclusion of activities in a new structure that was 
created by the agency. 
Another exemplified the type of difficulties that personnel changes make to AC placements: 
I just stepped in for my director and have no idea about the ToRs or any formal 
documents  
The ToRs provide the basis upon which the stated aims are specified for the placements. Table 
3.2.2.2 shows the counterparts’ ratings of the extent to which the aims were met, from 1 ‘not at all’ 
to 5 ‘completely’.  
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Table 3.2.2.2 Counterparts’ ratings of the degree to which the placement aims were met 
Item Mean 
Fully or  
considerably 
N 
The capacity development aims for you were met 4.0 77% 13 
The capacity development aims for your 
department/agency were met 
4.2 92% 13 
The placement's overall aims were met 4.3 92% 13 
 
Nearly all respondents (92%) rated the placements’ aims as being fully or considerably met, both in 
the overall sense and for the agency’s capacity development. Notwithstanding this, the proportion 
of counterparts who thought that the aims for their capacity development were met was lower at 77 
per cent. This may reflect the capacity substitution element of a placement contributed by an 
adviser to an agency helping to achieve the overall and agency aims. Figure 3.2.2.2 shows the 
responses graphically by percentages for the type of aims (counterpart, agency and overall). 
Figure 3.2.2.2 Percentages of counterparts’ rating that the placement aims were met fully or 
considerably 
 
Arguably, the most important aspect of aims being met is the effectiveness of the relationship 
between the counterpart(s) and their adviser. Table 3.2.2.3 shows the counterparts’ ratings (from 1 
‘highly effectively’ to 5 ‘highly ineffectively’) of the extent to which they worked effectively or not 
with their adviser. 
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Table 3.2.2.3 Counterparts’ ratings of the effectiveness of working with their adviser 
Item Mean 
Highly 
effective 
or 
effective 
N 
Effectiveness of working relationship with adviser during 
the placement. 
4.7 100% 12 
 
The data are unequivocal here that the counterparts’ mean rating (4.7) of the effectiveness of their 
working relationship with their adviser was ‘highly effective’. Given that almost all else in a 
placement depends on this relationship, and that 91% of advisers (see Table 3.1.2.3) also gave a very 
high mean rating (4.34), this suggests that, between 2006 and 2012, the people at the heart of the 
placements have been working very effectively with each other. Given the cultural and other 
differences, this seems to be an outstanding feature. This is borne out in the c statements in their 
online survey responses. Some examples follow. 
I was able to work very effectively with the Adviser during the placement. We 
understood each other very well particularly in relation to the roles we played in our 
work. She understood her role as an Adviser and there was no 'role conflict' in our daily 
work. In addition, there was always very good communication and understanding 
between the Adviser and me.  
The advisor knew her role and advised accurately on my work outputs. I was very 
comfortable to relate with her in all matters of my role.  
I worked with two different ASF Advisers. The relationship with me, the top 
management and staff was great.  
I had a very good working relationship with the Adviser. We understood each other well 
and there was no 'role conflict' in relation to work performance.  
I saw the placement as an opportunity for me and it was highly effective because I have 
learned much from the Adviser. Not so much on a technical level but on the 
management level, capacity building and hands-on training/multitasking in the work 
place.  
With regard to what was achieved for counterparts as a result of such working relationships, Table 
3.2.2.4 shows the counterparts’ mean ratings (from 1 ‘none at all’ to 5 ‘considerable’ a lot) of the 
extent to which they rated that their capacities were developed. 
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Table 3.2.2.4 Counterparts’ ratings of the improvement in capacity development achieved through 
their advisers 
Item Mean 
Considerable 
or a lot 
N 
Other 4.4 88% 8 
Knowledge 4.2 85% 13 
Overall capacity to fulfil role 4.2 77% 13 
Administrative skills 3.9 77% 13 
Leadership skills 4.0 77% 13 
Professionalism 4.2 77% 13 
 
Table 3.2.2.4 illustrates that the capacity development was evenly spread across several aspects of 
capacity development, with ‘knowledge’ attracting the greatest proportion (85%, excluding ‘other’) 
as being developed ‘considerably’ or ‘a lot’; this was also the case with the advisers’ ratings (see 
Table 3.1.2.4). 
Figure 3.2.2.3 shows the counterparts’ rating of their achievements in relation to particular aspects 
of their knowledge and skills. The ratings show in all cases between 70% and 90% of counterparts 
rated the various aspects of their development as either ‘considerably’ or ‘a lot’. 
Figure 3.2.2.3 Percentages of counterparts’ rating they achieved a ‘considerable’ or ‘a lot’ of 
improvement in capacity development through their advisers 
 
The counterparts’ additional comments in the online survey reflected not only the data above in 
Table 3.2.2.4 and Figure 3.2.2.3 but also showed some of the specific areas in which they gained 
capacity. Three particular examples are below. 
(I increased my) ability to deal with other agencies of Government in relation to the 
specific area that I was dealing with together with the Adviser.  
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(I learned to make) a difference in difficult situations and manage difficult 
communications at different levels and importance of people.  
We really built our confidence in ourselves (Counterparts) and were able to undertake 
the (work) function in a more professional manner.  
A related matter was the extent to which the counterparts rated the capacity development in their 
agencies as a result of the placement. Table 3.2.2.5 shows the counterparts’ ratings for such 
development (1 = not at all to 5 = considerable) against particular aspects of their agencies’ work. 
Table 3.2.2.5 Counterparts’ ratings of development in specific areas from working with the adviser 
in the agency 
Area Mean 
Considerably 
or a lot 
N 
Policy development 4.4 100% 13 
Policy implementation skills 4.2 100% 13 
Planning and/or plan implementation 4.3 92% 13 
Administrative activities 4.1 85% 13 
Other 3.8 80% 5 
Overall capacity to fulfil role 4.2 77% 13 
Professional responsibility 4.2 77% 13 
 
Again the mean ratings (apart from ‘other’) are around the threshold of ‘considerably’ (4<) with 
policy and planning aspects also having the highest percentages (92% to 100%) of ratings 4 and 5. 
Figure 3.2.2.4 illustrate the percentage ratings graphically. 
Figure 3.2.2.4 Percentages of counterparts’ rating ‘considerable’ or ‘a lot’ of development in 
specific areas from working with the adviser in the agency 
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The above data are substantially based on the counterparts’ ratings or views about the matters in 
question. As was done with advisers, the counterparts were asked to identify any evidence to 
support their ratings. The intention was to identify any evidence that may be appropriate to 
incorporate in the research activity reported in section 4 (below). The evidence identified is 
discussed in the next section, 3.2.3.  
3.2.3 Evidence of success 
It was important to establish what evidence counterparts believed would support their ratings and 
comments in the online survey and their APAs. As noted previously, appropriate evidence was 
required for the fifth stage of the research project where key GoPNG and other informants would be 
used to verify selected evidence of capacity development. In the online survey several areas were 
identified in which capacity development was typically required in AC projects and participants were 
asked to rate the extent to which there was identifiable evidence of success in each area. Table 
3.2.3.1 lists these areas and shows the mean rating (1 = no evidence, 5 = considerable evidence), and 
also the percentages of counterparts who identified ‘considerable’ or ‘substantial’ evidence in the 
nominated areas. Figure 3.2.3.1 shows this latter feature graphically. 
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Table 3.2.3.1 Counterparts’ rating of extent to which there was evidence of success and/or 
improvement by area 
Item Mean 
Considerable 
or 
substantial 
evidence 
N 
Information dissemination 4.4 92% 12 
Policy 4.2 92% 12 
Production of manuals and/or checklists 4.1 91% 11 
Planning 4.3 91% 11 
Service delivery 4.2 91% 11 
Stakeholder relations 4.3 91% 11 
Transparency 4.6 91% 11 
Systems 4.2 90% 10 
Accountability 4.2 83% 12 
Change in work culture 4.3 83% 12 
Collaboration 4.3 83% 12 
Staff understanding of their role and function 4.3 83% 12 
Your training and mentoring 4.3 83% 12 
Performance management 4.1 82% 11 
Procedures and processes 4.2 82% 11 
Impartiality 4.2 82% 11 
Public service ethic 4.1 82% 11 
Reporting 4.5 82% 11 
Sustainability 4.0 82% 11 
Restructuring 4.1 80% 10 
Budgeting 4.1 73% 11 
Management 4.2 73% 11 
Other 4.0 50% 2 
 
Table 3.2.3.1 shows the extent to which counterparts identified evidence of success; it is the 
companion to Table 3.1.3.1 for advisers. Comparing the results between these tables, it is clear that 
counterparts consistently provided higher ratings than the advisers on each measure and that the 
percentages of counterparts rating as ‘considerable’ or ‘substantial’ are also consistently higher. 
Every mean rating and percentage is higher for counterparts than advisers. The counterparts’ mean 
ratings are all on or above the threshold (4<) for ‘considerable’. This suggests that the counterparts 
were of the view that success generally had been close to considerable across all areas, and that 
there was evidence to show such. Figure 3.2.3.1 illustrates that the areas the highest percentages of 
counterparts rated as ‘considerable’ or ‘substantial’ were ‘information dissemination’ (92%), service 
delivery (91%), transparency (91%) and stakeholder relations (91%); the respective percentages for 
advisers for these areas were 40 per cent, 36 per cent, 43 per cent and 48 per cent. The areas that 
the lowest percentages of counterparts rated as ‘considerable’ or ‘substantial’ were ‘budgeting’ 
(73%), ‘management’ (73%) and ‘restructuring’ (80%). The equivalent percentages for advisers for 
these areas were, respectively, 26 per cent, 42 per cent and 54 per cent. In contrast, the lowest for 
advisers were ‘impartiality’ (17%), ‘performance management’ (21%) and ‘public service ethic’ 
(23%).  
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Clearly the discrepancies between advisers and counterparts are marked both by the degree to 
which they can identify evidence for success, and in the areas in which they rate lowest and highest. 
The mean rating (excluding ‘other’) for counterparts was 4.2 (slightly above ‘substantial evidence’) 
and 3.2 (slightly above ‘some evidence’ for advisers). The differences may be explained by the 
counterparts being more clearly aware of what the agency was like before the AC placement and 
what it was like at the end of the placement. It is likely that the advisers’ ratings are shaped partly by 
what they understand as good practice from an Australian or international perspective. The 
differences may also be explained by differences in what advisers and counterparts see as important 
areas of success, and also what they see as constituting evidence of success.  
Figure 3.2.3.1 Percentage of counterparts rating ‘considerable’ or ‘substantial’ evidence of success 
by area 
 
The data presented above are complemented by the evidence drawn from the counterparts’ APAs. 
The first question in the APA asked: ‘What is your assessment of the progress of the ASF placement 
in your agency over the last few months?’ This question was modified with the introduction of the 
EPSP program to: ‘Overall, what is your assessment of the Adviser’s performance progress over the 
past twelve months?’ In addition, both forms of the question asked counterparts to indicate a rating 
of either ‘Excellent’, ‘Very Good’, ‘Good’, ‘Fair’ or ‘Poor’ and requested comments on their ratings.  
Of the 91 APAs reviewed, 50 counterparts rated their adviser as ‘excellent’, 31 as ‘very good’, three 
‘good’, three ‘fair’ and two ‘poor’. Of the 84 counterparts (92%) who gave their advisers ratings of 
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good or above, the explanatory comments supporting the ratings focused primarily upon two 
categories: 1) the strengths and personal qualities of the adviser; and 2) the activities undertaken as 
part of the placement, or their effects. Approximately 60 per cent of comments focused upon the 
former category, while the remainder focused on the latter.  
In terms of the advisers’ strengths and personal qualities, counterparts connected their positive 
assessments of the placements with (in descending order of number of references made in the 
comments sections), the adviser’s: ability to form good working relationships (20%); demonstrated 
knowledge and experience in the field (18%); the quality and relevance of advice (16%); being 
‘always available’ and working beyond ‘the call of duty’ (16%); being cooperative and supportive 
(10%); exemplifying good communication, spotting weaknesses, thoroughness, consultative, a ‘team 
player’ and being fair and just (each <10%). 
When focusing on activities or their effects, eight counterparts (17%) referenced the placement’s 
stated aims by commenting that the meeting of planned outcomes was progressing well or was ‘on 
target’. Six counterparts (13%) noted that their own skills had improved. There were four references 
(each <10%) made to improved procedures, four assertions of improved performance output, and 
four general comments to the effect that the counterpart believed they were ‘getting a lot out of’ 
the adviser being there. Three counterparts commented on a positive change in organisational 
culture that had occurred as a result of their advisers’ activities and approaches.  
The five low ratings were accompanied by two comments that the adviser does not teach but rather 
‘does’ (C21, 2007; C36, 2010), one comment that the adviser should do less advising and more 
‘doing’ (C74, 2011), one that the adviser lacks understanding of the PNG public sector (C45, 2008), 
and another attributing lack of progress (with another AC placement in his department) to the 
absence of a clear counterpart to work with (C32, 2008). The remaining discussion in this section 
considers the specific areas where counterparts identified evidence of success. 
As counterparts were not required to discuss specific areas of activity/development addressed in the 
course of the placements in their APAs (whereas advisers were so asked in their PCRs), the 
categories discussed here are those for which more than 20 per cent of counterparts independently 
mentioned some level of success. These categories are: planning and/or plan implementation; 
training and mentoring; and human capacity building (or the acquisition of skills and/or knowledge). 
A further category of ‘gender equity and equality’ is also discussed, as counterparts were asked to 
provide ratings in the APAs on this from 2009. 
3.2.3.1 Planning and/or plan implementation 
In total, 25 of the 91 counterparts mentioned some level of success in this category. By far the most 
frequently occurring comments (50%) pertained to specific plans that had been formulated, revised 
or implemented in the course of the placement, for example, Counterpart C52 (2009) said, ‘We [will] 
have our Corporate Plan 2010-2014 finalised soon’. Around 25 per cent of counterparts mentioned 
improvements in planning/plan implementation processes or frameworks, while a similar number 
mentioned improvement in planning skills more generally. For example, ‘I have learnt a lot in terms 
of planning and organising all strategic issues. This has helped me a lot with my responsibilities to be 
delivered effectively’ (C44, 2011). In terms of limited success, one counterpart noted their 
‘disappointment’ that the plans developed had not yet been formally approved by the Board (C33, 
2007). 
A counterpart (C77) reported in a focus group that his agency’s strategic plan was a definite 
indicator of success from the placement. The plan is used to shape future work and actions. She 
claimed that there are key things to do with their reporting now which are much better. They have 
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asked for the adviser to return for follow-up activities and this led to a short-term contract to make 
several brief visits. 
3.2.3.2 Training and mentoring 
Twenty-two counterparts referred to success achieved through the mentoring they received, while 
19 referred to their success from training activities. When reporting mentoring successes, 
counterparts most often commented on the quality of the adviser’s advice: ‘[The adviser] has given 
advice on all financial aspects and the department has improved ever since his attachment’ [C61, 
2011]. Some made broader statements about the overall quality of the adviser as a mentor and the 
gains they have reaped from the mentoring, of which some examples follow. 
[The Adviser] has worked with me and my staff as a coach and mentor on broader issues 
than procurement. By improving our communication skills, management skills, public 
speaking skills, research skills and even negotiation skills we have all become more 
proficient and have more confidence. (C17, 2007) 
During the 12 months [the Adviser’s] work performance was excellent. She was my 
regular coach and mentor whenever I encounter situations where I was unable to 
immediately address. I personally learnt a lot from her. From [the Adviser’s] regular 
coaching and mentoring to me, I personally improved on my communication skills both 
written and oral, presentation skills, report writing skills, policy formulation, training 
needs analysis skills, planning, leadership and managerial skills. (C63, 2011) 
The Adviser is an excellent mentor. I had no problem working with him and in fact have 
learnt much from his professional approach to work and problem solving approaches. 
(C58, 2011) 
When reporting on training successes, the most common response (over 50% of counterparts 
reporting success in training) was to list the specific training activities that had been conducted by 
the adviser. For example, [the adviser] conducted an in-house training on the interpretation of the 
Actuarial reports’ (C14, 2007). Where specific training activities were not mentioned, more general 
comments praised the skills of the adviser. 
[The Adviser] has worked extensively with my staff to refine and deliver training to 
provinces and departments. Everyone, and each province that spends time training with 
[the Adviser] provides great feedback and wishes for him to spend more time with them, 
and their workplaces. This is a testament to the high value that we all find in him and his 
ability to improve our capacity. (C17, 2007) 
In addition there were two counterparts who reported limited success in training and mentoring, 
one citing insufficient attendance by staff (C9, 2006) and another reporting that they ‘could not think 
of any’ skills or knowledge they had gained from the adviser (C45, 2008). 
3.2.3.3 Human capacity building 
The data for this category were mostly taken from counterpart’s answers to the third question on 
the APA: ‘What skills/knowledge have you developed during the time spent with the Adviser in the 
last few months?’ Under the EPSP program, this question became: ‘What are the main skills and 
knowledge that you have developed during the time spent with the Adviser in the past 12 months?’ 
In total, 53 counterparts noted the development/acquisition of technical skills in the course of the 
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placements, while 66 noted the development/acquisition of management skills. The majority of 
responses were made in the form of lists, such as: 
• Skills/knowledge of coming up with a policy document  
• Knowledge of putting together a work plan for my section  
• Effective communication and listening skills  
• Presentation skills (C42, 2008) 
Given the absence of explicit reference to the placements’ stated aims, it is not possible to ascertain 
the counterparts’ views of success in light of these. Therefore, for the purpose of answering this 
question, all assertions of successful skills and knowledge transfer are taken to reflect at least some 
success in human capacity building. Furthermore, given the absence of any firm ‘evidence’ to 
support these assertions, the most prudent approach is to report the most common types of skills 
and knowledge deemed to have been successfully acquired by counterparts. 
3.2.3.4 Technical skills 
In terms of technical skills acquisition (53 of 91 counterparts, or around 60%), the most often 
mentioned were essential skills required by the counterpart to fulfil their day-to-day work functions, 
for example: 
• Data inputting in the Concept system and [Agency] intranet 
• Accessing information from Concept system and [Agency] intranet. (C26, 2007) 
Within this category, around half of the counterparts itemised specific measurable skills (such as 
completing bank reconciliations or learning to operate new ICT systems) related to their workplace 
roles. Alternatively, counterparts mentioned the acquisition of general skills, such as, computer skills 
(around 15% of the 53 counterparts), or more expansive skills such as the ability to develop plans 
(20%) and policies (<10%). 
Counterpart C78 commented in a focus group interview, that as a result of what he learned during 
the placement his report/audit writing skills are now sufficient for him to produce reports/briefs of 
evidence suitable for prosecution. This represented an important improvement for him and the 
agency in the conduct of its work. 
3.2.3.5 Management skills 
Almost three-quarters of counterparts mentioned the acquisition of one or more management skills 
as a consequence of their ASF/EPSP placements. In descending order of occurrence, counterparts 
mentioned improvements in: communication skills (20%); analytical skills (20%); people 
management skills (18%); presentation skills (18%); strategic thinking skills (15%); time management 
skills (14%); leadership skills (12%); and general increased confidence (12%). Other skills mentioned 
by counterparts included: interpersonal skills, decision-making, problem-solving, and skills in 
teamwork/team-building. 
Occasionally, commentary as to skills acquisition was extended to improvements in general 
productivity or the fulfilling of organisational functions. 
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A variety of skills and knowledge were transferred to many of us in the…Division. 
However the highlights would be that we are able to strategically manage the 
[Agency’s] governance framework and reporting requirements better and meet 
reporting requirements that we previously could not and at the same time valuable 
advice on how to streamline our work was also taken on board. (C67, 2011) 
In the counterparts’ group interview, Counterpart C88 acknowledged that he learned a lot 
about the management of ICT in the organisation. He had been a technical person 
previously focused mainly on systems use. He learned about supervising staff, planning, 
and developing and implementing policy. He said that before his placement ‘he didn’t like 
policy, but now I appreciate it’.  
3.2.4 Gender equity and equality 
From 2009, a question was added to the APA that asked counterparts to comment on the adviser’s 
attitude and behaviour concerning gender equity and equality. This question was:  
What is your assessment of the Adviser’s attitude and behaviour on gender equity and 
equality? (i.e. equal participation of both men and women in meetings, discussions and 
decision making). Please rate the adviser and provide comments as well. 
Forty counterparts responded to this question, 38 gave their advisers ratings of ‘good’ or better, the 
majority of whom rated them as ‘excellent’. Two counterparts gave ratings of ‘fair’, one stating that 
they were not sure of the adviser’s attitude (C36, 2010), and the other stated that the adviser had 
‘only participated in meetings related to gender’ (C74, 2011). 
Examples of comments accompanying ratings of good or above are: 
[The Adviser] always ensures that there is equal participation in the workplace. [The 
adviser] supports the HRM branch staff in ensuring there is equal distribution of 
opportunities available in all processes and decision making. (C72, 2011) 
The Adviser’s attitude and behaviour on gender equity and equality has been admirable 
and is of high standard. Gender equality in PNG is something we are struggling to be 
acquainted with and to see the role model of the adviser gives us the challenge on how 
we should treat each and every one equally. (C70, 2011) 
In all meetings and during other discussions that we carry out in the organization 
whether it be IT related or other general discussions, [the adviser] has proven himself to 
be equal to both men and women. During our ITC meetings we also invite women to 
participate. (C57, 2010) 
The next section (3.2) considers the advisers’ strategies and approaches that they used to achieve 
their AC placements’ aims. 
3.3  Advisers’ strategies and activities adopted to enable their counterparts’ 
learning 
This section addresses the following research questions:  
 What strategies were adopted by advisers to enable their counterpart(s) to learn what was 
required to fulfil their placements’ aims? 
 How did the advisers learn about or develop such strategies? 
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As for the previous sections (3.1 and 3.2), evidence from the online survey—both quantitative and 
qualitative data—the PCRs, interviews and focus groups is used to answer these questions.  
Sections 3.3.1 and 0 report survey data and section 3.3.2 reports PCR data. 
3.3.1 Strategies and activities used by advisers to enable counterparts’ learning 
Table 3.3.1.1 below presents the online survey data concerning the types of activities that the 
advisers used as the means to help their counterparts learn and improve their knowledge and skills, 
that is, to develop their human capacities reported in sections 3.1 and 3.2. Figure 3.3.1.1 expresses 
these data graphically.  
Table 3.3.1.1 Activities used by advisers to help their counterparts’ learning 
Item N 
Mentoring 32 
Observation of adviser activities 28 
Workshops 27 
Role-modelling 25 
At-desk training 24 
Structured learning 19 
Other 13 
 
Figure 3.3.1.1 Activities used by advisers to help their counterparts’ learning 
 
Table 3.3.1.1 and Figure 3.3.1.1 show that, of the advisers responding to the survey, 32 used 
mentoring as a means to help their counterparts learn to develop their capacities in the placements. 
Indeed, the majority of advisers used most of the nominated activities or strategies. With the 
exception of ‘structured learning’ and ‘workshops’, all the means used are ones that are often used 
in workplace-based situations to foster learning related to ‘doing the job’. Some of the advisers 
elaborated on the strategies they used, as follows. 
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One of my key roles was to provide a forum where my Counterpart could openly discuss 
ideas and where I could provide suitable options/solutions. 
I did a piece of work the first time and then subsequently I did less and less and got them 
to do more and more. A good example would be writing plans and reports. 
Mentoring is, in my opinion, a long-term formal relationship where mentors model 
behaviours on, discuss issues and plan the mentees’ activities and future path. 
Once capacity had clearly been developed, I used a hands-off, more observational 
approach and provided guidance when needed and QA/editorial as requested. 
After working closely with my Counterpart and his senior staff on a range of professional 
activities to develop their skills, they would then present on those topics directly to other 
staff at workshops and through one-on-one training. This process gave my Counterpart 
and his senior staff 'ownership' of the issues and tools developed to address the issues, 
and proved to be an extremely effective learning technique. 
Some saw particular authentic activities as useful for learning: 
Project assignments. Shadowing. Working together on real activities. 
Fieldwork, visiting provinces and working as a team. 
Some advisers endeavoured to provide Australian experiences and networks to assist their 
counterparts to learn and appreciate contemporary best practices. Two advisers noted the following 
activities they had organised. 
Set up communication between an Australian agency and my office for placements of 
staff for on the job training in Australia. 
Organised visits to Australia: a three week work placement for one officer in a (named) 
federal government department; and two officers to attend meetings with Vocational 
Education and Training service providers. 
Table 3.3.1.2 below shows the advisers’ ratings of the effectiveness of the strategies used—from 1, 
not effective, to 5, fully effective—and the percentages of those who rated the activities as fully or 
considerably effective.  
Figure 3.3.1.2 below shows graphically the advisers’ ratings of the effectiveness of the strategies 
used. 
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Table 3.3.1.2 Advisers’ mean ratings of the effectiveness of activities for counterparts' learning 
Item Mean 
Fully or 
considerably 
effective 
N 
Mentoring 4.1 81% 31 
Other 4.0 75% 8 
Role-modelling 3.8 67% 27 
Workshops 3.8 63% 27 
At-desk training 3.6 48% 25 
Observation of your activities 3.4 45% 29 
Structured learning 3.4 41% 22 
 
Figure 3.3.1.2 Percentage of advisers’ who rated the activities of their counterparts' learning as 
fully or considerably effective 
 
There is a marked correlation between the activities most commonly used (as shown in Table 
3.3.1.1) and those that the advisers see as most effective. For example, ‘mentoring’ (or ‘coaching’ as 
some advisers preferred to see it) was the most commonly used and had the highest mean rating 
(4.1); ‘structured learning’ was the least used and was seen as the least effective, but was still rated 
as 3.4 (between ‘somewhat’ and ‘considerably’ effective’). Two advisers also mentioned other 
strategies they used that were effective. 
Working with them to achieve specific goals they had relating to their own job 
performance - so, for example, one Counterpart wished to have a unit established to 
undertake strategic planning so I worked with him to make the case for the 
Departmental CEO to approve it. 
A particularly successful technique was communal development of PowerPoint 
presentations using a data projector. As much of the work of the policy process involved 
communication, staff would often spend several days gathered around a table 
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discussing how to frame the points in each slide. This provided an opportunity to 
synthesise messages but more importantly to debate and decide policy issues. After I 
left, the organisation moved to new premises and they had a data projector installed 
into the ceiling of their conference room. I attended a number of meetings subsequently 
where they used the same approach to debate and to decide how they would work. 
3.3.2 Advisers’ strategies for developing counterparts’ learning 
Section 3.3.1 reported the relevant data from the online survey of advisers who had completed their 
placements between 2006 and 2013. There were 33 respondents to this survey. The 78 advisers’ 
PCRs for 2006-2012 were also analysed for the evidence they contained about the strategies and 
activities they used to help their counterparts learn and to develop their professional knowledge and 
skills. This section, 3.3.2 reports on these data and analyses.  
A majority of advisers expressed views that successful skills transfer and capacity development is 
reliant on the establishment of sound interpersonal relationships with counterparts, based on 
mutual understanding and trust:  
You can’t effectively build capacity if you don’t know your Counterparts, have earned 
their trust and have rapport with them. (A51, 2010) 
Your relationship is more important than successes or agreement on approaches. (A43, 
2009) 
Taking time to build relationships is paramount and critical to capacity building success, 
observing not forcing opinion and listening, earning trust and respect of Counterparts 
and always deferring recognition to Counterpart and broader team is essential if there is 
going to be any genuine capacity development. (A48, 2009) 
The key to success in a capacity development environment is partnership and strong 
Counterpart relationships. (A33, 2008) 
Advisers must demonstrate trust, honesty and integrity in order to be seen as credible in 
the work place. Relationship building is way ahead of technical know-how. (A58, 2011) 
Once such relationships are established then advisers were of the opinion that benefits and success 
accrue:  
Individual mentoring becomes progressively more effective as the relationship is 
established. (A36, 2008)  
If mutual trust and understanding is created, then the transfer of skills and knowledge 
becomes easy. (A60, 2011) 
Success [in skills transfer] occurred when trust was present and when there was a 
willingness to look at things differently and apply in a practical sense. (A56, 2011) 
Part of the relationship-building was seen to involve establishing one’s credibility as a practitioner in 
the area and as someone who could and would contribute to the task at hand. While most advisers 
agree that advisers should refrain from ‘doing the job’ in order to ensure that local capacity is 
developed, many expressed the view that a certain amount of contribution to daily work is required 
to build credibility with counterparts and local staff. 
 76 
I found that staff responded to enthusiasm as it can be infectious. They appreciate an 
Adviser getting involved, and getting their hands dirty. Of course there is always the trap 
that the staff is happy to let the Adviser do the work. The skill is in leading from behind 
and guiding and encouraging KAS and all staff to do the work. (A26, 2007) 
There is no point being an Adviser who advises but doesn’t ‘do’, I noticed improvements 
when I began to play an active role in the team’s investigations. (A63, 2012) 
Facilitating, rather than doing, is also a key factor, and in this sense, there is a need to 
‘do’ part of things to get them started. This also helped to build my credibility. (A12, 
2006) 
Develop and encourage Counterparts to do the work and experience the benefits. There 
were times when the best way forward was to lead and train by example and this had 
very positive impacts both with relationships and the development of skills. (A53, 2010) 
Part of this approach is also the adviser demonstrating to counterparts and KAS that the adviser is 
useful (rather than simply demanding). 
As indicated, the sense of the relationship between the adviser and counterpart and KAS is one of 
partnership, as distinct from that of teacher/student or expert/client. It is about ‘sharing skills and 
knowledge rather than teaching’ and making a ‘genuine attempt to learn from KAS and colleagues’ 
(A22, 2007); and using ‘coaching and mentoring skills, rather than [a] direct didactic teaching 
approach’ (A36, 2008). 
 A key factor was having an understanding of the core business of the Division and being 
able to make the learning relevant within that context. I have made a conscious effort to 
be one of the team and staff have responded well to that. I constantly use terms such as 
‘we’ and ‘our’ rather than ‘you’ and ‘your’. Performance issues have been seen as a 
problem that belongs to everyone and we have worked together to find solutions. I think 
as part of this process staff put in an extra effort rather than disappoint me! (A63, 2012) 
Most advisers believed that establishing good personal relationships early was essential partly 
because this was ‘the PNG way’ and it enabled an early understanding of the current PNG 
circumstances, from the agency to the wider polity and society. 
I used the ‘morning tea’ chats as a way of building a relaxed yet professional kinship 
with my Counterparts and my ‘open door’ policy became known very quickly. This made 
the KAS feel they were welcome at any time to drop in for a chat about nothing in 
particular, but would usually end up with some pertinent issue being discussed and 
resolved. (A36, 2008) 
Sharing an office with my key Counterpart enabled us to communicate in an informal 
manner on a daily basis. This led to us discussing issues and working on problems 
together on a daily basis. As a result my initial key Counterpart grew in his 
understanding of the General Orders and how to apply them and he gained confidence 
to draft responses without assistance. (A50, 2010) 
The range of strategies and activities used by advisers for skills transfer and training comprised: 
workshops/formal training sessions; on-the-job training (including coaching and mentoring); and, to 
a lesser extent, role-modelling. Of these, one-on-one, on-the-job training and mentoring was the 
strategy favoured by the overwhelming majority of advisers, which is consistent with the findings 
reported in the previous section 3.3.1. Generally, the rationales given for this approach were that 
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activities were directly related to day-to-day issues, and that on-one-on interaction encouraged the 
maximum engagement from counterparts and provided maximum reinforcement. 
Mentoring and coaching activities proved to be quite useful as the recipient had to be 
more involved and usually had a strong motivation to find a solution or a way to tackle a 
problem. (A25, 2007) 
A facilitative mentoring/coaching approach has been used to jointly work through 
objectives and processes so that learning can occur and those involved have full access 
to the resources. (A8, 2010) 
Due to a culture of respect for superiors and disinclination to speak up in open forums, I 
soon realized that the best environment for training was in a one on one basis. The KAS 
(and other staff) who were comfortable to engage in this process were the chief 
beneficiaries of the placement. (A1, 2006) 
Direct training is probably not so effective at the most senior levels, as most of these 
people see themselves as very experienced and knowledgeable, and therefore feel 
‘slighted’ when it is suggested that a ‘Development Plan’ be devised for them! 
Mentoring on specific issues and difficulties is probably the most effective strategy at 
this most senior level. (A44, 2009) 
 Mentoring and action learning were the strategies used to facilitate learning and 
understanding for all the staff members (Counterparts). In terms of the leadership and 
management abilities, this needed to be subtle but sure. Too strong an influence would 
be poorly received; yet consistent and clear messages regarding the value of democratic 
leadership and the importance of management that empowers and rewards staff 
performance were made on a daily basis and have proved to effectively impact upon the 
leadership and management of the secretariat. The primary recipients of more 
structured ‘mentoring’ and ‘action learning’ were the Project Implementation Managers 
and it was these staff members whose learning and development has had the most 
significant effect on the level of [program] implementation. (A65, 2012) 
One adviser made a clear distinction between mentoring and coaching. 
Mentoring is not a daily type of occurrence, the mentor is in the workplace doing their 
normal job and at the same time providing guidance or being a role model for others 
who wish to move through the organisation—it pertains to the achievement of career 
goals. With coaching, you are there, guiding and assisting and it is how you go about 
that that builds capacity…mentoring is not part of the capacity building tool-kit. While 
coaches are also role models, coaching is much more proactive; but as a mentor you can 
be reactive and still do a good job. (A39, 2008) 
Formal training was almost always used by advisers as an adjunct to their primary, daily, on-the job 
interactions. When used, advisers noted that the effectiveness of formal training was dependent 
upon: 1) the subject matter being directly relevant to counterparts’ day-to-day work; and 2) its 
content being actually transferred to/reinforced in the workplace. 
Although off the job training courses are less effective than on-the-job training, they 
play a complementary role in that any technical gaps identified in Counterparts from 
work can be rectified by providing appropriate exercise/case studies for practice or 
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underlying knowledge (e.g. use of statistical sampling or diagnostic analyses). (A67, 
2012). 
Training as such was only effective if it dealt with issues directly related to participant’s 
workplace and if they had the opportunity to practice what they had learnt. (A25, 2007) 
To ensure that learning actually transferred to the workplace I would, if necessary, go 
through a process with an individual repeatedly until they gained confidence – it may 
take 30 times and on the 31st attempt they might suddenly get it, and then retain it. 
(A31, 2008)  
During the focus groups advisers were asked: ‘What strategies have you used to develop the 
knowledge and skills of your counterpart(s)?’ It was important to understand how the advisers 
developed the capacity of their counterparts. The data show that several strategies were deployed 
to achieve these ends, and usually each adviser used two or more strategies. Modelling good 
practice was a popular strategy, because the adviser performed the task being taught, this also had a 
(sometimes unrecognised) capacity substitution element. 
I initially had five counterparts who were then eventually reduced to one (two – one 
major and one less involved). The initial approach was to model good practice by doing 
the tasks and then gradually shifting his work to the counterpart so that after nearly 
three years the latter was taking responsibility for tasks. This process worked well. (A93) 
I assessed the fit of the Counterparts to their jobs and works on those things that need 
development. Some people are very far from being the person that is required. Some 
don’t come to work, so I tried to get the management to identify people with potential 
and good values. A graduate entry scheme is proving successful because it makes the 
current staff realise that there are bright people coming in and they need to work harder 
and better to survive in their own careers. Modelling behaviour is important, and also 
mentoring. (A60) 
My ToRs include both capacity substitution and capacity development. The work team is 
good and the members are very keen, punctual and hardworking. The team is grossly 
understaffed for the work required. I work more with the team to provide advice than 
with the primary Counterpart. The primary Counterpart is the Secretary and I give him 
some advice but I am not sure if he uses it. The Secretary and Deputies to whom they 
report are committed to the agency and the changes embedded in the ToRs. The 
secondary Counterparts are keen to learn and there is regular knowledge and skills 
transfer though modelling and mentoring, in particular. (A93) 
I have a single Counterpart. We developed a work plan for us that then developed into 
an operational plan for the team. I run workshops which did not occur previously in the 
agency, although this is not formally part of my ToRs, it will help support the work. I 
work through mentoring and discussing matters with my Counterpart. (A101) 
Adviser A62 had five counterpart positions: 
One of the counterparts has done really well and mentoring and discussion has helped. 
Teams go out each day but I can’t participate due to security concerns. (A62)  
Another adviser had difficulties in that the agency had inadequate systems in place for him to model 
good practice. 
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I did an initial baseline assessment of the team’s capacity that showed that people who 
had various bits of training in the tasks did not have the capacity and confidence to 
implement these in their workplaces. The option is to train the whole department 
through workshops etc., or to focus on the individuals through modelling and mentoring. 
This is beyond working with the primary and secondary counterparts, but relates to the 
ToRs in terms of implementing the system. There is a keen interest in learning about the 
tasks, but the systems are not in place for practices to occur and for me to model good 
practice. (A99) 
Sometimes forms of direct instruction are used to develop counterparts’ knowledge, skills and/or 
values. Adviser A95 chose his counterpart by advertisement. He was seeking a woman with strong 
academic qualifications in the field. After appointment to the position, he felt that he needed ‘to 
break down her bad habits’ and ‘then rebuild her skills’. He used Socratic methods in the workplace 
to educate her. Tests and tasks were set under pressure to help develop her skills to cope with 
pressure in the future.  
Adviser A77 had several counterparts. She asserted that her main counterpart was one of the 
‘bravest’ and most sensible people she knows. Amongst the first development tasks was to teach 
him to write good English reports, ‘his reports were crap’. The adviser claimed that the counterpart 
often did things without seeking advice and sometimes he had to remedy things later, ’so learning 
was sometimes from mistakes’. The adviser is now more of a mentor ‘as the counterpart is able to 
do good work’. 
Adviser A31 provided an instance of what may be seen as an ideal working relationship. 
I have a Counterpart who is keen to work together and very grateful for assistance. There is a 
positive attitude and it looks as if the Counterpart will be able to build the agency’s strengths 
through their own sharing of knowledge and developing skills. (A31) 
An adviser reported in an interview that his approach was based on mentoring, but that 
sustainability was problematic due to the complexity of the proposed system. These things are 
based around the good relationships. His ‘nominal’ boss was a Coffey expatriate with whom he had a 
strained relationship, but he had a good relationship with the senior local in the Commission and it 
was with and through him that he managed to help the agency. He adopted a ‘positive, encouraging 
role’ ‘asking (non-threatening) questions ‘in a non-confrontational way’. ‘Sitting alongside people, 
not doing the role, but asking the right questions’ to help them (A74, 2007). 
Adviser A75 used several strategies to develop people. She ran workshops with break-out groups 
etc. so that they became involved. She noticed that her counterpart was not comfortable with 
consultation or with writing. She modelled good practice and gave him a ‘template’ for the particular 
process (writing memos, plans, etc.). ‘After about a year he seemed comfortable following the 
templates, but sustainability was not likely once I had gone’. 
Being a ‘critical friend’ was the strategy used by another adviser with her counterpart. The 
counterpart could talk to her in confidence before taking difficult decisions. ‘He had nobody else to 
do this with as the others had staff with their own agendas. As he got to know me he trusted my 
judgement’ (A16, 2007). 
Adviser A50 reported that he had an expatriate counterpart who possessed strong views. This made 
it difficult to bring about change in the department. ‘In spite of the open and positive relationship, it 
was sometimes awkward mentoring or capacity building another expatriate.’ This observation 
suggests that cultural background influenced the capacity development relationship beyond the 
 80 
actual capacities involved or required. Cultural issues represented an important feature for other 
advisers, too. 
It was important to allow my Counterparts to approach the tasks on their own in ways 
that took into account the local culture and circumstances. I think many Advisers go in 
with the expectation that their approach could be used without changing them for the 
PNG situation and this often backfires because as soon as the Advisers leave, the 
Counterparts return to their old ways with little change to show for the placement. (A73, 
2009) 
3.3.3 Advisers’ learning about teaching for counterparts’ capacity development 
Given that advisers are appointed as experts in their field to help counterparts learn to develop their 
capacities in that field, it raises the question of how advisers learn to teach, that is, to enable their 
counterparts’ learning. Table 3.3.3.1 shows the means that the surveyed advisers used to learn 
about how to enable their counterparts to learn, and their ratings of their use, from 1, not used at 
all, to 5, fully used. Figure 3.3.3.1 shows these data graphically. 
Table 3.3.3.1 Advisers’ forms of learning about strategies and activities to support counterparts’ 
learning 
Item Mean 
‘Fully’ or 
‘considerably’ 
used 
N 
Through previous experience 4.5 97% 32 
By consultation with other advisers/ASF 3.2 53% 30 
Other 3.7 50% 6 
Using a process of trial and error during the 
placement 
3.1 42% 
31 
From reading about effective capacity building 
approaches 
3.3 39% 
31 
During formal study, such as a postgraduate 
qualification 
2.6 26% 
27 
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Figure 3.3.3.1 Advisers’ means of learning about strategies and activities to support counterparts’ 
learning 
 
Previous experience was rated the most highly (4.5) with 97 per cent rating it in the top two 
categories (‘fully’ or ‘considerably’). Formal study was the least used, but as it was not asked what 
formal study people had undertaken and when, it is difficult to elaborate. There was no evidence 
during the study of an adviser specifically undertaking postgraduate study, for example, in order to 
enhance their teaching skills. The only comments made by advisers in the survey that related to 
specific learning they had undertaken for the human capacity development aspects of their 
placements were as follows. 
AusAID workshop on working with Counterparts. 
I found the Adviser workshops implemented by the ASF were useful in terms of: (i) 
opportunity to learn about a specific capacity building issue; (ii) opportunity to discuss 
experience and approaches with other Advisers. 
Observing the capacity building strategies in practice within the ASF office. 
It appears from the survey that there was little structured learning provided for advisers on how to 
‘teach’ counterparts effectively. The ‘Making a Difference’ course offered previously under the ASF 
was mentioned by some as being beneficial. For example, an adviser reported in interview that she 
‘learned through the course of the need for more informal mentoring and to put more value on 
other conversations and not just focus on statistical sampling workshops or how to process things in 
Excel or how to do a field interview’ (A69 2007). 
Advisers in one of the focus groups reported that they were provided with little advice about how to 
structure the counterparts’ capacity development. It was said that ‘there was a bit of written stuff 
provided’ but no regular support of this kind. Some advisers reported that they had useful informal 
talks on these matters with team leaders etc. 
The following section (3.4) examines what counterparts reported that they learned from their 
placements and the successes that followed. 
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3.4 The counterparts’ views of learning activities 
This section addresses the following research questions:  
 What approaches were adopted by counterpart(s) to learn what was required to fulfil their 
placements’ aims?  
 What do the counterparts believe are the main things they learned from their placement? 
What evidence is there of such learning?  
As for the previous sections (3.1and 3.2), evidence from the online survey—both quantitative and 
qualitative data, together with evidence from the focus groups and group interview are used to 
answer the questions. The counterparts’ APAs did not produce data on these questions.  
3.4.1  Counterparts’ ratings of, and preferences for, learning activities provided 
by advisers 
Table 3.4.1.1 below presents the online survey data concerning the types of activities used by 
counterparts for their learning. These activities were provided by their advisers to help them learn 
and improve their knowledge and skills, that is, to achieve the counterpart (and agency) human 
capacity development reported in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.  
Figure 3.4.1.1 expresses these data graphically.  
Table 3.4.1.1 Advisers’ strategies and activities used by counterparts for their learning 
Activity N 
Mentoring 11 
Workshops 11 
Demonstrating tasks and activities 10 
Role-modelling 10 
At-desk training 9 
Structured learning 7 
Other 4 
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Figure 3.4.1.1 Advisers’ strategies and activities used by counterparts for their learning 
 
Eleven counterparts responded to the online survey, so Table 3.4.1.1 shows that all respondents 
experienced both ‘mentoring’ and ‘workshops’ provided by the advisers. As was reported in Table 
3.3.1.1 for advisers, counterparts reported ‘structured learning’ as the least used capacity 
development activity. The counterparts offered the following comments on the activities they 
experienced. One reported that, ‘the Adviser used fully all facets of training during her tenure in the 
division.’ Others noted that there were other activities from which they learned, for example: 
Apart from workshops, [we also had] meetings and discussions about how to effectively 
implement the Department's annual work plans so that outcomes are achieved.  
[We were taught] reconciling actuals against projections and setting up simple MSExcel 
databases.  
Arguably, these activities could well have fit within one or more of the categories in Table 3.4.1.1, so 
perhaps they were merely being emphasised by the respondents. 
Table 3.4.1.2 below shows the counterparts’ ratings of the effectiveness of the strategies or 
activities that they experienced—from 1, not effective, to 5, fully effective—and the percentages of 
those who rated the activities as fully or considerably effective. Figure 3.4.1.2 below shows 
graphically the counterparts’ ratings of the effectiveness of the strategies experienced. 
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Table 3.4.1.2 Counterparts’ mean ratings of the effectiveness of activities for their learning 
Item Mean 
Fully or 
Considerably 
effective 
N 
Mentoring 4.5 100% 12 
Workshops 4.3 92% 12 
At-desk training 3.9 80% 10 
Other 4.0 75% 4 
Observation of your activities 3.9 75% 12 
Role-modelling 3.9 70% 10 
Structured learning 3.9 60% 10 
 
Figure 3.4.1.2 Percentage of counterparts who thought the activities were fully or considerably 
effective for their learning 
 
There is a marked correlation between the activities most commonly used (as shown in Table 
3.4.1.1) and those that the counterparts saw as most effective. For example, ‘mentoring’ was the 
most commonly used and had the highest mean rating (4.5); ‘structured learning’ was the least used 
and was seen as the least effective, but was still rated highly as 3.9 (almost ‘considerably’ effective). 
As was found in Section 3.2, the counterparts’ mean ratings are somewhat higher than the advisers’ 
mean ratings on the equivalent items, except one (see below). In this instance, counterparts rated 
‘mentoring’ as 4.5 (advisers 4.1), ‘workshops’ 4.3 (advisers 4.1), ‘structured learning’ 3.9 (advisers 
3.4), ‘observation of activities’ (advisers 3.4), ‘role-modelling’ 3.9 (advisers 3.6) and, the only activity 
that advisers rated more highly than counterparts, ‘at-desk training’ at 3.6 (advisers 4.0). 
Counterparts were asked in the focus groups and in the group interview about what were the best 
ways for them to develop their knowledge and skills with their advisers.  
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Only one counterpart (C77) reported working with his adviser at the beginning to identify his needs 
and then to develop a plan for fulfilling them. This contrasts with several advisers in Section 3.1.2 
who suggested that they conducted needs analyses or other forms of assessment of the capacity 
development required at the beginning of their placements. 
In accordance with many advisers, counterparts often preferred learning from their advisers 
modelling good practice and/or mentoring. 
I learned from cases that were analysed and how to deal with them in terms of the 
Public Service Act etc. So it was modelling and then mentoring. (C82) 
I find that on-the-job work and mentoring was the best. There needs to be discussion 
and consideration of strengths and weaknesses of any organisational changes in the 
ToRs. It is important to do this so that the change process can be explained and 
advocated in the organisation. (C83) 
I was an accounting and finance person who was moved to work in HR. It was necessary 
for me to learn managing people from the Adviser in order to develop in the new role. 
(C79) 
Two counterparts (C84 and C85) said that they developed models for their agencies that their 
advisers usually reviewed and commented on. They preferred this form of task-oriented mentoring. 
Another counterpart (C75) preferred talking and addressing issues together with his adviser, ‘so that 
the Adviser is not imposing things’. The counterpart stated that she makes the final decision, but 
that through the adviser she ‘hopes to get ideas and matters that [she has] not considered before 
that may help the organisation.’ Counterpart C80 learned through the co-development with his 
adviser of a workplace health policy for the agency; this was then implemented.  
Some concerns were expressed about advisers performing the required tasks rather than helping the 
counterparts to do so, or performing other tasks (beyond the ToRs) instead of supporting the 
counterparts. 
It is important that Advisers are left to work with their Counterparts to achieve the ToRs. 
They sometimes get given other tasks that detract from their contracted work. They do 
these extra things so they get their contracts renewed…Sometimes because of staff 
shortages the Advisers fill gaps otherwise the agency will not do a required task or even 
function adequately. My Adviser works with me and the team on things that we need to 
do, but the Adviser also [additionally] runs workshops to address problems for the 
agency (C78). 
Another counterpart (C81) complained that his adviser was doing too many of the tasks herself, such 
as writing letters and documents, so he and others couldn’t learn the skills. They wanted to learn the 
English language and style/genre skills and knowledge for this work but were restricted from doing 
so by the adviser’s approach. 
3.4.2 Counterparts’ views about what they learned 
Counterparts’ learning is an important element of the capacity development process and the success 
of AC placements generally (matters that have been discussed in previous sections). Here the 
counterparts specifically note things that they have learned (or are learning in the case of focus 
group participants) during the placements. Typical comments about what was learned follow. 
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I learned a lot from my adviser to do with processes and systems…I learned about 
developing policy and technical papers [that] reported to senior management. The 
Adviser was very helpful and skilful in these areas. I still meet her occasionally when she 
returns to PNG for consultancy and we have email contact. (C87) 
One counterpart (C88) learned a lot about the management of ICT in the agency. He learned about 
supervising staff, planning, and developing and implementing policy. He manages 13 people now in 
two sections. He would have liked, however, to have more opportunities to learn his management 
skills, though formal programs or workshops.  
Counterpart C86 stated that, ‘I learned a lot about financial procedures and systems. My Adviser 
taught me about project management and conceptualising projects.’ This is similar to another 
counterpart (C76) who said that he learned about report writing and developed his English skills. 
This was, however, ‘not something that was part of the ToRs but it was very important to my tasks.’ 
Management skills were a priority for many counterparts as they aspired to become, or improve as, 
senior managers. 
My aim was to work in senior management and I wanted to gain confidence from 
working with the Adviser and to develop my management and leadership skills. I have 
also learned strategic planning and about change management… [and how] to get the 
staff engaged and to have ownership of the strategic plan if there is to be real change. 
(C77) 
I wanted to learn new skills, knowledge and also new ways to do things, such as, governance. I 
needed to build my confidence to lead and manage. (C80) 
Counterpart C77 reported that his adviser wrote a tender document that the agency had to submit 
and so he learned how to do this sort of work by seeing how the adviser completed the work. He 
said that his team now uses this knowledge and skills to complete their own reports, plans and other 
documents. 
One counterpart (C78) stated that he wanted to learn about auditing skills and strategies, and also 
how to manage and lead the organisation. In one of his early assessments he said he wasn’t learning 
much because of his lack of involvement with the adviser (who was communicating mainly with the 
agency head) and as a result this was remedied. He says that his English writing skills were 
developed during the placement.  
A counterpart (C83) observed that her agency had ‘a gap in its strategic planning and management 
and the organisation needed to become better’. She needed an adviser, rather than a consultant, to 
help ‘fill the gap’ because ‘an adviser has a genuine interest in trying to help someone develop their 
knowledge and skills’. The agency needed specific assistance with workforce planning processes and 
models in order for the organisation to budget and deliver its services appropriately. These were 
developed with the advisers, but ‘the new processes are contested within some parts of the 
organisation so implementation is not easy’.  
The theme of advisers being ‘genuinely interested’ in the agency was reflected in the final comment 
from Counterpart C81 who believed that ‘there was mutual learning that occurred between advisers 
and counterparts’. He argued that he ‘taught the Advisers the rules of engagement’, that is, the 
Public Service Act and the hierarchical structure of the public service.’ He also argued that the 
advisers needed to have ‘the cultural circumstances’ explained to them.  
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Section 3.5 follows with a discussion of the enablers of, and impediments to, the success of AC 
placements. 
3.5  Enablers of and impediments to the success of AC placements  
This section addresses the research question: What were the enablers of, and impediments to, the 
success (or ‘drivers of change’) of the AC placements?  
Evidence from the online survey—both quantitative and qualitative data—and from the advisers’ 
PCR reports and interviews, and the counterparts’ APAs and group interviews is used to answer this 
question.  
3.5.1 Survey evidence about enablers of success for AC placements 
The online survey asked advisers to what degree the factors in Table 3.5.1.1 (below) were important 
to the success of their AC placements. They were asked to rate whichever of the items were relevant 
to their placement on a five-point scale (‘not at all’, ‘a little’, ‘somewhat’, ‘considerably’, or ‘fully’). 
This table also shows the percentage rated as either ‘fully’ or ‘considerably’ important to the 
placements’ success. Figure 3.5.1.1 shows the ‘fully’ or ‘considerably’ ratings graphically. 
Table 3.5.1.1 Advisers’ ratings of enablers of success for AC placements 
Item 
Mean 
Fully or 
considerably  
N 
Flexibility 4.53 97% 31 
Collaboration 4.20 93% 31 
Communication 4.47 93% 31 
Interpersonal relationships 4.57 93% 31 
Confidence building 4.37 90% 31 
The counterpart's/counterparts' approach 4.23 83% 31 
Counterpart's/counterparts' attitude 4.27 83% 31 
Cultural awareness 4.20 80% 31 
Planning 3.87 80% 31 
Continued adviser support 4.10 79% 31 
Leadership 4.10 77% 31 
Staff attitude 3.90 77% 31 
Staff understanding their purpose and function 3.83 72% 30 
Quality of underlying analysis of needs 3.55 62% 31 
Improved stakeholder relationships 3.71 61% 29 
The counterpart's/counterparts' experience 3.60 60% 31 
Continuous training 3.29 46% 31 
Skilled staff 3.27 43% 31 
Performance management 3.11 41% 31 
Cultural awareness training 2.69 31% 30 
Producing checklists guidelines etc. 2.93 27% 31 
New staff 2.63 19% 31 
Restructuring 2.67 17% 31 
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Figure 3.5.1.1 Percentages of advisers rating enablers as ‘fully’ or ‘considerably’ important for 
success of AC placements 
 
Almost all advisers rated all the items in relation to their importance. The conspicuous items are 
those that rated lowest (mean rating of around ‘a little’ importance): ‘producing 
checklists/guidelines’, ‘new staff’, ‘cultural awareness training’ and ‘restructuring’; and those that 
rated highest (mean rating of between ‘considerably’ to ‘fully’ important): ‘interpersonal relations’, 
‘communication’ and ‘flexibility’. 
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Table 3.5.1.2 (below) shows similar (but not identical) survey data for the counterparts with  
Figure 3.5.1.2 shows graphically the percentages of counterparts rating items ‘fully’ or 
‘considerably’.  
Table 3.5.1.2 Counterparts’ ratings of enablers as important for success of AC placements 
Item Mean 
Fully or 
considerably  
N 
The adviser's approach 4.8 100% 11 
The adviser's experience 4.8 100% 11 
Collaboration 4.8 100% 11 
Communication 4.8 100% 11 
The adviser's attitude 4.5 100% 11 
The adviser's cultural awareness 4.7 100% 10 
Flexibility 4.7 100% 11 
Improved stakeholder relationships 4.7 100% 10 
Interpersonal relationships 4.6 100% 11 
Leadership 4.5 100% 10 
Performance management 4.4 100% 10 
Quality of underlying analysis of needs 4.6 100% 9 
Staff attitudes 4.6 100% 10 
Staff understanding their purpose and function 4.5 100% 10 
Continued adviser support beyond the initial 
placement period 
4.5 91% 11 
Confidence building 4.4 90% 10 
Planning 4.4 90% 10 
Having skilled staff 4.3 90% 10 
Continuous training 4.3 89% 9 
The production of checklists, guidelines etc. 4.1 82% 11 
Employing new staff 3.9 75% 8 
Restructuring 3.9 70% 10 
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Figure 3.5.1.2 Percentages of counterparts rating enablers as ‘fully’ or ‘considerably’ important for 
success of AC placements 
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Almost all counterparts rated each item. As for previous instances of ratings in the surveys, the 
counterparts consistently gave higher ratings than the advisers, although both were skewed towards 
the positive end of the scales. The least highly rated items for counterparts were ‘new staff’ and 
‘restructuring’ which were the only two items to receive a mean rating (3.9) just below 
‘considerably’. Advisers also rated these two items amongst the lowest. There were four items that 
counterparts rated equally highly (mean rating of between ‘considerably’ to ‘fully’ important): 
‘adviser’s approach’, ‘adviser’s experience’, ‘collaboration’ and ‘communication’. The first two of 
these items were particular to the counterparts’ survey, and advisers also rated the latter two 
amongst the highest. 
3.5.2 PCR and APA evidence of enablers of success 
A total of 25 enablers of project success were isolated in the qualitative analysis undertaken in Stage 
1 of this project. Table 3.5.2.1 shows the range and number of enablers identified. It should be noted 
that advisers and counterparts were not asked to specifically comment on these factors in their 
PCRs/APAs. These factors were isolated during a qualitative analysis of these reports. The numbers 
refer to the number of advisers or counterparts who mentioned these enablers in, respectively, their 
PCRs and APAs. 
Table 3.5.2.1 Enablers of success of AC placements identified in PCRs and APAs 
ENABLER Advisers Counterparts 
Interpersonal relationships 48 9 
Collaboration 46 6 
Checklists, manuals, templates and other documentation 40 - 
Counterpart attitude 38 1 
Cultural awareness 37 3 
Staff understanding of purpose and function 31 1 
Quality of underlying analysis of needs 27 4 
Improved systems, procedures and processes 25 - 
Counterpart ownership of project activities 24 - 
Flexibility 23 1 
Improved communication, information dissemination and production 23 1 
Improved planning 23 - 
Continued adviser support (beyond initial project term) 21 7 
Continuous or additional training 21 3 
Leadership 19 - 
Recruitment of new staff 17 - 
Adviser attitude and experience 16 26 
Improved performance management 16 - 
Restructuring/organisational review 15 - 
Confidence building  10 1 
Management 10 2 
Improved stakeholder relationships 8 - 
Involvement of as many staff/managers as possible 8 - 
Presence or recruitment of skilled staff 8 - 
General staff attitude 3 - 
 
Table 3.5.2.1 shows that, of the 25 enablers discernible in the advisers’ PCRs, ‘interpersonal 
relationships’, ‘collaboration’, ‘checklists and guidelines’, ‘cultural awareness’ and ‘counterpart 
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attitude’ were most common. In the advisers’ survey, with the exception of ‘checklists and 
guidelines’ which rated amongst the lowest, these items were rated amongst the highest in terms of 
importance. The counterparts also frequently mentioned ‘interpersonal relationships’ and 
‘collaboration’ as enablers, but by far their most frequently mentioned enabler of success was ‘the 
adviser’s approach and experience’; this was also amongst the most highly rated in the counterparts’ 
survey. Therefore, although these sources of data are quite different and were generally completed 
at quite different points in time and for different purposes, there was considerable consistency 
between them. 
Of the five most oft-mentioned enablers, four represent a constellation of enabling factors focused 
on, or amenable to influence by, the interpersonal aspects of the AC placements. These five enablers 
are discussed below and, although treated in isolation, they may be seen as mutually supportive and 
reinforcing. Further, reference is made to other enablers not specifically discussed when their 
influence interacts or overlaps. 
3.5.2.1 Checklists, guidelines, manuals, templates, and other documentation 
A total of 40 out of 78 advisers specified the production of checklists, guidelines, manuals, templates 
and other documentation as important enablers of success, both in terms of achieving positive 
outcomes throughout the placements and as a means of promoting the sustainability of these 
outcomes. Over half of these advisers stressed the importance of checklists, guidelines and 
templates in streamlining procedures and processes throughout departments, and around 20 per 
cent linked the production of templates etc. with improvements in efficiency. For example, three 
advisers commented in their PCRs as follows. 
The availability of accurate data and the introduction of various training administration 
forms and report templates have streamlined the activities of training administration, 
preparation and delivery. The new forms and templates have also improved the 
efficiency of preparing and administering training courses. With the new report 
template, trainers can now easily and quickly prepare training reports after the delivery 
of each training course. Further, because the report format has now become standard, it 
has also become easier for the coordinators to read through them and identify 
problems/issues that the trainers have encountered during the delivery of the training. 
(A23, 2007)  
Operational efficiency has also improved, supported by development of operational 
templates, training plans and training programs undertaken by staff members. (A28, 
2008) 
The flow of [permit] processing has been streamlined resulting in faster processing 
times. This process has been supported by the developed of a new workflow checklist for 
each stage of the screening and assessment process which also acts as a decision record. 
(A33, 2008) 
Further, around one-third of advisers linked the production of documentation supporting 
procedures with improved outcomes vis-à-vis sustainability. 
Sustainability has been enhanced through the development of documented procedures 
and processes which are now used by all staff. (A33, 2008) 
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 Actions to enhance sustainability include: For important corporate functions, developing 
operational policies and procedural documents that aim, amongst other things, to “lock 
in” policies and procedures for the longer term. (A51, 2010) 
Continuous training, on the job and off the job and checklists covering tasks, timeframes 
and quality assurance are the means to ensure sustainability. (A14, 2011) 
What was done within the placement to enhance sustainability of the above 
improvements/changes? [1] Documented policies, procedures and work instructions. [2] 
Work instructions for daily processes are available on the desktop. [3] Clearly defined, 
documented and understood roles and responsibilities. (A31, 2008) 
Adviser A31’s comment above also links ‘clearly defined, documented and understood roles and 
responsibilities’ with sustainability. A total of 31 advisers commented upon agency staff’s improved 
understanding of their purpose and function within the organisation as an enabling factor in 
human/organisational capacity building.  
Although none of the counterpart APAs analysed contained information regarding their views on the 
enabling effect of supporting documentation, one adviser’s report included the following quote from 
one of his counterparts:  
The training manual produced by the Adviser made it so much easier to understand the 
process. I am now able to teach others including staff in my section. (A22, 2012) 
3.5.2.2 Interpersonal relationships 
A majority of advisers (46 out of 78) placed particular emphasis on the need to cultivate solid 
interpersonal relationships as a means of maximising placement success. Indeed, for many advisers, 
the importance of building strong relationships with KAS and other agency staff cannot be 
underestimated. 
It remains evident that of paramount importance is the ability to build strong working 
relationships and be proactive. These areas should be the key focus of any Adviser in the 
first few months of the position or it will be very difficult to complete any of the tasks 
identified in the work plan. (A41, 2008) 
The key to success in any capacity development/building environment is partnership and 
strong Counterpart relationships. (A33, 2008) 
Building relationships – this is vital to achieving any change, and is critical in the success 
of an Adviser placement. The building of the relationship cannot be rushed and needs to 
focus on working with their needs and the priorities they perceive. KAS can be very 
disapproving if ideas or changes are forced upon them. Establishing the relationships 
and involving them is critical. (A26, 2007) 
Building a good and trusting relationship with the Secretary has proved pivotal to the 
success of my placement and offered opportunities for greater creativity and honesty in 
dealing with wide-ranging concerns of the department. (A19, 2007) 
Counterpart C75 stated in a focus group that interpersonal relations between the advisers and 
counterparts are important. He stated that another counterpart was so difficult to work with that 
the advisers could not have had successful placements, so he (C75) helped them ‘to work around’ 
the difficult counterpart.  
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There is a significant amount of agreement among advisers that successful skills transfer, training 
and mentoring/coaching is especially reliant on relationships with KAS that are based on mutual 
respect, understanding and trust. 
For me, the key factor for success [in skills/transfer and training] was the relationship 
developed with KAS. Through respect and by developing trust we were able to work 
together to achieve the outcomes in the work plan. We established a safe working 
environment where issues could be discussed and attempts made at completing a task 
without judgment or criticism. My KAS had ownership of the activities at all stages of the 
process. (A20, 2007) 
Some advisers went further to link the establishment of mutually respectful, honest and trusting 
interpersonal relationships with broader/or and more sustainable changes in their organisation. 
The relationships built with [Agency] Counterparts were built on open and honest 
communication and a platform of support, patience and understanding. This 
relationship enabled parties to raise questions and ideas and debate in a friendly and 
professional manner. Debate, especially between senior and junior staff and expatriates 
and nationals is certainly not frequent in PNG. However being able to build this unique 
relationship with KAS allowed for the free flow of ideas and solutions to problems, the 
correct information as to what was happening or why things were happening and 
importantly consultation when something was or may go wrong. This relationship was 
visible to others and facilitated a much-quickened removal of barriers with participants 
in training sessions and staff from client agencies. (A18, 2007) 
For each KAS the methods of interacting are quite different and it was important to take 
the time to build relationships of trust and cooperation with each of the KAS and in most 
situations their subordinate staff as well. This helped make any improvement in capacity 
more sustainable as officers within the Branches became engaged in the capacity 
building process and activities. (A36, 2008) 
Whilst considered here as an enabler, the need to establish strong working relationships before 
commencing substantive work has implications for the completion of ToRs within the given 
schedules. This will be referred to later when discussing the impediment ‘time’ later in Section 3.5.6.  
With all placements a critical issue is the establishment of a productive and 
professional working relationship with the agency KAS and/or Director. The 
process of establishing respect and rapport takes time, in the case of my 
placement only patience and time proved to be the vehicles for overcoming early 
issues of establishing my role and purpose in the [Agency] team. (A34, 2008) 
3.5.2.3 Collaboration 
A total of 46 advisers (almost 60%) mentioned collaboration (or ‘partnership’, ‘cooperation’, etc.) 
with KAS as fundamental to their AC placements’ success. This general view is encapsulated in the 
following quote, taken from the ‘Lessons Learned’ section of one adviser’s PCR: ‘The main lesson 
learnt is that a partnership approach yields the most effective results’ (A33, 2008). More elaborate 
comments pertaining to the essential nature of a collaborative approach in ensuring successful 
placement outcomes can be divided into three categories: 1) the need for collaboration between 
advisers and KAS; 2) the need to foster a collaborative team-approach across agency staff; and 2) the 
positive benefits of inter-adviser collaboration.  
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When discussing the need for collaborative partnerships between advisers and KAS, advisers 
stressed the need for this approach across all project stages, from the initial or continuing 
development of ToRs/work plans, to planning, policy and systems development, all the way through 
to implementation.  
The ToRs were compiled in collaboration with my Counterpart. The ToRs formed a 
platform which enabled us to work through a series of HR processes to build the capacity 
of the HR Unit in modern practices. (A4, 2006) 
A collaborative approach to problem/issue/opportunity identification was taken. 
Therefore, the deliverables were what the Department wanted – not what I wanted. An 
inclusive approach to system/process improvement was taken. Those that had to work 
with the system were always involved in working through options. A great deal of effort 
was put in to ensuring that officers within the Department took ownership of the work in 
which I was involved. (A8, 2006) 
It is essential that KAS are involved in the planning phase of activities such that they 
develop the skills to take an activity from conception to completion, as this ensures they 
feel ownership from the activity from the start and also that they can use this approach 
for other activities in the future. (A13, 2006) 
The second and third quotes above convey a collaborative approach as being important for ensuring 
counterparts’ ‘ownership’ of project initiatives. Although not separately addressed in this report, it is 
worth noting that approximately one-third of advisers specifically mentioned counterpart 
‘ownership’ of activities as essential to maximising project successes. 
The key to sustainability however is the fact that all improvements and changes were 
done via consultation and discussion, so they are supported by the KAS as well as other 
involved employees. This will ensure the improvements are continued as they are 
‘owned’ by those individuals within [the Agency] and not by me as the Adviser. (A54, 
2010) 
The statement by Adviser A8 above also envisages the second form of collaboration that advisers 
stressed as important: ensuring a team-approach across agency/department staff. In addition to 
frequently noting the previously mentioned theme of ‘ownership,’ the comments made were often 
quite specific in terms of the positive benefits seen to accrue from such an approach. 
A team approach is essential in such a technical area. This provides a multi-skill result 
and helps make up for the lack of capacity. (A2, 2006) 
During my placement, I worked with management to open communication lines, and 
introduced shared consultation, discussions on performance and an open forum to 
discuss career progression. A focus on teamwork is being incorporated into the 
restructure of the Division to encourage team ownership of activities and this has had a 
positive flow on effect on the time taken to complete tasks. Some further work is 
required to ensure that these new work practices become entrenched, sustainable and 
provide a solid base from which to build on. There are already positive outcomes coming 
from these changes. Management are beginning to acknowledge staff openly for the 
work that has been done well, increasing staff satisfaction to work. (A28, 2008) 
A very useful tool from the beginning of this placement was establishing the KAS as a 
team responsible for the achievement of the Adviser’s ASF Work plan. KAS were involved 
 96 
right from the outset in the formulation of the work plan and they all determined who 
between them would be responsible for leading each project within the work plan. The 
KAS team met regularly to review progress with each KAS member’s work plan tasks and 
the project overall. One of the benefits of these meetings was that all KAS members put 
aside their positions or titles and simply operated as equal members of the KAS team 
whose objective was to see the ASF work plan come to fruition. This provided an 
excellent opportunity for KAS to provide feedback to each other that might not have 
otherwise occurred. (A35, 2008) 
Finally, almost half (21 out of 46) of the advisers who stressed the essential nature of collaboration 
focused on the positive benefits arising from inter-adviser collaboration both across, and within, 
agencies. Some of the strongest statements in support of collaboration pertained to this particular 
type. In their comments, advisers tended to highlight the efficacy of inter-adviser collaboration in 
pursuing the broader goal of organisational capacity building as a whole.  
The group training activities undertaken by the ASF Advisers in a team situation were 
extremely effective not only in the training outcomes but in breaking down the barriers 
between Branches and Divisions. The Department operates with the silo effect, where 
there is little interaction between Divisions or Corporate and Technical groups. There has 
been a significant degree of change as a result of the workshops that have included 
corporate and technical officers in sessions such as change management, team 
leadership and management, Vision and Mission development, and Corporate 
Awareness. I was fortunate in working within a self-managed team of three ASF 
Advisers and as such had the ability to seek counsel from my team on issues or 
challenges. In many instances we were able to work on issues together with generally a 
greater overall outcome for everyone. (A36, 2008) 
The support of the other ASF Advisers for both team activities and finance specific 
activities was vital. As their KAS also reported to the CSM, they helped in trying to get 
him to take a broader view of the division and occasionally the finance section alone. 
The team created a lot of synergies and the relationships between the Advisers and their 
KAS enhanced the relationship between the individual KAS and the team leading to 
much more consultation over decisions. This needs to be further built on as this is where 
the real change can begin. (A42, 2008) 
There is considerable synergy of capacity building when there is a team of cohesive, 
dedicated, mutually supportive and committed Advisers in the same organisation. (A46, 
2009) 
Having a strong network of Advisors in similar roles to discuss issues with or seek 
feedback from is important. The HR Advisors have managed to set this up well in 2009. 
(A50, 2010) 
3.5.2.4 Cultural awareness 
Just under 50 per cent of advisers (37 out of 78) emphasised cultural awareness as essential to 
maximising placement successes, in particular, in the realms of skills transfer and training activities 
and capacity building more generally. Comments made by advisers ranged from general 
exhortations as to the need to, for example, ‘understand the sociocultural setting in which you 
work—preferably by dialogue with the staff with whom you work’ (A52, 2010), to more detailed 
explanations of the specific cultural context in PNG to which advisers must respond.  
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Try [to] understand how culture influences people’s decisions and actions. For instance 
the fear of ramifications in asking questions of people with more status (seniority); that 
fear can be interpreted by Papua New Guineans as respect; that doing nothing is at 
times relates to lack of confidence and survival, if people do nothing it might be because 
they think they will then not put themselves in a position where someone can tell them 
they did something wrong (and potential conflict); that possibly one of the influencing 
factors around the lack of performance management culture might be that some Papua 
New Guineans seem to take comments personally (and are not easily able to be 
objective and separate ‘themselves’ from discussions about progress, lack of or 
otherwise). (A5, 2006) 
Silence is golden – if the Adviser stays silent and allows long pauses in the conversation, 
this encourages KAS to open up and continue to share information, and this is the same 
in meetings, where some Advisers try to dominate. The PNG way is to share information 
slowly and in a round-about way, so it is important as an Adviser to recognise this and to 
allow a conversation to move slowly and in the direction the KAS want to take it, as they 
will inevitably get to the point and vital information will be forthcoming. (A26, 2007) 
The notion of taking time to understand the ‘way things work’ locally was an oft-repeated sentiment 
of advisers stressing the essential nature of cultural awareness. 
Don’t rush, it takes a long time in PNG for people to trust new folk on the scene, and 
information gets shared slowly and sometimes in very obtuse ways. So a patient 
approach and gently, gently approach gets there in the end. (A44, 2009) 
The initial phases of this placement involved a lot of observation and getting to know 
the culture of [the Agency] along with the culture of PNG people. The first thing I learnt 
was not to rush anything as it can be seen as pushy and bossy. I learnt that one needs to 
sit back and raise the issue and allow ownership to take over by the KAS. Then through 
support whilst the process is underway, the capacity building can be effectively achieved 
and the task completed. (A54, 2010) 
As shown above, cultural awareness is associated with the development of trust and respectful 
interpersonal relationships which, as previously discussed, were also deemed by many advisers as 
absolute necessities in the pursuit of successful placement outcomes. The need to take account of 
the local cultural context was also stressed with regard to the production of training materials and 
approaches to problem-solving. 
When designing training or materials for agency staff – it is important not to use 
materials off the shelf. Avoid assuming because it worked in Australia or another 
country that it will work in PNG. Materials should be designed by the Adviser to suit the 
[Agency] and to ensure they are PNG culturally adapted. It is important to avoid jargon 
and complicated language. Advisers must put themselves in the agency staff’s shoes. It 
is imperative to think about them operating after you have gone – and consider what 
they will need to do so. Do not leave them with things they cannot use without an 
Adviser there. Make the training and the work fun. Papua New Guineans have a fun 
loving sense of humour and it helps to incorporate this into what you do with them. 
(A35, 2008) 
Try to find solutions that take the best of all the cultures and ensure it is agreeable to 
PNG culture overall. Do not rely on ‘First World’ concepts and assumptions or “first 
world” thinking for finding solutions. (A25, 2007) 
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Ensuring language, materials, tools, examples, etc. are culturally adapted. They should 
incorporate Papua New Guinean words and concepts and not just be downloaded from 
the Internet or imported from another country without being adapted for Papua New 
Guineans. (A35, 2011) 
Although there is a paucity of detailed commentary in counterparts’ APAs, generally speaking, the 
comments below demonstrate the positive impact of an adviser’s cultural awareness from 
counterparts’ viewpoints and, as noted in the first quote, that this is directly related to the 
establishment of solid interpersonal relationships and, at least by association, to successful 
placement outcomes. 
[The Adviser’s] progress at the [Agency] has continued to be very good. With his 
assistance we are continuing the task of updating the financial records of the 
organization to an acceptable level. He has built up a good relationship with all staff in 
the [Agency] as well as other divisions. He has been able to achieve this because of his 
professional knowledge and experience as well as his outside knowledge of PNG people 
and culture. (C33, 2007) 
[The Adviser’s] understanding of procurement, and processes in a PNG context has seen 
him improve the procurement capacity of everyone that he spends time training. (C16, 
2007) 
3.5.2.5 Counterparts’ attitudes 
Almost 50 per cent of advisers (38 of 78) considered that counterparts’ attitudes toward their 
placement activities and to the adviser were fundamental to success. A common pool of adjectives 
describing the essential features of a counterpart’s attitude appeared frequently throughout the 
PCRs, including, ‘willingness’, ‘determination’, ‘perseverance’, ‘receptivity’, ‘commitment’, 
‘responsiveness’, ‘enthusiasm’, ‘openness to change/new ideas’, and ‘ambitious’. Some examples of 
their comments follow.  
The key factors to success were the willingness of the agency officer(s) to learn and to 
make a difference. (A8, 2010) 
During this placement it became very clear to the [Department] Adviser that a 
Counterpart who is committed to working in a capacity building relationship with an 
Adviser translates into better outcomes and a more successful placement. Cooperation 
and commitment are crucial elements to the successful transference of skills and 
knowledge to Counterparts. (A47, 2011) 
Alongside this strong commonality in the terms used, it was possible to identify particular means 
used by advisers to cultivate, encourage or maintain these qualities in their counterparts during the 
placements. The main ones identified, together with examples of the advisers’ statements about 
them, follow. 
a) Discovering what motivates counterparts 
Finding the right motivating drivers for Counterparts and staff is just as important if not 
more important than building capacity. An organisation needs motivated and 
committed people first and then the skills can be developed from this base. (A53, 2010) 
What is in it for me situation – Counterparts need to find out very early in the process 
that there is some benefit for them in this cooperation and work together. (A22, 2012) 
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b) Focusing on KAS’s, counterparts’ and the organisations’ priorities 
One of the most important aspects in achieving capacity building is that KAS want to be 
involved in the activities and see the outcomes as a priority, both for themselves 
individually and for the organisation. For example, KAS actively worked towards the 
completion of the [Department] Manual as they considered this a high priority and could 
see the benefits for themselves (in respect to having a major new initiative completed) 
and for the Authority (in respect to having vital information disseminated to all 
employees and to improve employee management). (A13, 2006) 
Within [the Branch] there was constant checking with the Counterparts to ensure they 
were committed to the direction capacity building was taking. Ensuring their 
commitment and confidence was a key component of the advice I have given. (A59, 
2011) 
c) Awareness of counterparts’ obligations to others, not only to their advisers 
Whilst the Authority initially indicated support for the ToRs listed, this did not always 
translate into commitment to implementation. It is, therefore, important to build on the 
commitment of all and to try to maintain enthusiasm for activities. One means to do this 
was recognising that KAS still have day-to-day work to complete and ensuring that 
assistance is provided in prioritising and time management to help them meet the 
varying demands on their time. (A13, 2006) 
Successful activities depended on: a willing Counterpart; focusing on activities that make 
the Counterpart’s job easier/more effective; being flexible to fit in with Counterparts’ 
readiness; resisting the temptation to take over a task; developing an open relationship 
which cares for the people involved and is not just about the ‘work’; sufficient time, 
practice and repetition; having a laugh! (A16, 2007) 
d) As with the preceding and the following quote, focusing on the relationship: 
KAS commitment only comes and is maintained by continuous interaction building an 
environment of trust. (A38, 2008) 
3.5.2.6 Counterparts’ views about advisers’ characteristics that enable success 
Analysis of the APA comments made by counterparts shows the kinds of adviser characteristics they 
regard as enabling success. In particular, counterparts valued advisers who were: supportive but 
non-directive; good role models; able to build strong interpersonal relationships; demonstrated 
strong professional competence in their field; and seen to be accessible to their counterparts. As can 
be seen in the following selection of counterpart comments, these qualities are often mutually 
supportive. 
a) Supportive but non-directive advisers 
He was very open and gave advice. His nature of work was that he provided advice but 
did not make it his concern on whether we took the advice or not. If he gave me advice, 
he made it my decision whether I wanted to take the advice or not. (C9, 2006) 
Remind all advisors that they are placed in all our organisations to advise and 
complement our work and they must not try to run our divisions or departments and try 
to overrule their Counterparts as this happens with one or two of the advisors that have 
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come and gone through our department but we are thankful that [this Adviser] was not 
like this. (C67, 2011) 
b) Advisers as good role models 
I enjoy and benefit from working with [the Adviser] as he deals with people and clients. 
Whilst he is often very straightforward he bases his views on logical arguments that are 
supported by the facts or legislation. From his example, we have improved our ability to 
deal with and negotiate with clients. (C17, 2007) 
[The Adviser] is a workaholic and she is very conscious of time management—she 
advises and reminds me not to allow official time [to be] wasted by all staff. (C56, 2010) 
c) Advisers who build strong interpersonal relationships 
Relationships based on trust - Can argue freely/ Debate/ Resolve/ improved 
understanding/ strong personal relationships/ respect/private sector experience. (C9, 
2006) 
[The Adviser] has a strong personality and always conducts himself with honesty and 
integrity with all Counterparts that he works with. The nature of his role is that he 
identifies deficiencies; so building trust with Counterparts is critical to his success. [The 
Adviser] has done this well. (C17, 2007) 
[The Adviser] is a people-centred person and tried his best to know officers in the 
different branches of the department. He has very good PR and I believe with the type of 
personality he has, we will learn a lot of good things from him. (C19, 2007) 
Rapport between the Adviser and all members of my [Department] Team is outstanding. 
[The Adviser] was the main drive for my division’s involvement in Provincial Capacity 
Building activities. Prior to that [the] Division was totally internal focused. (C23, 2007) 
d) Advisers who demonstrate strong professional competence in their field 
The Adviser is highly skilled and competent. In fact, he will be an ideal candidate for any 
line agency placement in any government agency including [this agency]. (C58, 2011) 
[The Adviser] has time for me at any time during his placement in [this office]. I have 
found him to be very conversant on all aspect of finance and administration work, hence 
it makes easy to work with him. (C34, 2008) 
His knowledge and experiences in procurement and managing people has resulted in 
[the Adviser] identifying a number of key deficiencies and he works tirelessly with staff in 
the [agency], provinces and departments. (C17, 2007)   
He has built up a good relationship with all staff in [this] Directorate as well as other 
divisions. He has been able to achieve this because of his professional knowledge and 
experience as well as his outside knowledge of PNG people and culture. (C33, 2007) 
e) Advisers who are accessible 
[The Adviser] is easily approachable as she is always willing to assist with whatever work 
problem we are faced with. (C2, 2006) 
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[The Adviser] is a great mentor and always available to offer alternatives. (C4, 2006) 
FACTORS FOR ADVISER SUCCESS…Open door policy (original emphasis) (C10, 2006)  
3.5.3 Adviser and counterpart interview and focus group evidence of enablers of 
success 
Fourteen advisers participated in interviews by phone or Skype, and four counterparts participated 
in a group interview in Port Moresby. A further 13 (current) advisers participated in three focus 
groups in Port Moresby (across two occasions in 2013) as did 12 (current) counterparts. The 
questions for these data collection methods were derived from the research questions and previous 
research stages to pursue particular matters in more detail. The written records of interviews etc. 
were analysed and, for this section, material selected on the enablers of success. The key matters 
that were identified and are presented below with supporting quotes are as follows: ‘style of 
engagement’; ‘cultural adaptation’; ‘leadership’; ‘means of recruitment’; and ‘number of 
counterparts’. 
3.5.3.1 Style of engagement 
It is clear from the interviews that the manner in which advisers engage with their counterparts is 
considered to be a crucial element to successful capacity development. In particular, two-thirds of 
the advisers interviewed emphasised the importance of close, one-on-one, daily, on-the-job 
interaction with counterparts, which ranged from, ‘actually sitting there and doing the job with 
them’ (A68, 2007) to the adviser simply ‘sitting alongside people…asking non-threatening questions 
in a non-confrontational way’ (A74, 2007). Mostly, this approach was privileged by advisers and 
augmented from time to time with more formal or subject-specific workshops. Clearly this approach 
goes beyond the idea of the adviser-as-role-model or technical trainer, and suggests that most 
advisers pursue capacity building through collaborative, on-the-job coaching. These views echo the 
finding discussed above that 59 per cent of advisers saw ‘collaboration’ as essential to success. 
It is clear that this method of working was seen as the most appropriate for direct capacity building 
activities, that is, for the imparting of skills and knowledge required by counterparts to fulfil their 
organisational roles. One adviser spoke of how her counterpart’s development accelerated when 
they began to share an office and could discuss issues as and when they arose and work together on 
time-management and goal-setting practices, and how it was ‘these little things, this on-the job 
stuff’ that had been the most effective (A50, 2010). These working arrangements were also seen as 
facilitating other factors that have been identified as enablers of success. For example, as noted 
previously, interviewees saw such day-to-day, on-the-job interaction as crucial for establishing good 
interpersonal relationships and also for ensuring counterpart ownership of processes and outcomes. 
In addition, the comments made by some interviewees indicated that this approach can address 
some of the impediments to success that are discussed below. For example, one adviser noted that 
this style was imperative due to the fact that there was simply not enough background experience 
for staff to complete tasks on their own (A68, 2007) (51% of advisers noted ‘insufficient human 
capacity’ as an impediment to placement success in the PCRs). Another adviser noted that this mode 
was the only way to achieve cultural change in an organisation, saying that ‘sustainable change is a 
function of the length of time available to have this day-to-day interaction’ and that ‘incremental 
change and cultural change…needs to be worked out on a continuous basis, you can’t change on a 
fly-in-fly-out basis’ (A21, 2010).  
The need to work in a collaborative and consultative way with counterparts was implicated as a 
factor that inevitably affects placement schedules (analysis of the PCRs evidenced that 46% of 
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advisers viewed ‘insufficient time’ as an impediment to project success). An adviser noted that, ‘this 
[approach] means that the process can take twice as long as originally envisaged, but if personnel 
are not engaged in producing outcomes then ultimately they will have little worth’ (A69, 2008). 
3.5.3.2 Cultural adaptation 
As discussed earlier, the analysis of the PCRs found that 47 per cent of advisers saw cultural 
awareness/adaptation to local circumstances as an enabler of placement success. Throughout the 
interviews comments asserted the need for cultural awareness and for understanding the local 
context. These comments included understanding local living conditions and wages, and the effects 
of these factors on staff commitment (A17, 2007), and the need to understand the PNG emphasis on 
personal relationships over data-driven results (A73, 2009).  
One adviser specifically linked the tailoring of initiatives to local cultural specificities as essential for 
sustainability, suggesting that without this approach counterparts would merely ‘revert to their old 
ways’ subsequent to the adviser’s departure (A73, 2009). Another adviser (A70, 2008) stressed the 
importance of using PNG-specific approaches from the outset of system design and development. 
This adviser took the broader conceptual issues underpinning Australian-type systems and 
integrated them with local practices to produce ‘a new PNG-style approach’. He added that the 
resulting outcomes, while successfully adopted locally, sometimes ‘horrified’ his Australian 
colleagues. 
Some counterparts also expressed complementary views. Counterpart C80 said it was essential for 
advisers to respect the local culture and ways, and to understand the legislation under which they 
operate. She was concerned that previous advisers developed policies and procedures that 
contravened the Public Service Act and the General Orders over matters such as recruitment and 
procurement. Counterpart C80 then had to teach KAS what was required and remedy the policies 
and procedures. This is another example in which what has been identified as an enabler has a 
corollary impediment, depending on, in this case, whether cultural and contextual awareness exists 
(enabler) or is absent (impediment).  
Counterpart C81 said that it was necessary to teach advisers the ‘rules of engagement’, that is, the 
Public Service Act and the hierarchical structure of the public service. The cultural circumstances 
need to be explained to the advisers in order for change to occur. Another counterpart felt that 
‘some advisers are ‘outsiders’ who just do the job and leave, others participate in the two-way 
process so that the adviser learns and appreciates PNG, as well as the counterpart learning about 
the job’ (C87).  
3.5.3.3 Leadership 
In Stage 1 it was found that 19 per cent of advisers saw engaged leadership as vital to placement 
success. Similar views were expressed in the interviews, from both positive and negative 
perspectives. Two advisers discussed how the leaders in their agencies had been essential to their 
placement successes, for example, ‘[the Agency] had a fantastic leader, but if this had not been the 
case if would have been impossible to do anything’ (A16, 2007) and how ‘a “change champion” is 
essential if real gains are to be made’ (A70, 2008). In contrast, two advisers spoke of how their 
efforts had been stymied by uncooperative agency and departmental heads (A73, 2009 & A71, 
2010). 
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3.5.3.4 Means of recruitment 
Both advisers and counterparts in a number of interviews addressed adviser and counterpart 
selection processes. In one case an adviser found that a number of her key counterparts were 
unwilling to cooperate and so she sought out other, willing, agency staff. This adviser argued that, 
‘the element of self-selection in this process had proved critical to the success’ of her placement 
(A17, 2007). Another adviser believed that being interviewed and chosen by the agency director was 
essential to her placement’s success. This was beneficial because it showed that the agency thought 
she would be a ‘good fit’ and that ‘at the very least this should mean that the head of the agency 
would not try to undermine the work being done by advisers’ (A68, 2007). Relating these two 
insights back to the findings of Stage 1, they could be seen to support both the enabler ‘counterpart 
attitude’ (49% of advisers, Stage 1) and at least partially mitigate two impediments: ‘lack of 
will/interest’ (58% of advisers) and ‘active resistance to adviser’ (23% of advisers). 
3.5.3.5 Number of counterparts 
A few advisers spoke of how working alongside multiple agency staff improved overall placement 
effectiveness (in Stage 1, 10% of advisers indicated involving as many people as possible as an 
enabler of project success). In the case of one adviser (A68), an arrangement with multiple 
counterparts had been instituted after her first primary counterpart ‘went bush’ and the second left 
the organisation after a short period of time (A68, 2007). In this way, the practice of recruiting 
multiple counterparts can be seen as mitigating the effects of two impediments to placement 
success isolated in Stage 1: ‘absence of key counterpart’ (27% of advisers) and ‘staff 
turnover/removal’ (26% of advisers). Moreover, this initiative was seen as actually enhancing overall 
placement outcomes because of how it ‘allows [an Adviser] to focus efforts more broadly and helps 
with the broader project of institutional capacity building’ (A68, 2007).  
3.5.4 Survey evidence on impediments to success in capacity development 
The online survey asked advisers to what degree the factors in Table 3.5.4.1 (below) were 
impediments to the success of their AC placements. They were asked to rate whichever of the items 
were relevant as impediments to the success of their placements on a five-point scale (‘not at all’, ‘a 
little’, ‘somewhat’, ‘considerably’ or ‘fully’). This table also shows the percentage rated as either 
‘fully’ or ‘considerably’ significant as impediments. Figure 3.5.4.1 shows the ‘fully’ or ‘considerably’ 
ratings graphically. 
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Table 3.5.4.1 Advisers’ ratings of the major impediments to placement success 
Item Mean 
Complete or 
considerable 
impediment 
N 
Organisational culture 3.13 45% 31 
Lack of accountability 2.94 42% 31 
Existing infrastructure 2.87 37% 31 
Inadequate leadership 2.83 37% 30 
Lack of will 2.77 35% 31 
Counterpart's/counterparts' absence 2.67 33% 31 
Counterpart's/counterparts’ attendance 2.47 30% 31 
Availability of personnel 2.90 29% 31 
Lack of coordination 2.90 29% 31 
Time 2.62 28% 30 
Hiring processes 2.85 27% 30 
Lack of funds/resources 2.52 26% 31 
Bureaucratic processes 2.68 23% 31 
Organisational structure 2.71 23% 31 
The physical environment 2.45 23% 31 
Staff turnover 2.29 21% 31 
Inadequate planning 2.45 19% 31 
Non-compliance with established procedures 2.23 17% 30 
New appointments during placement 2.07 11% 31 
Attendance 2.16 10% 31 
Inadequate communication 2.52 10% 31 
Restructuring 1.92 8% 31 
Quality of underlying needs analysis 2.07 7% 31 
Active resistance to adviser 1.77 6% 31 
Lack of trust 1.77 3% 31 
Overreliance on advisers 2.23 3% 31 
Lack of cultural awareness 1.52 0% 31 
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Figure 3.5.4.1 Advisers’ ratings of the impediments to placement success 
 
Almost all advisers rated all the items in relation to their importance as impediments to success. The 
conspicuous items are those that rated lowest (mean rating of around ‘a little’ importance): ‘lack of 
cultural awareness’, ‘lack of trust’, ‘resistance to adviser’, and ‘restructuring’; and those that rated 
highest (mean rating around of ‘somewhat’ importance): ‘organisational culture’, ‘lack of 
accountability’, ‘existing infrastructure’ and ‘inadequate leadership’. Table 3.5.4.2 (below) shows 
similar (but not identical) survey data for the counterparts, with Figure 3.5.4.2 showing graphically 
the percentages of counterparts rating items ‘fully’ or ‘considerably’.  
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Table 3.5.4.2 Counterparts’ ratings of the major impediments to placement success 
Item Average 
Complete or 
considerable 
impediment 
n 
Attendance 3.0 60% 10 
Bureaucratic processes 3.3 58% 12 
Availability of personnel 2.9 50% 10 
Overreliance on Advisers 3.0 50% 10 
Inadequate leadership 2.6 44% 9 
Lack of accountability 2.9 40% 10 
Hiring processes 2.8 40% 10 
Lack of funds/resources 2.7 40% 10 
Inadequate communication 2.8 36% 11 
Staff turnover 2.9 36% 11 
Non-compliance with established procedures 2.7 33% 9 
Lack of coordination 2.6 30% 10 
New appointments during placement 2.5 30% 10 
Inadequate planning 2.4 30% 10 
Quality of underlying needs analysis 2.6 30% 10 
Time 2.6 30% 10 
Organisational culture 2.7 27% 11 
Lack of trust 2.4 25% 8 
Existing infrastructure 2.4 20% 10 
Restructuring 2.4 20% 10 
Organisational structure 2.5 18% 11 
Lack of cultural awareness 2.5 18% 11 
The physical environment 2.4 10% 10 
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Figure 3.5.4.2 Counterparts’ ratings of the impediments to placement success 
 
Almost all counterparts rated each item. The counterparts gave slightly higher ratings (that is, seeing 
impediments as slightly more important) than did the advisers. As the number of counterparts 
responding was so low there is little to be drawn from these differences. The least highly rated items 
for counterparts, all scoring a mean rating of 2.4 which is between ‘a little’ and ‘somewhat’ were: 
‘lack of trust’, ‘restructuring’, ‘existing infrastructure’, ‘inadequate planning’ and ‘physical 
environment’. Advisers also rated ‘lack of trust’ and ‘restructuring’ amongst the lowest, but they 
rated ‘existing infrastructure’ amongst the highest in terms of its importance as an impediment. The 
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Counterparts rated highest (mean rating of about ‘somewhat’ important): ‘attendance [of agency 
staff]’, ‘over-reliance on advisers’, and ‘bureaucratic processes’, none of which matched the 
advisers’ highest ratings, although the score differences were minor and, as noted previously, the 
number of counterparts responding means little can be drawn from these differences. 
3.5.5 PCR and APA evidence of impediments to success 
A total of 39 impediments to placement success were isolated in the qualitative analysis undertaken 
in Stage 1 of this project. Table 3.5.5.1 lists the impediments to success identified in this analysis, 
along the numbers of advisers and counterparts who mentioned these impediments.  
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Table 3.5.5.1 Impediments to success of AC placements identified in PCRs and APAs 
IMPEDIMENT Advisers Counterparts 
Lack of will, interest 45 - 
Organisational culture and/or politics 43 - 
Insufficient human capacity 40 2 
Management 39 - 
Insufficient time 36 1 
Lack of availability of skilled personnel 36 1 
Attendance 31 1 
Inadequate performance management 31 1 
Incorrect needs analysis 27 1 
Lack of funds, resources 24 - 
Non- or inconsistent compliance with policies and procedures 23 - 
Staff lack understanding of purpose and function 23 - 
Absence of key counterpart 21 - 
Poor leadership 21 - 
Staff removal, turnover 20 - 
ToRs unrealistic 20 - 
Hiring processes 19 2 
Overreliance on advisers, donors, external assistance 19 1 
Active resistance to adviser 18 - 
Physical environment 17 - 
Reliance on other agencies, departments, individuals 17 - 
Inadequate budgeting practices 16 1 
Lack of accountability 16 - 
Organisational structure 13 - 
Systemic 13 1 
End of adviser placement 11 1 
Lack of coordination 11 - 
Poor internal communication 10 - 
Inadequate infrastructure 10 - 
Insufficient organisational capacity at outset 9 - 
New staff, appointments during placement 9 - 
Inadequate planning 8 - 
Restructuring 7 - 
Bureaucracy 6 - 
Elections/change of government 5 - 
Interpersonal relationships 2 - 
Poor stakeholder relations 2 - 
Adviser attitude/experience 1 4 
Poor stakeholder relations 2 - 
 
The five most oft-mentioned impediments were: 1) insufficient human capacity; 2) organisational 
culture and/or politics; 3) lack of will/interest; 4) management; and 5) insufficient time. As with the 
enablers, most elements within these categories are mutually reinforcing and interactive. These five 
impediments are discussed in this section, with reference made to others not specifically discussed 
when their influence interacts or overlaps. As would be expected, much of the data presented here 
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(but by no means all) relates to factors that are furthest from the advisers’ powers of influence, 
often being related to conditions arising from deep within the local culture and/or work and political 
context. 
3.5.5.1 Insufficient human capacity 
The nature of the AC projects as ‘capacity building’ is founded on there being capacity deficiencies 
requiring development. The ‘insufficient human capacity’ impediment, therefore, pertains to 
situations where advisers reported that initial levels of capacity were inadequate to fulfil certain 
ToRs. The lack of capacity reported may refer to individual counterparts, and/or to the unavailability 
of sufficient numbers of personnel, and/or to insufficient higher-level capacity to implement 
initiatives, policies or plans devised throughout the course of the placements. A total of forty 
advisers reported insufficient human capacity as an impediment to success at one or all of these 
levels. (A further impediment, ‘initial analysis of needs incorrect’, which was reported by 27 advisers, 
is also implicated here.) The advisers’ statements reported below provide examples of the 
impediments and of the ways in which they impeded success and sustainability. 
a) Inability to complete ToRs due to insufficient starting levels of human capacity 
There is a significant amount of work to be achieved in the time-frame by the HR Advisor 
and [Agency] HR Counterparts and this should not be underestimated. Given the current 
capacity of the HR team, both in terms of their abilities to perform at the levels required 
to achieve the outcomes required and from a resourcing perspective, it is unlikely all of 
these issues will be able to be addressed in a 12-month timeframe. (A50, 2010) 
These outcomes were realistic and desirable in principle. However as the Staff on 
strength of HR was so low (only 15 staff were actually in place from a branch 
establishment of 32 for some time after I started) in addition to the key Counterpart 
positions being vacant (that is the HR Manager position and Senior Training Manager 
position) there was not the capacity in HR branch to really move forward on ToR 4 & 5. I 
tried to achieve by ToRs by seizing opportunities in their day today work to include some 
aspect of the ToRs. (A55, 2011) 
Reasons for the unrealistic time frame related to terms of reference: It takes at least 3 
years for big [professional] firms in developed countries to train a qualified person so 
that he/she can carry out end-to-end [professional] process and assess the internal 
controls independently and competently. With the existing level of skills, knowledge and 
analytical ability of my PNG Counterparts, it will take longer time and greater effort to 
develop the [process] Counterparts in PNG. The [professional} skills and knowledge of 
the experienced audit Counterparts are not significantly better than the younger and 
less experienced audit staff. This has created a vacuum in the supervisory level. I could 
place very limited reliance on my key Counterparts to acquire new skills from me first 
within a relatively short time frame and then assist in training his staff. Instead, I was 
required to train all staff from the same basic level and at the same time. (A67, 2012) 
Work was carried out on each of these ToRs but they were not achieved as noted in the 
agreed work plan. These objectives along with the remaining six also require a 
reasonable level of expertise and capacity from Counterparts. This was non-existent. The 
level of expertise and understanding was found to be extremely low, boards were not 
capable of being aware that they themselves operated outside of legislative parameters, 
and at the agency and provincial level their ability to operate sound procurement 
processes is hindered by the lack of capacity and understanding at the most 
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fundamental levels such as the drafting of specifications and evaluation plans. (A18, 
2007) 
The [Counterpart] had no previous experience in human resources and as such 
opportunities for capacity building were limited to basic human resource activities 
commensurate with the [Counterpart’s]. (A47, 2009) 
b) Inability to implement initiatives developed throughout the placement 
[The Branch] lacks the management capability to implement processes and procedures 
including performance standards for trainers, effective performance management of 
staff, communication structures, strategic planning and management and resource 
usage. Despite the development of a Training Operations Manual outlining standards 
and processes to ensure quality training development and delivery, there is little ability 
to cause compliance from staff. (A39, 2008) 
The third reason that anticipated outcomes from this placement were unrealistic in the 
timeframe is that capacity to implement and sustain envisaged changes to [the 
Agency’s] operating model is very unequal among staff across the organisation and the 
pace of change is necessarily slow. (A16, 2007) 
c) Implications for sustainability 
When endeavouring to build capacity in other trainers to assist with design and 
development, it became evident that their supposed qualifications gained in Cert 4 TAA, 
which includes four units of competency in design and development of learning and 
assessment materials is almost non-existent. Therefore the sustainability is a problem 
with trainers unable to agree on many aspects, creating their own rules, not adhering to 
consistency, etc. (A57, 2011) 
The intermediate outcomes, which I have achieved during the past 2 years, fall short of 
the self-generating CD [capacity development] level where staff could develop 
themselves based upon the existing [professional] infrastructure which I have developed 
and [professional] skills and knowledge which I have transferred to the staff. (A67, 2012) 
3.5.5.2 Organisational culture and/or politics 
A total of 43 out of 78 advisers reported that success was impeded by organisational culture and/or 
politics. Advisers expressed concerns about the difficulty KAS have in asserting themselves and in 
promoting change due to the prevailing attitudes about challenging authority.  
Overall the training and mentoring activities have been effective. In conjunction with the 
other ASF advisors located in the [Agency], we have been working to improving 
analytical skills within the agency. This work has shown progress, however, there are 
cultural issues with staff frequently reluctant to challenge the views of more senior 
officers. (A11, 2006) 
My whole approach was about building sustainability through understanding, 
particularly of the key organisational drivers of interpersonal and systemic relationships. 
Many senior staff were beginning to capture this understanding, and with it, its practical 
implications for their daily management. But faced with the reality of the operating 
culture and leadership style were finding it hard to implement. (A29, 2008) 
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Advisers reported that, in some circumstances, organisational culture was such that there was little 
or no incentive for KAS to support any organisational change and/or for the adviser to promote 
change successfully. 
The working environment is such that it is not in the self-interest of staff to change. 
Change requires compliance with the Public Finance (Management) Act and the General 
Orders. This means that the opportunity for personal gain through the manipulation of 
existing systems will be eliminated, thereby making staff who currently benefit from 
such manipulation worse off than they are currently. Hence there is no incentive to 
change. (A30, 2008) 
Public service culture, risk aversion, protection of miscreants and a general unwillingness 
to speak up reduce the ability to make a quantum change in service performance or to 
undertake appropriate disciplinary actions. (A36, 2008) 
A selection of statements from advisers follows regarding the specific challenges they faced in the 
cultural/political contexts in which they were working. These show that this particular impediment is 
implicated in a number of other impediments identified in the analysis of the PCRs: ‘active 
resistance’ (18 advisers); ‘inadequate performance management’ (31 advisers); ‘attendance’ (31 
advisers); ‘lack of will or interest’ (45 advisers); ‘management’ (39 advisers); ‘staff turnover/removal’ 
(20 advisers); and ‘hiring processes’ (including ‘Wantokism’ - 19 advisers).  
During the input, the organisational will to change was not consistent and some 
initiatives moved quickly while others did not progress at all despite significant effort by 
both Advisers and KAS. Internal politics often stands in the way of implementing 
change—and changing ‘alliances’ among managers makes it difficult to assess in 
advance how successful an initiative will be. For example, the Director Corporate 
Services—a KAS for the HR Adviser—has been inconsistent in support for activities 
supported by the HR Adviser. Initially he was very resistant to Adviser assistance, then 
very supportive of Adviser assistance, largely a reflection of leadership from changes in 
the A/MD position. During the last months of the placement he has been supportive, 
allowing for finalisation of a number of initiatives. Over time it has become apparent 
that there are many social, cultural and political reasons for things to happen or not 
happen and despite some change, in general it seems that decisions are still not 
generally made in the best interests of the Authority and usually are in the best interests 
of one or more individuals involved in, or influencing, the decision-making process. It is 
likely that appointment of a substantive Managing Director will overcome some of the 
inconsistency in support for change and the period after the appointment of a 
substantive MD will be an opportunity for significant change. (A13, 2006) 
‘Wantokism’ is prevalent in the [Agency] and prevents any performance management. 
(A18, 2007) 
Improving performance management across [the Agency] - this requires significant 
changes to organisational culture. People recognise what ‘good’ management is but 
there are limited incentives for good performance. As noted, there are few and rare 
(although jarring) consequences for unprofessional conduct and non-delivery. (A19, 
2007) 
PNG has a formal and an informal system for project planning and resource allocation, 
the formal is run on a legal rational basis and is the one that is described in procedures 
manuals; the other is the informal system where a society-wide patrimonial or ‘Big Man’ 
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system influences public choices. This system is one in which ‘Big Men’ — politicians and 
senior bureaucrats in today’s terms — have huge expectations placed upon them by 
their kinsfolk and constituents for them to use their positions to access and distribute 
largesse. These two systems exist side by side and are always in competition. An Adviser 
may help to strengthen the formal rational system and while capacity building alone will 
help, there is always powerful countervailing pressures applied from the informal 
system... In PNG the survival of the rational planning system depends on the resolve of 
senior managers and the Minister. (A24, 2009) 
Political alignment and jealousy affected my ability to connect with certain staff who 
seem determined to bring down any changes, improvements or successes that may 
provide success for their rivals. (A43, 2010) 
I would rate the placement as being successful as we have achieved a lot and some very 
effective relationships were formed at all levels. The level of success has been limited 
due to the entrenched work culture of senior managers and the level of sustainability is 
limited. (A53, 2010) 
3.5.5.3 Lack of will/interest 
The positive effect of counterparts’ willingness to participate in placement activities and 
commitment to pursuing placement outcomes on success was seen as an enabler, whereas its 
absence was seen as an impediment. The following is an example of the adviser’s experiences of this 
impediment. 
Many frustrations were faced by myself and my partner Adviser in the [Agency] in trying 
to address skills gaps within the [Agency], training and capacity building can only be 
successful if there is a willingness to learn and participate by the Counterpart. In the 
[Agency] the staff that were non-performing did not have either. (A18, 2007) 
The data isolated within this category go beyond the realm of skills transfer and training into the 
territory of lack of willingness to implement project initiatives at the highest echelons of agency 
leadership/management. A total of 45 out of 78 advisers reported lack of will/interest as an 
impediment to placement success, with the majority pointing to staff at the senior/executive 
management, director and assistant secretary/secretary levels as impeding AC projects’ 
improvement of agency functioning.  
The examination of data within this category provides insight into the distinction between ratings of 
‘successful’ (often with qualifiers such as ‘reasonably’ or ‘moderately’) and ‘very successful’ made by 
advisers, by highlighting some of the difficulties faced by advisers in translating intermediate project 
outcomes into fully implemented and sustainable ones. Once more a constellation of factors is 
implicated in accounting for lack of will/interest, in particular, organisational culture and the 
associated impediments of hiring practices, ineffective management, and inadequate or non-
existent performance management regimes. Although the following quotes are presented under 
general headings, it can be seen that the impediments mentioned above are mutually reinforcing 
and are capable of having deleterious effects on placement outcomes in the long term. 
a) General impediments 
The objectives and outcomes were generally unrealistic and overly optimistic in terms of 
what could be achieved in the timeframes. In some cases outputs were achieved but the 
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level of [Agency] ownership and sustainability is not adequate. This is due to a lack of 
leadership and management commitment to progressing initiatives. (A53, 2010) 
This part of the planning process has been greatly enhanced through the placement but 
remains in a fragile state and is unlikely to survive the exit of the Adviser as the CPMO 
lacks the necessary ‘mental discipline’ to carry it forward without close monitoring from 
an effective Secretary. (A3, 2006) 
b) Hiring processes – Acting positions and long-term vacancies 
The ToRs were realistic but the commitment ability of staff to work to this level was not 
forthcoming. In part, the lack of commitment has been due to the continuing vacancy of 
the position of Manager [specified] since the end March. (A21, 2007) 
A large number of senior management positions within the IT Division were Acting 
positions, resulting in instability and limited commitment from senior management to 
make operational and technical improvements. This issue was Department wide and not 
only within the IT department. (A28, 2008) 
On paper and on the surface these things were realistic and achievable and whilst a 
corporate plan and policies and procedures were designed and formulated; the most 
important state of moving things to the completion and implementation stages were 
almost impossible because of the lack of will from the acting managing director due to 
resistance from the senior management group. The corporate plan, the restructure and 
other related, but difficult issues, were only finally implemented when the substantive 
managing director was appointed. (A44, 2009) 
c) Organisational culture, including performance management 
Training and mentoring of the Secretary has proved less effective, whilst he is often 
receptive to one-on-one mentoring he did not make the effort to complete work tasks, 
or follow-up on work that was actually done for him. I did not envy his position, staff 
performance has been a significant issue and the underperformers are his relatives. This 
coupled with the Chairman and Secretary holding their respective positions on an acting 
basis compounded the problem. Non-attendance has been an ongoing issue; attempts 
by Finance to pay officers according to hours worked (i.e. by the time sheets lodged) 
have not been successful either. (A18, 2007) 
To be fair to the Department, implementation only commenced in 2007 after its 
endorsement by the [government]. However, my view is that the Department will be 
ineffective in the implementation due to the general malaise within the Department, 
general incompetence of management and lack of any form of discipline or performance 
management. (A30, 2008) 
These activities were effective in the sense that KAS know the right thing to do. They 
have a good understanding of the Public Finance (Management) Act and the General 
Orders. They just decline to implement those laws, preferring to take an easier or more 
personally advantageous course of action. (A30, 2008) 
d) Implications for placement outcomes 
The strategy is simple but it would have to be sustained over two or more years to turn 
around the entrenched culture and practices of [the Agency]. Application of 
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performance management throughout all levels of [the Agency], from top-to-bottom, is 
the critical missing ingredient in [the Agency]. This would start with a performance 
agreement between the Chief Secretary and [the Agency] Secretary, cascading down to 
individual performance agreements for every manager. Such agreements for managers 
are in place now and have been an important output of my placement. What is missing 
is firm, fair and consistent decision-making by the Secretary where he puts systems in 
place to make his two deputy secretaries accountable for their personal performance 
and that of their divisions. What is also missing is holding the deputies to account, 
handing out consequences and rewards for poor and good performance respectively; 
repeated poor performance would be dealt with, by discipline where necessary. Such an 
approach would be repeated throughout the rest of the organisation… The foundations 
and systems for this cultural change are there: many were built through this placement. 
What is needed now is executive willingness to make it happen, and a willingness to do 
all the hard work and take the tough decisions that go with changing organisational 
culture. By my reckoning, such willingness is not there at present. (A51, 2010) 
Regarding the achievement relating to audit recommendations, no positive impact could 
be made upon the public sector governance and control until top management in [the 
Department] is committed to implementation. With the present management style, 
corporate culture and staff capability, I am not optimistic that those key 
recommendations will be implemented by [Department] management. (A67, 2012) 
e) Perfunctory support for a collaborative approach 
It is sometimes difficult to gauge ‘genuine’ interest/motive from managers to 
implementing improvements and change during initial meetings and in hindsight it 
would have been beneficial to facilitate a group discussion with managers on changes to 
planning, monitoring and reporting during the first month of the assignment. The 
purpose of this group discussion would have been to try and internalize the need for 
change. The types of questions to be posed to the managers would have been: ‘what is 
in it for me’; ‘what is in it for you’ and ‘what is in it for us’. As it turned out, I don’t think 
enough people supported the proposed changes to progress from developing an annual 
plan to implementing it and monitoring progress despite there being overall agreement 
to do so from the SMC during the timeframe of the assignment. Therefore more time 
needed to be spent on getting real buy-in to the proposed changes. (A5, 2007) 
Because the Acting Director at the time, [Counterpart name], did not provide any input 
into the formation of the final terms of reference, there was a lack of commitment and 
support as evidenced by his reluctance to support their implementation. (A47, 2009) 
3.5.5.4 Management 
A total of 39 of 78 advisers reported inadequacies in management practices as impediments to their 
placement’s success. Due to the interrelated nature of impediments, each of the impediments 
discussed thus far—insufficient human capacity, organisational culture and/or politics, and lack of 
will/interest—both implicate and have implications for staff working at the managerial level. There 
are a number of extracts from the PCRs in previous sections that specifically address management 
issues. For this reason, these issues and concerns will not be raised again here. 
The additional concern reported here concerns advisers reporting the negative effects of managerial 
influence—or lack thereof—on work undertaken with their direct counterparts. 
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[My Counterpart’s] ability to gain more from the placement was hampered by a lack of 
resources and managerial support in Corporate. (A17, 2007) 
[My Counterpart] possesses the underlying skills and knowledge to be able to provide 
effective coordination in her area of responsibility. Her constraints are – limited 
resources, ineffective formal structure, ineffective management support and confidence. 
(A39, 2008) 
Internal service delivery by HR has certainly improved due to the initiatives discussed so 
far. There is no doubt there is room for further developments but there has definitely has 
been progress made. This improved service delivery operates quite independently of 
Adviser input however whether it will continue after the Adviser placement has finished 
is questionable. Undertaking these activities while interesting and rewarding require 
effort. To-date there has not been a great deal of pressure nor reward from 
management for the HR staff to expend this additional effort and therefore the 
enthusiasm displayed by the KAS may reduce over time. (A20, 2007) 
[Training and mentoring of] the Acting Director [has been] very effective. However he 
has been hampered by an uncooperative band of senior managers in his attempt to 
implement and enforce compliance with policies and procedures. (A37, 2008) 
3.5.5.5 Insufficient time 
Almost 50 per cent of advisers (36 of 78) reported insufficient time to meet project ToRs within the 
placement periods. Unsurprisingly, the various reasons given for insufficient time directly relate to 
each of the impediments discussed here, as well as others mentioned in passing. Further reasons 
relate to the project enablers, in particular the need to establish sound interpersonal relationships 
based upon mutual respect and trust, and the time taken to establish these before substantial work 
towards the realisation of ToRs can begin. Examples of each are offered below, as well as an 
additional factor not previously mentioned: the nature of adviser placement contracts.  
a) Organisational (and local) culture 
[ToR] Change in organisational culture to focus on achieving results: a most noble ideal 
but unrealistic in the project time available under PNG conditions. It is generally 
recommended that achievement of cultural change in an organisation would take 
between 3 to 5 years under ideal conditions. Listing this objective for achievement in 2 
years under PNG conditions and without employing ‘shock tactics’ (which is not really an 
option in PNG as it requires extremely strong leadership) the timeframe was most 
unrealistic. In addition to the PNG contextual issues the leadership in [the Agency] has 
been counterproductive to achieving this outcome - it required people who could ‘walk 
the talk’ and be a ‘role model’ for others in the organisation. (A3, 2006) 
I would caution about having unrealistic expectations about the timing required to 
undertake tasks when planning projects. Decision-making in PNG is often a very iterative 
process, and considerable importance is attached to everyone having their say, which 
can be very frustrating when it seems apparent that a decision has already been agreed! 
Despite working here for several years I can still be surprised by the number of 
unexpected issues that can arise to delay project implementation. These have included 
national staff having to manage sick or dying relatives (an issue that is only going to 
exacerbate with the increasing prevalence of HIV-AIDS), power outages damaging 
computer equipment and delays in government procurement processes. (A11, 2006) 
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b) Insufficient time for implementation/sustainable change 
This type of change in PNG requires on-going maintenance and while the activities were 
completed in the timeframe the on-going application of the skills and long-term effects 
may not be realized without further support. (A20, 2007) 
During the placement a total of 55 HR policies and procedures have been developed 
which provide clear direction and responsibilities for managing HR issues. Training has 
been provided to 120 managers and supervisors in the first 15 of these, however, due 
the timing of approval of these coinciding with the end of the placement; I have not 
been able to support the implementation and training in the remaining 40 policies and 
procedures. There is a need to ensure that this initiative is fully implemented to achieve 
the highest level of change possible and to ensure that the policies and procedures do 
not become just another folder on the desk but are actually used on a daily basis to 
guide better management. (A13, 2006) 
c) Insufficient human capacity/initial analysis of needs incorrect 
Throughout the placement issues arose in the lack of wider understanding of 
procurement from other advisors and contractors. The amount of time required to 
provide assistance and support was not considered in the work plan. The provision of 
assistance is important and was provided, the note here is that the broader need for this 
advice and assistance is not acknowledged nor catered for. (A18, 2007) 
The ToRs were very ambitious for a 12-month period, particularly given the HR staffing 
levels…and the level of understanding of HR practices by my key Counterpart, the acting 
Registrar. (A50, 2010) 
d) Initial analysis of needs incorrect/time needed to form relationships 
At the time of accepting this position the job and person specifications appeared current 
and relevant. However on assessing the [Agency] situation and progress with their field 
operations work for the [placement focus] at the start of my contract, the situation was 
such that the role required far more operational inputs and activities than outlined in 
the job specifications as a ‘standard’ Adviser position and therefore allowed less time for 
capacity building which resulted in that particular specification being largely 
opportunistic… Further, given that it takes time to build trust and relationships in order 
to have free and frank discussions with Counterparts, the amount of lead in time to the 
project also affected the level of capacity building desired to take place. Proposed 
changes are that an appropriate assessment of the actual situation for an Adviser 
placement be undertaken to ensure that AusAID, the program management contractor, 
Adviser and Adviser facility are in full agreement regarding the capacity building, 
operational activities and expected inputs and outcomes. (A62, 2011) 
e) Lack of will/interest 
The objectives and outcomes were generally unrealistic and overly optimistic in terms of 
what could be achieved in the timeframes. In some cases outputs were achieved but the 
level of [Agency] ownership and sustainability is not adequate. This is due to a lack of 
leadership and management commitment to progressing initiatives. For example an 
outcome that requires managers from across the organisation to use information more 
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constructively was always going to be a huge challenge in the short to medium term (3 
years). (A53, 2010) 
In the placement period, the Adviser considered it necessary to get a few structural 
issues attended to, like the development and introduction essential policies and 
procedures, conducting training and attempting to create a cultural shift towards 
complying with procedures, especially on procurement, when none had been followed, 
as there were none to follow. This culture shift was bigger than developing KAS capacity, 
as it related to developing the Agency’s capacity to do it. While the seeds of this shift 
have been planted, and has had some success, the lack of leadership and support from 
senior management has resulted in bringing limited success to the broader culture shift. 
(A37, 2008)  
f) Existing workload of KAS 
After the initial novelty of having an Adviser working with the HR team had subsided, 
the reality of the work that came with reviewing systems and formulating policies etc, 
became apparent to the KAS. The KAS had now inherited work that some of them saw as 
an ‘extra work load’. Although the Adviser work plan tasks they had taken on were in 
fact extra work – the tasks were in most cases activities that should have been occurring 
in the first place. Deadlines for completion of work plan tasks often had to be moved as 
KAS had not been able to complete them when they planned to. It would have been easy 
for the Adviser to step in and complete the tasks, but this would have defeated the 
capacity building aspect of the KAS being the one to do the task. (A35, 2008) 
g) Twelve-month placements/contractual arrangements 
Capacity building is a long process and does not happen within months or even a year as 
it requires behavioural change and most of all, the willingness to change at all. ASF 
placements are initially for a period of 12 months. Although they are often extended for 
twelve more months, one must assume it is for 12 months only. I would have 
approached some issues differently if I had known from the beginning that I would have 
24 months. (A25, 2007) 
I could, and did, aim to influence the thinking, direction and pace of change in some 
areas of [the Agency’s] performance but it is unrealistic to anticipate ‘sustained’ 
capacity in this setting within a twelve-month period. I feel that [the Agency] has been 
disadvantaged by my departure at the end of the twelve-month placement; the ASF has 
advertised for a new Adviser for an extension of the placement. I feel this outcome could 
have been avoided if the ASF could provide better certainty on placements offered as 
‘twelve months with possibility of extension’. Unfortunately, when the decision was 
subsequently made to extend the placement it was too late for me to revisit my 
departure. I believe that continuity of my advisory role would have been a better 
outcome for the agency and the placement. (A16, 2007) 
3.5.6 Adviser and counterpart interview and focus group evidence of 
impediments to success 
Fourteen advisers participated in interviews by phone or Skype, and four counterparts participated 
in a group interview in Port Moresby, a further 13 (current) advisers participated in three focus 
groups in Port Moresby (across two occasions in 2013) as did 12 (current) counterparts. Further 
details are provided in section 3.5.3 above. The key matters that were identified and are presented 
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below with supporting quotes are as follows: ‘difficulty of measuring success’, ‘late contract 
extensions’, ‘gender issues’, ‘insufficient human capacity’, ‘incorrect needs analysis’, ‘inadequate 
performance management’ and ‘inadequate preparation of staff’. 
3.5.6.1 The difficulty of measuring success 
One of the most discussed impediments to achieving ‘success’ in capacity building related, not to 
capacity building itself, but to how its success is identified and measured. Advisers argued that their 
views of the success of their placements changed over time. They came to realise that ‘the 
[outcomes] occur over a longer timeframe than the placement itself, often many years longer’ (A69, 
2008). In the majority of cases, advisers believed their placements were far more successful years 
after the fact. One adviser, almost five years since the end of her placement, still ‘reads and hears 
about initiatives occurring that were the subject of discussion with [her] Counterpart’ (A68, 2007). 
Another adviser initially regarded his placement as of limited success because his project office had 
been closed down, but later realised that his work had been ‘picked-up when the project was re-
established and would have led to the project’s ultimate success’ (A76, 2006). One adviser could not 
think of any evidence of success that would have been apparent at the end of his placement, but 
could arguably see evidence of it now in examples of organisational behaviour that indicated 
positive cultural change. In the short-term however, this adviser’s placement had ‘just felt like 
continuous frustration’ (A21, 2007).  
One adviser (A58, 2011) took the opposite view of his first placement, which he left believing was 
‘very successful’ but later realised that, while ‘procedurally a lot of things happened [the 
Counterpart had] not successfully connected the dots’. He realised that the counterpart understood 
all of the processes in isolation and could carry them out independently but, ‘he didn’t actually 
understand how and why they fit together’ This is reflective of the impediment ‘staff lack 
understanding of purpose and function’ isolated in Stage 1 (29% of advisers), which this adviser 
addressed in subsequent placements by ‘starting at the top and working down to the process’. 
In other cases advisers believed that success was difficult to quantify because it encompassed 
immeasurable factors such as self-confidence and changes in demeanour and attitude (A16, 2007). 
In addition, the activities engaged in by advisers to promote this kind of development were 
themselves difficult to quantify. An adviser stated that, ‘there is a tension there about what you can 
put on a checklist—it is easier to say I ran three workshops and four seminars, two field trips and five 
questionnaire designs, than it is to say I had ten conversations with her that made her feel more 
confident as a female in PNG society. It is really hard to put that in a report’ (A68, 2007). With regard 
to individual capacity development in general, another adviser noted that, at least at the time of her 
placement, ‘there was no real formal method for identifying Counterparts’ development as a result 
of placement activities’ (A50, 2010). 
3.5.6.2 Late contract extensions 
Several advisers mentioned problems arising from the system of instituting six-month or twelve-
month initial placement periods, with the possibility to extend. Decisions about extensions were 
often left until very late in the initial placement period, therefore advisers often located and secured 
other employment prior to an extension decision being made (advisers spoke of this with regard to 
themselves and as having been the experience of other advisers they knew and/or worked with). 
One adviser noted: 
 [This] string of Advisers is problematic because everyone does things differently 
regardless of how detailed handover notes are…while this doesn’t mean starting from 
scratch every time there is not a nice continuous process…backtracking happens; 
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relationship building has to start from scratch… and [there is the risk of] Adviser fatigue. 
(A50, 2010)  
Another noted the problem of ‘reinventing the wheel’ (A16, 2007). As a result of the uncertainty 
about how long an adviser will have with an agency, it was argued that the practice of appointing for 
an initial period and then extending it ‘was not an effective or efficient use of resources’ (A73, 2009). 
Adviser A79 asserted that ‘AusAID does not like extensions. It likes breaks and new projects with 
Advisers’. He claimed that his initial six months was ‘just a scratch’ on the work required and that the 
agency could have an adviser there for years which would delight the PNG government. 
3.5.6.3 Gender issues 
Four of the women advisers interviewed specifically mentioned problems they encountered in their 
placements with senior males in their organisations. One such adviser suggested that, ‘to really have 
an impact on senior male managers the adviser [has] to be a senior male manager (A68, 2007). 
Another female adviser who had seen male staff act respectfully toward a male expatriate colleague 
stated, ‘I definitely think if I was a male adviser they [the senior males] would have behaved 
differently’ (A16, 2007). Often this caused delays in commencing placements as time had to be taken 
to overcome counterpart resistance to working with a woman. As one adviser stated, she was 
‘eventually [able] to work with his team’ although it was a much longer period before she was able 
to work with the director, her primary counterpart (A71, 2010). 
3.5.6.4 Insufficient human capacity  
One adviser spoke of her counterpart simply not having sufficient capacity to fulfil his role. He had a 
series of advisers over 10 years and ‘basically did not have what it takes to do his job’ (A75, 2008). 
Others spoke of how a very low level of starting capacity made it difficult, if not impossible, for them 
to achieve the higher level capacity development aims of their placements within the contract. 
Advisers found that they needed first to undertake training at a very basic level (A50, 2010 & A71, 
2010) or that a lack of understanding of technical issues ‘made the organising of technical workshops 
and training more complicated’ (A68, 2007). Another adviser found it easier to work on systems 
development, saying that ultimately all he could do was ‘try to take staff along with all the new 
processes and processes’ and that ‘staff picked up knowledge in a piecemeal fashion through these 
various interactions’ (A70, 2008). The following impediment of incorrect needs analysis is clearly also 
implicated here. 
3.5.6.5 Incorrect needs analysis 
The analysis of PCRs (above) showed that 35 per cent of advisers identified that inadequate needs 
analysis during the planning for the placement was an impediment to success. This was stated 
clearly by advisers in a focus group who alleged that EPSP’s capacity diagnostic exercise was 
‘ludicrous’. They characterised the process as involving eminent PNG bureaucrats to investigate the 
‘failings of agencies’ and to recommend solutions. They suspected that the teams were briefed that 
ASF was ‘a disaster’ and need ‘big fixes’. Hence, they argued, ‘things that ASF got right’ were ignored 
and there was a lack of consultation and/or ignoring of agencies’ advice. It was said that the 
subsequent capacity development agreements often bore no relation to the discussions that 
occurred and that this contributed to poorly targeted AC placements and some unrealistic ToRs. 
Some advisers spoke of how it became clear that their counterparts’ difficulties did not reside in 
them not knowing what to do, but rather in not knowing how to do it. In these cases, it was often a 
matter of building counterpart confidence (A21, 2007) or setting up opportunities for counterparts 
to practise and then apply their skills (A39, 2008). One adviser believed that this problem was a 
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function of both placement design and the way that success is measured (A39, 2008). In the design 
stage he believed that what was often identified as a ‘training need’ was really a ‘performance gap’, 
with the latter arising from a variety of possible causes and only one of those being a need for 
training. Further, when placements were designed around the delivery of training, this adviser 
believed that those placements were deemed to be ‘successful’ once the training had been delivered 
and its deliverers had ‘ticked all the boxes’ (A39, 2008). He added, however, that the ‘delivery of 
training means nothing if after it the skills cannot be or are not actually applied’ and that ‘you can 
only know that there has been success when you can see the skills put into action’ (A39, 2008). 
In the group interview with three counterparts (C86, C87 & C88) a general feeling was expressed 
that the AC projects are conceptualised without an adequate appreciation of the abilities of the 
staff. Often the potential counterparts are not asked or not even aware of the project before they 
are engaged. Counterpart C86 gave the example that ‘there are problems when the Adviser does 
things that the Papua New Guineans already know’. Counterpart C87 claimed that, ‘while there are 
knowledgeable PNG people in [my] Agency, until the Adviser came they were not being used 
effectively, so now everyone does better’. 
3.5.6.6 Inadequate performance management 
As was the case in the PCRs, a few advisers mentioned difficulties cementing capacity building gains 
in skills and knowledge because, for example, ‘management issues are not being addressed [and] 
staff remain unaccountable for their actions and there are no sanctions applied’ (A39, 2008). In 
stronger terms: the ‘main obstacle to achieving any form of progress in PNG is a total lack of 
executive will or leadership to institute proper performance management, people don’t turn up and 
know that they will only be promoted if their Wantok is the manager’ (A75, 2008). This state of 
affairs then led to ‘low motivation’ on the part of staff (A70, 2008), feeding into the impediment of 
‘lack of will/interest’ mentioned earlier. 
3.5.6.7 Inadequate preparation of staff 
A few advisers mentioned that their placements had been adversely affected by the fact that 
counterparts or other agency staff had not been properly advised of or prepared for their arrival. 
This resulted in ‘resentment and confusion’ (A16, 2007) and ‘a lack of willingness to engage’ (A17, 
2007). One adviser expressed the cause of this resentment as the fact that ‘suddenly someone 
arrives saying “I’m here to help you do your job better” and they didn’t realise they were doing 
anything “wrong”’ (A39, 2008). In the words of one adviser, ‘there needs to be a “climate of 
readiness” in the area where the placement [is] to occur if it [is] going to be fully successful’ (A17, 
2007). Formulated alternatively, ‘the Adviser needs to be seen as not forced on staff and this 
requires both managerial and broader organisational buy-in’ (A21, 2007). Clearly this has 
implications for other impediments isolated in Stage 1 of this project, namely ‘lack of will/interest’ 
(58% of advisers), ‘active resistance to adviser’ (18%) and also has implications for ‘counterpart 
attitude’ (noted by 49% of advisers as an enabler of placement success). 
Counterparts expressed some other related views. In a group interview, four counterparts had the 
view that that the AC placements are conceptualised without an adequate appreciation of the 
abilities of the staff. Often the potential Counterparts are not asked or not even aware of the project 
before they are engaged.  
3.5.6.8 Internal politics 
The majority of advisers interviewed made mention in some way of how internal politics (closely 
linked with organisational culture) had negatively affected some aspect of their placements. This is 
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in line with the 55 per cent of advisers in Stage 1 who made mention of this impediment in their 
PCRs. Of particular concern was the fact that internal political wrangling could mean that by the time 
an adviser arrived at their placement the situation had ‘dramatically changed’ in terms of priorities 
and personnel (A69, 2008) and, concomitantly, that pre-established ToRs would no longer be fitting. 
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4 Discussion 
4.1 Introduction 
This section is based on the topics of the main research questions described previously in section 
2.3. It draws on the data and discussion provided in section 3 to offer analyses and discussion under 
the following headings: ‘the effectiveness of AC placements’; ‘capacity development through AC 
placements’; ‘the influencing factors on AC placements’; ‘stakeholders’ views about AC placements’; 
and ‘the role of other modalities in capacity development’.  
4.2 Effectiveness of AC placements 
This section brings together the issues around the effectiveness of undertaking AC placements in 
PNG government agencies. It will cover the operation of the placements and issues around setting 
them up. In determining the effectiveness of AC placements this section also considers what 
evidence is available to determine their level of effectiveness. This section draws on the findings 
discussed in sections 3.2 and 3.3 on the fieldwork undertaken with advisers and counterparts. This 
section also draws on the review of previous work undertaken in the area as outlined in the 
literature review in section 2.2. 
This section will discuss the issues around research questions one and two as stated below: 
RQ1 What are the advisers’ views of the success or otherwise of their partnerships with their 
counterpart(s) in achieving their placements’ stated aims? What evidence is there to support 
these views? 
RQ2  What are the counterparts’ views of the success or otherwise of their partnerships with their 
advisers in achieving their placements’ stated aims? What evidence is there to support these 
views? 
Determining whether an AC placement is a success or not is complex and perspectives will often vary 
between those involved with the placement, for example, advisers, counterparts, colleagues and the 
managers of counterparts. It is acknowledged that other parties will also have views of the success 
of a placement including the funding agency (DFAT) and the managing contractor for the program 
(Coffey International). However, the aim of this section is to discuss the views of the advisers and 
counterparts of the success of their placements.  
The nature of the evidence of the outcomes of AC placements varies widely. In some cases the 
output of a placement leads itself to tangible evidence, e.g. the development of a policy, in other 
cases where a cultural change in an agency is the desired outcome explicit evidence may be more 
difficult to identify. Even where there is evidence of a successful output of the placement (e.g. the 
writing of a policy) whether a successful outcome has occurred is often more difficult to assess, e.g. 
the policy has improved the area it has addressed. 
4.2.1 Terms of reference and meeting the aims of the placement 
The role of the Terms of Reference (ToRs) was acknowledged by all the parties as central to the 
success or otherwise of an AC placement. It was often seen as emblematic of the whole planning and 
preparation process of placements with all the issues that brought to bear. Of all the topics covered 
by this study, the ToRs were perhaps the one that caused the most strident comments from advisers 
and counterparts. 
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Although 97 per cent of advisers, as shown in section 3.1.2, indicated that they felt that their ToRs 
were either highly appropriate or appropriate at the time of commencement on reflection many 
were critical of them later. The level of critical reflection seemed to increase the further away the 
comments were made from the start of the placement. Discussions with advisers who were 
currently engaged with their placement indicated that they could see shortcomings with their ToRs 
which were often a factor of changes in personnel or the environment (see section 4.4.4). The survey 
of advisers also showed 67 per cent indicating that their ToRs were highly appropriate or 
appropriate at the completion of their placements. In interviews, the advisers who had completed 
their placements several years previously were the most critical of their ToRs. This effect is possibly 
explained by the advisers becoming aware of what could have been done if alternatives had been 
available at the beginning of the placement. The role of reflection and distance on views about the 
success of planning and outcome of a placement should not be underestimated. This point is further 
explored in section 4.4.4 which discusses capacity diagnostics and placement design.  
Counterparts’ views of the ToRs varied from that of advisers; counterparts generally had lower levels 
of satisfaction with 64 per cent indicating that they thought that their ToRs were highly appropriate 
or appropriate (see section 3.2.2 for further details) at the beginning of the placement but less 
reduction in those levels (62%) the later the views were gathered from when the placement 
commenced. It appears that counterparts were consistently satisfied or not with the ToRs from 
when they were drawn up to after the placement completed. Perhaps this is due to the counterparts 
knowing from the start, from being situated in the context where the placement was going to occur, 
whether the ToRs were appropriate or not. Thus they had a more direct experience to draw on as to 
whether the ToRs were a good fit or not for their context, whereas the advisers learnt this the more 
they were exposed to the placement. 
The development of the ToRs was a cause of great discussion by all concerned with AC placements, 
i.e. the funding agency, the managing contractor, and advisers and counterparts associated with the 
placement. One of the tensions around the development of the ToRs was their influence on whether 
the placement was seen to be successful or not, that is, whether ToRs acted as a target or a 
limitation. In the case of the ToRs acting as a target they were sometimes perceived as being 
unachievable for a variety of reasons which caused advisers to become frustrated or led to the 
perception that advisers focused purely on meeting the ToRs while ignoring other important 
matters. Whereas when they were perceived as acting as a limitation, the ToRs were seen as making 
desirable outcomes that advisers or counterparts felt useful unachievable. Often changes were 
required because of a change of direction in agencies due to ministerial changes (see section 
4.4.3.2). Finding a balance between the two was felt to be an important precursor to a successful 
and sustainable placement. 
Both advisers and counterparts acknowledged that there had been changes by EPSP in the way ToRs 
were developed and allowed to evolve during placements. There was also acknowledgement that 
developments and changes in the agency and it surrounding context often overtook ToRs, 
sometimes even before the placement commenced. Thus, there was a strong feeling amongst 
counterparts that, once a broad area had been identified as requiring an adviser, those who were to 
have direct contact with the adviser should have a significant role in revising the ToRs before the 
placement commenced. 
Closely connected to the above discussion of the role of the ToRs is the determination of whether 
the aims of the placement have been met. The consequence, or otherwise, of this occurring is 
closely tied to the impact of a placement. If the aims of the placement are not met, it is not likely to 
have the desired impacts. 
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Broadly two dimensions were identified by advisers and counterparts in determining whether the 
aims of the placement were met. The first dimension was that of the development of the 
counterpart or counterparts and the second was the development of the department or agency 
where the Adviser was located. These dimensions broadly reflect the wider view of development 
discussed in section 2.2.3 of development occurring at the individual, agency and societal levels. 
The determination of whether the stated aims of a placement had been met was often left to the 
adviser’s opinion, as there was no formal mechanism for the counterpart to add their voice to this 
determination. Although it was sometimes mentioned that EPSP would conduct interviews with key 
managers in the agency to solicit feedback (see section 4.6.5) few counterparts in this study were 
asked themselves. The evidence from the survey suggests that the views of advisers and 
counterparts are somewhat at odds with each other. The counterparts, on the whole (97%), 
appeared to feel that the aims of the placements were more often met than advisers (69%). This 
raises the issue of, if judgements of the success of the EPSP program are based on advisers’ views, 
whether an underestimation of its impact is occurring. 
4.2.2 Working with counterparts  
The centre of an AC placement is the relationship between advisers and counterparts. It was 
acknowledged by most advisers and counterparts that if the relationship between the key 
individuals was not positive then the chance of the placement being successful was considerably 
reduced. The working relationship between advisers, counterparts and others in their agencies 
manifested itself in many variations depending upon a wide range of issues and contexts of where 
the placement took place. 
The evidence in sections 3.1.3 and 3.2.2 of the advisers’ and counterparts’ views of their 
relationships respectively shows similar levels of perceived effectiveness when quantified in the 
survey, but the qualitative data brought out differences as well as similarities between the two 
groups. Both groups agreed that positive working relationships needed to be formed as quickly as 
possible in the placement (see section 4.4.1.1). However, the context surrounding the relationship 
often brought the two parties together from quite different circumstances. For example, many 
counterparts had a number of advisers before and some had troubled relationships with them. This 
often affected the way counterparts approached new advisers. Most advisers were aware of such 
sensitivities but sometimes with the pressure of their placements, particularly short-term 
placements, there was little opportunity to address them (see sections 4.4.1.7 and 4.5.2).  
A further factor in working with counterparts was, not only the relationship with the individual who 
had been identified as the key person, but also the team and managers who worked around him or 
her. Advisers often spoke about the issue of senior managers being obstructive to their work, or 
their counterparts not receiving support from appropriate colleagues and this adversely affecting 
the outcome of the placement. This suggests that the agency did not ‘own’ the placement from the 
outset. As outlined in section 2.2.4.1 the matter of ownership of development activities is one that 
has been at the centre of a debate for a long time. The move towards more ownership to the 
recipient of development activities should improve the prospect of better working relationships 
developing in AC placements (see section 4.6.5 for comments made by senior managers on this 
issue).  
4.2.3 Departmental planning and policy development 
Many of the placements were designed to improve the planning processes of the agency in which 
they were situated. Often the counterpart was one of the key staff responsible for the development 
of a departmental plan. This area is one where the measurement of success can significantly vary 
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between producing an output (e.g. a departmental plan) and an improvement in outcomes (e.g. 
improvement in the running of the department). It was often the case that the adviser was able to 
report that a plan had been written but was less sure about whether there would be subsequent 
changes as a result of implementing the plan or indeed whether the plan was implemented at all.  
What was clear from the data from the advisers was the effect of the length of a placement when its 
aim was to address departmental planning. The nature of departmental planning means it is on an 
annual cycle and therefore the opportunity to allow counterparts to learn and apply the skills and 
knowledge was difficult to achieve with any placements shorter than two years. Many advisers 
spoke of their frustration at not being able to follow through with departmental planning both in 
terms of its implementation and ensuring that their counterpart was able to undertake it when they 
had completed their placement (see section 4.4.1.7 for further discussion on this issue). 
There is often a close connection for many of the departments included in this study between 
planning and policy development and they share several of the issues identified above. However, in 
the case of policy development the distance between the output of the placement (the development 
of the policy) and the outcome (the effect of the policy on the area concerned) is much greater and 
there are many more factors, often outside of the department, at play. This is perhaps reflected in 
the data from the advisers’ survey with the level of evidence of successful implementation of 
policies being approximately one third less than that of departmental planning. In comparison, 
counterparts showed little difference between levels of evidence of successful departmental 
planning and policy development. 
It is in this area that the issue of stability in the agencies’ remit and ministerial oversight is in most 
focus. Advisers whose placements were centred on policy development often spoke of the fact that, 
although they and their counterparts and their senior managers had developed and approved a 
policy, getting it through the ministerial process was often frustrating. This frustration was often due 
to the instability of the government but also counteracting pressures from other areas of the 
government (see section 4.4.3.1). As discussed in section 2.2 this issue has been recognised for some 
time, but more consideration needs to be given to how to support advisers and counterparts when 
they encounter this situation. 
4.2.4 Service and system delivery 
An overriding objective of the EPSP program is the improvement of government services for the 
people of PNG. The connection between the activities undertaken during an AC placement and 
improvement in service delivery is a complex one as there are often many factors outside the control 
of the placement. Also, in most cases in this study the service delivery outcomes of a placement are 
services delivered to other departments or agencies.  
There seemed to be a wide disparity between advisers and counterparts in their views of the 
amount of evidence of success in the area of service delivery. Advisers felt that there was little 
evidence of success with only 36 per cent of the survey respondents indicating considerable or 
significant evidence compared to 91 per cent of counterparts on the same measure. It is difficult to 
explain this large difference other than perhaps the levels of expectations of the placements 
between advisers and counterparts. Amongst advisers there seemed to be two distinct groups of 
opinions. One group believed their placement had produced improvements to service delivery 
within the constraints of their placement. The other group believed that because of all the factors 
external to their placements, it was almost impossible to determine if improvements had been made 
to the final point of the delivery of the service.  
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In some placements the aim was to deliver improved systems and less the development needs of an 
individual or individuals. This is not to say that the development of individuals’ skills and knowledge 
were not planned to occur in such placements but rather these came as a result of implementing a 
system of some type, more often than not an IT system. Producing evidence of the improvement or 
implementation of the system itself is usually not difficult but showing evidence that those whose 
jobs it will be to use, maintain and improve the system have had their capacity improved is more 
problematic.  
Similarly to the findings for service delivery, there was a large disparity between the results from the 
adviser and counterpart surveys on the improvement of systems. Fifty per cent of advisers reported 
that they could identify evidence of considerable or significant improvements to systems as a result 
of their placement, whereas 90 per cent of counterparts felt they could identify such evidence. Again 
this difference may be explained by differences in expectations. 
As with any systems delivery that involves the use of IT, the success or otherwise can broadly be split 
into two major components; the technology used (hardware and software) and the business re-
modelling (the associated ways of doing the work in question). In the AC placements both these 
aspects of system delivery posed challenges and advisers commented on them widely as outlined in 
section 3.1.3.4. The challenges encountered when the placement was primarily focused on delivery 
of the technical component was about ensuring that technical staff had the skills and knowledge to 
maintain the system, particularly after the adviser had left. In addition, the advisers who were 
involved with business remodelling, as a result of introducing new IT systems, indicated that in many 
cases the changes in processes and policies were also a very useful outcome of introducing such 
systems. 
4.2.5 Capacity building 
At the core of most AC placements is the development of a counterpart’s capacity to undertake their 
role in their department. This human capacity building is essentially an educational activity occurring 
in the workplace. This aspect of AC placements is examined in section 4.3, therefore in this section 
only issues around the evidence found of human capacity development is discussed. 
As outlined in section 3.1.3.6 human capacity building is seen as more than the acquisition of skills 
and knowledge. Rather, it is seen as the development of the whole person, so for example it includes 
improvements in confidence, commitment, developing relationships, independence, leadership etc. 
The elements that go beyond the skills and knowledge learned during a placement are the outcomes 
that are more likely to have an enduring result after the adviser has left. This, along with the 
understanding of ‘why’ rather than ‘how’ something should be done, is central to the notion of 
human capacity development. However, these sorts of changes are more difficult to achieve and 
measure. 
Some evidence was found by advisers, but less so by counterparts, of the broader range of human 
capacity development attributes discussed above. One adviser cited examples of where they had 
seen the counterparts ‘grow into respected leaders’ (A3, 2006) while another said he saw his 
counterpart become a ‘competent and confident manager’ (A22, 2007). When asked about such 
issues, counterparts had a tendency to cite examples at the more technical level but some 
recognised issues such as communication and listening skills as being important.  
The idea of capacity building being focused on individuals is a longstanding one but there has been a 
realisation that this is insufficient if long-term change is to occur. Recent developments in capacity 
building in the literature (for example, see Morgan’s [2008] views in section 2.2.2) have pointed to 
the notion of capacity building needing to occur across a number of levels for it to have impact and 
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sustainability. One of these levels is organisational capacity and there is growing acknowledgement 
that addressing this level is critical. The nature of organisational development and providing 
evidence of such is more contentious and difficult to show.  
One way of conceptualising organisational capacity building is the development of groups of 
peoples’ capacity rather than focusing on individuals. One adviser cited as an example of building 
organisational capacity a cultural change in an agency that was designed to bring its values in line 
with acceptable practice and this was achieved by engaging with teams of staff. Other advisers cited 
examples of development plans and procedures which they believed would be followed after they 
left because of the change in the way the organisation worked as a whole, again due to changes in 
values held by the organisation which was achieved by working with large numbers of staff.  
The issue of how capacity development is achieved is discussed in section 4.3.  
4.2.6 Conclusions 
This section has addressed the issue of determining whether an AC placement can be considered 
successful or not. In addressing this issue it became apparent through the data and the literature 
review that this is a complex area which relates to all the other parts of the study’s consideration. 
However, there is evidence that many placements can be considered to be successful against a 
number of measures including the ToRs originally identified for the placement and broader 
measures of success, e.g. improvement in managerial or technical skills etc. 
In the next section the process of how capacity development occurs within AC placements is 
considered. 
4.3 Capacity development through AC placements 
This section draws principally on the data reported in section 3.3 above and the related literature 
discussed in section 2.2. It relates to the following research questions. 
RQ3  What strategies were adopted by advisers to enable their counterpart(s) to learn what was 
required to fulfil their placements’ aims? How did the advisers learn about or develop such 
strategies? What do the advisers believe are the main things their counterparts learned? What 
evidence is there of such learning? What can be understood from these experiences and how 
might capacity development be improved through future Australian Aid programs? 
RQ4 What approaches were adopted by counterpart(s) to learn what was required to fulfil their 
placements’ aims? What do the counterparts believe are the main things they learned from 
their placement? What evidence is there of such learning? What can be understood from 
these experiences and how might capacity development be improved through future 
Australian Aid programs? 
Section 3.3 presents the data related to these questions, with the exception of the two final 
questions in RQ3 and RQ4: What can be understood from these experiences and how might capacity 
development be improved through future Australian Aid programs? These two questions are the 
particular focus of the present section. 
4.3.1 Learning as the foundation of capacity development 
In section 2.2 the literature relating to capacity development was reviewed. This showed that, over 
approximately the past 60 years, the major aid and development agencies, networks and others 
have addressed capacity development as a foundational aspect of international development 
 129 
assistance (IDA). The notion of ‘capacity’ in IDA is generally understood in broad terms. The UNDP 
describes capacity as ‘the ability of individuals, institutions and societies to perform functions, solve 
problems and set and achieve objectives in a sustainable manner’ (UNDP, 2007, p. 5). This definition 
embodies the interplay between individuals and collective forms of human activity in the enactment 
of capacity; instances from the present research, however, show that such interplay may include 
resistance to performing functions, solving problems, and/or setting and achieving objectives. 
Section 3.1 provided examples of instances where such resistance occurred and affected the 
achievement of AC placements’ outcomes. For example, in the survey responses two advisers 
commented: 
While the original ToRs may have been appropriate for my initial entry on duty, the 
whole ball game changed the day before I arrived in that my intended Counterpart, the 
(HoD), who had commissioned the project, was sacked and there followed a succession 
of Acting (HoDs) who had diametrically opposing agenda and, usually, different 
allegiances. 
My original ToRs encompassed the key capacity development needs in relation to 
agency management and the need for effective coordination between the Advisers and 
(senior) officer. The 2nd objective in my ToRs related to providing advice and assistance 
to the agency in implementation of the strategic and operational plans. In reality, there 
was no agency management ownership of the existing strategic plan and there was no 
operational plan. The more immediate priority was, therefore, to assist the agency to 
develop an operational plan for the initial six months.  
Another example from a PCR makes a similar point. 
I would critically rate the placement as ‘limited’ in terms of achieving the planned 
objectives and outcomes primarily because they (outcomes and objectives) were created 
based on an inaccurate assessment of existing capacity and achievement in the agency 
and because their ultimate delivery was heavily dependent on a reasonable level of 
support from the Secretary, which was never realised. (A3, 2006) 
It important, therefore, to understand that ‘opportunities for capacity development’ may ebb or 
flow as competing or complementary individual and collective interests come into play. Therefore, 
AC project capacity development processes may be ‘swimming’ with or against the ‘tide’ unless the 
competing interests can be nullified or otherwise managed. Without such management, neither 
placement outcomes nor sustainability will be achieved. 
In essence, the individual and collective interests in the PNG agencies involved in AC placements 
represent the human elements of the learning milieus within which capacity development occurs. 
Although, as is reported in section 3.1, agencies’ physical and technical infrastructures are also 
important features and, where inadequate, prevent capacity development. For example, an adviser 
made the following point in a PCR: 
Service delivery is closely linked to the information available in the [Agency Information 
System], and investigations have found that data to be at least 60% incorrect and the 
system is open to error and illegal activity. Until GoPNG treats the replacement of [this 
system] as a priority very little can be done in this regard. (A3, 2006) 
Arguably, learning is at the heart of all capacity development (see Morgan, 2010; Johnson & Wilson, 
1999; Raab, 2008) and, in particular, in AC placements in PNG. Technology, systems, infrastructure, 
etc. are all important elements to sustaining national life, but it is the people involved who use, 
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develop and maintain these elements who are the essential enabling human capacity. Humans need 
to learn how to use and maintain new technology, systems and physical infrastructure; hence, the 
technical assistance provided by donors to install such new items requires (human) capacity 
development if agencies are to use the items. This is part of Morgan’s (2010, p. 5) ‘first generation’ 
approach which emphasised technical donor-to-agency skills transfer, capacity substitution, etc. 
Adviser-counterpart placements fit within Morgan’s ‘second generation’ of agency designed and 
‘owned’ technical assistance provided by donors. Capacity development, in this context, ‘…is the 
process whereby people, organisations and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt 
and maintain capacity over time’ (OECD/DAC definition, cited in Baser & Morgan, 2008 p. 22). 
In the PNG context of this research, EPSP adopted the AusAID definition of capacity development as 
‘the process of developing competencies and capabilities in individuals, groups, organisations and 
sectors or countries which will lead to sustained and self-generating performance improvement’ 
(DFAT, 2009, p. 26). In order to develop the ‘competencies and capabilities’—and associated 
knowledge and values— to ‘perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve objectives in a 
sustainable manner’ (UNDP, 2007, p. 5) requires the advisers to teach and the counterparts to learn. 
That is, the advisers are required to go beyond a ‘first generation’ technical assistance/capacity 
substitution approach and act within a ‘second generation’, agency-owned/oriented approach. Such 
an approach is congruent with collaborative forms of education that focus on workplace-based, 
action-oriented learning, rather than didactic approaches. Advisers, therefore, need to learn in order 
to teach, and counterparts may teach (their advisers) in order to shape their own learning. (This 
matter is discussed further in section 4.3.3.) 
Agency-owned/oriented collaborative forms of education that focus on workplace-based, action-
oriented learning are relatively complex to understand and use. They are often difficult for advisers 
(and others) to understand and use, especially if their own professional fields of study are learned 
somewhat didactically. This raises the matter, which follows, of how the advisers learned to ‘teach’ 
their counterparts and how this may be improved. 
4.3.2 Advisers’ learning about teaching for capacity development 
Given that the foundation of capacity development concerns people (counterparts) learning from 
others (advisers) about ways to improve and change their (and their agencies’) practices, then it 
suggests that the advisers’ knowledge and skills about teaching for capacity development are crucial 
to the success and sustainability of their AC placements. How then do advisers acquire the necessary 
knowledge and skills about teaching for capacity development in order to meet their ToRs and fulfil 
the AC placements’ aims?  
Table 3.3.3.1 (in section 3.3) represents numbers and ratings data about advisers’ methods for 
learning to develop their counterparts’ capacities. ‘Previous experience’ was the most common 
method that advisers used to learn about how to develop their counterparts’ capacities. The mean 
rating (4.5) was between ‘considerably’ and ‘fully’ in terms of their use of this source. Previous 
experience in this context is problematic, especially for advisers new to PNG and/or to the agency, 
and for those with no qualifications and/or training in human resource development, workplace 
training, professional development etc. Previous experience was seen as important because it 
concerned what was being taught (best practice, etc.) rather than how it is best taught. As was 
noted in section 3.3.3, formal study was the least common means of learning about capacity 
development, and there was little evidence of an adviser specifically undertaking postgraduate study 
to learning or enhance their teaching skills in international development contexts.  
There was evidence that some advisers had participated in short courses or workshops offered by 
the managing contractors. These opportunities were viewed positively. 
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Under the auspices of the ASF, the ‘Making a Difference’ (MaD) program was developed and offered 
between 2006 to 2009, prior to the ASF’s cessation in May 2010. Participation was encouraged, but 
not required, and it is not clear how feasible it was for advisers and counterparts to attend prior to 
or early in their placements. The MaD program brought advisers and counterparts together to learn 
about action-learning approaches to, and processes of, capacity building and change management. A 
typical comment from an adviser who attended follows.  
I found the Adviser workshops implemented by the ASF were useful in terms of: (i) 
opportunity to learn about a specific capacity building issue; (ii) opportunity to discuss 
experience and approaches with other Advisers. 
In mid-2010 EPSP developed a new program, Wokabaut Wantaim (WW) which was designed as a 
modular professional development course for advisers and counterparts that they engaged with 
during their placements. EPSP commenced offering the WW modules in late 2010. It ceased in 2013 
(except for a special offering) because of changing DFAT priorities. The EPSP Annual Report 2013 
(EPSP, 2014) describes the circumstances thus: 
The Wokabaut Wantaim (WW) program is a series of professional development modules 
designed for Advisers working with Counterparts on DFAT funded programs in PNG. The 
program is an offshoot of the Making a Difference program and was developed in 
response to feedback from PNG- based professionals requesting tailored content 
delivered periodically over the span of an Adviser-Counterpart relationship. 
EPSP began developing and presenting WW modules in 2010. Thirty-three WW sessions 
were conducted in 2012, and attended by 505 (278 males and 225 females) Advisers and 
Counterparts. 
In early 2013, concerns were raised by DFAT as to the ongoing relevance of the program 
in its current form as a result of the declining number of long-term Advisers; most 
current Advisers and Counterparts having already attended the course; and the 2012 
review of EPSP which recommended future technical assistance focus on addressing 
immediate, specific service delivery issues rather than medium-term capacity 
development. 
Poor attendance at the first WW offering for 2013 accelerated the decision to change 
the delivery schedule to ‘on request’ rather than regular monthly sessions and 
development work on two additional modules: Anti-Corruption and Leadership was 
discontinued. 
During 2013, PNG Customs requested a tailored version of the Change and Coaching 
modules through their SGP Adviser. A series of sessions was conducted mid-year 
combining workshop training sessions with workplace follow-up directed at supporting 
change initiatives introduced during the year within PNG Customs. 
In late 2013, as future EPSP program directions emerged with clarification on such 
matters as service delivery issues to be addressed and national/sub-national 
collaboration in addressing them, discussion around Wokabaut Wantaim has been 
revived. There have been suggestions that specific modules such as Financial Processes, 
Change Management and Coaching —with some redesign— have relevance to the 2014 
program (pp. 15-16). 
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As noted in section 3.3, there was limited evidence of advisers undertaking structured learning in 
how to ‘teach’ counterparts effectively. This is probably due to the MaD and WW programs not 
being offered consistently and consecutively from 2006 to 2013 (the period of this research), and it 
not being mandatory for advisers and counterparts to participate. There were instances of positive 
comments about each program, but these sit alongside others such as advisers’ comments in one of 
the focus groups that they received little advice about how to structure their counterparts’ capacity 
development. It was said that ‘there was a bit of written stuff provided’ but no regular support of 
this kind.  
The preceding discussion suggests this as an area of improvement that may be enacted and 
beneficial across each AC placement from the planning to evaluation (final report) stages. If learning 
is fundamental to counterparts’ (and agencies’) capacity development, then this suggests that the 
ToRs and aims for each placement should explicitly consider the learning required and the 
counterparts’ learning needs and contexts, and that these should be embedded in a learning plan (or 
at least an outline of such) which the adviser is required to address. Once the placement has 
commenced, the learning plan needs to be confirmed and agreed between the parties and 
documented. The documentation should include what is to be learned, how and when, and also how 
it will be assessed. Although the counterparts are the main focus of the learning, other members of 
the particular agency involved may well be expected to learn particular things at given times in order 
for the changes required in the ToRs to be embedded in the organisation and to become sustainable. 
At this point one may expect that the counterpart ‘teaches’ the others, or is involved with the 
adviser in so doing. That is, the counterparts may well be expected (in the learning plan) to learn 
how to teach their colleagues. 
The above approach to planning for learning within the development process of each project and its 
ToRs, more complex than ‘knowledge transfer’ or ‘skills training’, although these may be part of the 
learning plan. It also requires the Adviser to have a role as a ‘learning manager’ who ensures that the 
learning plan is monitored for scheduled achievements and provides assistance, remediation etc, as 
required to maintain the schedule; something that the Counterparts are learning, but experiencing, 
too. 
Such learning plans are best seen as ones that contain an iterative process that enables each adviser 
and their counterpart(s) to review, reflect and act to keep the learning plan attuned to the agency’s 
needs and circumstances as these evolve during the project. Raab (2008) highlights the benefits 
accruing from process-centred approaches that ‘allow for constant redesign of plans as the 
participants’ knowledge evolves’ (p. 435). The general principle is that process-centred, 
participatory, people-centred and iterative approaches are most likely to produce knowledge and 
outcomes that are truly ‘owned’ by participants and thus more able to be adapted and sustained in 
changing contexts.  
At the agency level, similar principles of ‘action-learning’ are recommended by Johnson and Wilson 
(1999). Again, participatory approaches are required for agencies and donors to negotiate shared 
meanings and agendas for learning and innovation (p. 45), and, in our terms, to produce agreements 
about ToRs, aims, objects and, importantly, performance assessment mechanisms. Such an 
approach indicates that learning, as opposed to knowledge or skills transfer, involves iterative and 
participatory processes capable of providing feedback mechanisms that can then become the basis 
for further and sustained learning. It is in this way, Johnson and Wilson argue, ‘collective and 
purposeful norms of behaviour can be developed and changed over a sustained period of time, both 
in shared practices and in coordination and cooperation’ (p. 45).  
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The following section considers the approaches that were used by advisers and counterparts to 
achieve capacity development and how these may be improved in accordance with the suggestions 
made above. 
4.3.3 Advisers’ and counterparts’ engagement in capacity development 
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 reported, respectively, on the strategies deployed by advisers to foster capacity 
development and the counterparts’ views of their learning during their placements. These adviser 
and counterpart perspectives of their engagement in capacity development processes are important 
for understanding ways to improve capacity development and to achieve sustainable change within 
agencies. Given that the MaD and WW courses, to varying degrees, focused on mentoring as a viable 
approach to teaching counterparts to improve their practices, this perhaps influences the ratings in 
Table 3.3.1.1 and Table 3.3.1.2 showing that mentoring was the advisers’ most popular approach. 
Advisers also rated mentoring as the most effective approach (81% rated mentoring as either ‘fully’ 
or ‘considerably’ effective with a mean of 4.1). It was reported in section 3.3 that there was a 
marked correlation between the activities most commonly used and those that the advisers saw as 
most effective and that, in contrast to ‘mentoring’, ‘structured learning’ was the least used and was 
seen as the least effective (but was still rated as 3.4, that is, between ‘somewhat’ and ‘considerably’ 
effective’). As isolated in the PCRs, the range of strategies and activities used by advisers for capacity 
development comprised: workshops/formal training sessions; on-the-job training (including 
coaching and mentoring); and, to a lesser extent, role-modelling. Of these, one-on-one, on-the-job 
training and mentoring was the strategy favoured by the overwhelming majority of advisers, which is 
consistent with the findings reported in section 3.3.1. Generally, the rationales given for this 
approach were that activities were directly related to day-to-day issues, that on-one-on interaction 
encouraged the maximum engagement from Counterparts and provided maximum reinforcement of 
what was learned.  
Table 3.4.1.2 shows that the counterparts also rated mentoring in their survey as their equal most 
used learning strategy alongside ‘workshops’. (Workshops are a common feature of professional and 
industrial education and training in PNG. Often a new system, approach etc. has not commenced 
until it has been ‘workshopped’ in a well-catered setting!) Counterparts rated ‘mentoring’ (mean 
4.5) slightly more highly than workshops (mean 4.3) (see Table 3.4.1.2). They also rated ‘structured 
learning’ equal lowest but with a relatively high mean of 3.9. An important feature here is that both 
advisers and counterparts generally concurred about the frequency of use for the particular 
strategies they used/experienced, and the ones they rated highest and lowest. In this respect, 
mentoring is the agreed highest-rated strategy and structured learning is (amongst others) the 
agreed lowest-rated strategy. This may suggest that mentoring is where the future improvements lie 
and that structured learning should be avoided. Given, however, the MaD and WW courses’ 
encouragement of mentoring, the former is to be expected; the paucity of structured learning also 
suggests that there is little opportunity for positive experience of its benefits which may contribute 
to its lower ratings. 
Mentoring is a useful reflective process for professional development, but it tends to be limited to 
responding to the activity in which the counterpart (in this instance) is engaged and guiding them to 
complete it satisfactorily. In educational contexts, mentoring may be understood as an activity 
undertaken by senior or experienced colleagues within the organisation who has undertaken the 
tasks that the mentee wishes to learn how to improve. Coaching on the other hand may be seen as 
an activity undertaken by someone, often outside the organisation, to address a specific skill or lack 
of knowledge in an area (see Parsloe & Leedham, 2009). Coaching tends to be more structured than 
mentoring and a coach may not necessarily have done the job of the person being coached. 
Mentoring assumes that the activity undertaken by the mentee is the correct one to be doing at the 
time (if at all), which it may be if the placement’s ToRs and aims are appropriate. The role of an 
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adviser can be conceived as a hybrid of a mentor and a coach as it has elements of both and this is 
reflected by many advisers and counterparts using the two terms synonymously. In section 3.3, 
however, one adviser was quoted making a clear distinction between mentoring and coaching. 
Mentoring is not a daily type of occurrence, the mentor is in the workplace doing their 
normal job and at the same time providing guidance or being a role model for others 
who wish to move through the organisation—it pertains to the achievement of career 
goals. With coaching, you are there, guiding and assisting and it is how you go about 
that that builds capacity…mentoring is not part of the capacity building tool-kit. While 
coaches are also role models, coaching is much more proactive; but as a mentor you can 
be reactive and still do a good job. (A39, 2008) 
Section 3.1 above showed that one third of advisers (see Table 3.1.2.1) found that their ToRs 
became, in their view, less appropriate or realistic once there were ‘in placement’ and became 
familiar with the local conditions and/or circumstances, or experienced changing conditions and/or 
circumstances. In such instances, advisers needed to be proactive in shaping what was done and, 
therefore, what was learned. 
The notion that advisers usually need to be proactive in ‘teaching’ their counterparts was generally 
predicated on three conditions: understanding the local PNG culture; appreciating their particular 
agency’s context and needs; and forming good working relationships with the counterparts with 
whom they worked. Several advisers reported in section 3.3 that they conducted needs analyses or 
other forms of assessment of the capacity development required at the beginning of their 
placements, although only one counterpart (C77) reported working with his adviser at the beginning 
of the placement to identify his needs and then develop a plan for fulfilling them. It possible that 
those advisers who conducted needs analyses did so for their own personal professional purposes 
and did not share the process or the outcomes explicitly with their counterparts or, if they did so, 
these were not recognised as ‘needs analyses’ by the counterparts but as something more generally 
related to their placements.  
In section 3.5 it was reported that almost 50 per cent of advisers emphasised cultural awareness as 
essential to maximising project successes, in particular, in the realms of skills transfer and training 
activities and capacity building more generally. The following comment is typical of those made by 
Advisers on this matter. 
The initial phases of this placement involved a lot of observation and getting to know 
the culture of [the Agency] along with the culture of PNG people. The first thing I learnt 
was not to rush anything as it can be seen as pushy and bossy. I learnt that one needs to 
sit back and raise the issue and allow ownership to take over by the KAS. Then through 
support whilst the process is underway, the capacity building can be effectively achieved 
and the task completed. (A54, 2010) 
Counterparts’ also reported (see section 3.5) on the positive effects of advisers’ cultural awareness 
on the success of AC placements and on establishing good interpersonal relationships.  
[The Adviser’s] progress at the [Agency] has continued to be very good. With his 
assistance we are continuing the task of updating the financial records of the 
organization to an acceptable level. He has built up a good relationship with all staff in 
the [Agency] as well as other divisions. He has been able to achieve this because of his 
professional knowledge and experience as well as his outside knowledge of PNG people 
and culture. (C33, 2007) 
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[The Adviser’s] understanding of procurement, and processes in a PNG context has seen 
him improve the procurement capacity of everyone that he spends time training. (C16, 
2007) 
Counterpart C81 engaged with the matter of advisers being ‘genuinely interested’ in their agency 
and in PNG’s development in general. He suggested that ‘there was mutual learning that occurred 
between advisers and counterparts’. He believed it was necessary that, advisers be ‘taught…the 
rules of engagement’, that is, ‘the Public Service Act and the hierarchical structure of the public 
service’ and ‘the cultural circumstances’. Such ‘both ways’ learning can do much to strengthen the 
capacities of both advisers and counterparts in their respective roles; the didactic, adviser-
instructing-counterpart path was eschewed by most if not all research participants. Being able to 
undertake an equal, collaborative relationship is difficult, of course. The power relations, politics, 
cultural and professional backgrounds, for example, suggest that each adviser and counterpart will 
experience activities and events during their placements in which their relative power and influence 
will ebb and flow relative to the other. For example, it was reported in section 3.5 that counterparts 
(C84 and C85) said that they developed models for their agencies that their advisers usually 
reviewed and commented on. This suggests that these counterparts controlled the activities and 
that their advisers influenced the outcomes. Another counterpart (C75) explained that she discussed 
activities issues together with her adviser, ‘so that the Adviser is not imposing things’ and she makes 
the final decision. The sense of ownership by the counterparts and their agency was significant, 
however, the limited responses received from counterparts for some elements of the research mean 
that it is possible (maybe likely) that the non-respondents have a different view of their power and 
positions in their placements.  
4.3.4 Conclusions  
The above discussion can be related to the five central principles for sustainable capacity 
development embodied in the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action (OECD, 2005/2008). 
Ownership—Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development 
policies, and strategies and coordinate development actions; 
Alignment—Donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national 
development strategies, institution and procedures; 
Harmonisation—Donors’ actions are more harmonised, transparent and collectively 
effective; 
Managing for Results—Managing resources and improving decision-making for results; 
and 
Mutual Accountability—Donors and partners are accountable for development results 
It can be argued that the AC placements broadly can be reviewed against these principles, but in the 
case of the capacity development discussed in this section these principles need to be interpreted at 
the agency rather than national level. Morgan (2008) argued that counterpart relationships in PNG 
could be improved by attention to matters that relate to some of these principles, and recent 
practices in EPSP (and other programs) indicate that Australia and PNG are part of the international 
changes contributing to the ideas in the aforementioned Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for 
Action. Therefore, each AC placement needs to be constructed and, in the case of this Report, 
interpreted within the partner (PNG) and donor (Australia) nations’ actions with regard to the five 
principles, if sustainable change is to occur. 
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At the heart of the principles is the notion that ‘ownership’ of, in this case, AC placements, is firmly 
held by GoPNG with donors working ‘harmoniously’ toward PNG ends. This implies that 
collaboration (literally ‘working together’) is necessary and requires being conducted in a 
‘transparent’ manner. Arguably, the foundation for such collaboration centres on the GoPNG and 
GoA negotiations that develop the ToRs for each placement. There is much evidence (see, especially, 
sections 3.1 and 3.3) that, in this process and in the first stages of each placement, collaboration is 
essential. Also, as the following examples show, advisers stressed the need for this approach to span 
all project stages, from the initial or continuing development of ToRs/work plans, to planning, policy 
and systems development, all the way through to implementation.  
The ToRs were compiled in collaboration with my Counterpart. (A4, 2006) 
A collaborative approach to problem/issue/opportunity identification was taken. 
Therefore, the deliverables were what the Department wanted – not what I wanted. An 
inclusive approach to system/process improvement was taken…. A great deal of effort 
was put in to ensuring that officers within the Department took ownership of the work in 
which I was involved. (A8, 2006) 
It is essential that KAS are involved in the planning phase of activities such that they 
develop the skills to take an activity from conception to completion, as this ensures they 
feel ownership from the activity. (A13, 2006) 
The link from ownership, collaboration to sustainability was well made by the following adviser. 
The key to sustainability, however, is the fact that all improvements and changes were 
done via consultation and discussion, so they are supported by the KAS as well as other 
involved employees. This will ensure the improvements are continued as they are 
‘owned’ by those individuals within [the Agency] and not by me as the Adviser. (A54, 
2010) 
This individual, within AC placement, approach mirrors the national (GoPNG and GoA) approach to 
establishing PNG’s ‘development policies, and strategies and coordinat[ing] development actions’ 
(OECD, n.d.). It is important, however, to recognise that, in Kuhl’s (2009) terms, ‘when interventions 
are undertaken on one level only the effects will dissipate, so sustainable development requires 
simultaneous action at all of these levels’ (p. 551, emphasis added). This research suggests that 
there may be room for improvement here in ensuring that individual capacity development 
interventions (AC placements) are required to operate at multiple levels in order to achieve 
sustainability, and also are systematically formally assessed (in terms of the counterparts’ learning) 
and subsequently evaluated (in terms of the placements ToRs) in these respects. 
4.4 Influencing factors on AC placements 
This section will discuss the various factors that research data revealed as having a positive or 
negative influence on overall placement outcomes. As such, this section will draw predominantly 
upon the data presented in Section 3.5, in response to the research question: 
RQ6 What were the enablers of, and impediments to, the success (or ‘drivers of change’) of the AC 
placements? 
When considering project ‘success’, the discussion will extend beyond the framework of the ToRs 
and into areas considered fundamental to capacity development such as sustainability, and the 
translation of capacity development activities at the individual level into improved organisational 
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performance. Where relevant, the findings will be interwoven with the material presented in the 
literature review (section 2.2).  
In order to break the findings down into more manageable and potentially useful categories, the 
enablers and impediments will be discussed as they operate with regard to a) the individual level, b) 
the translation of capacity development from the individual to the organisational level, and b) the 
organisational level. While these distinctions are possible in the main, there will occur, at times, 
some unavoidable crossover. In addition to discussing the influences that affect the outcomes of 
placements once they have commenced, this section will also address some deficiencies that were 
highlighted in ASF/EPSP’s capacity diagnostic frameworks and the implications of these for both 
project design and final project outcomes. 
4.4.1 The individual level 
The evidence gathered throughout every stage of this research unambiguously confirms the 
fundamental part that interpersonal relationships play in the success of technical assistance projects. 
Whilst the necessity of adviser technical expertise is a given, the data shows that the processes 
through which this expertise is offered and taken up can be the lynchpin of sustainable skills and 
knowledge acquisition. Capacity development is about people, and learning and change must take 
place at the level of the individual for capacity development initiatives to bear fruit. This section 
discusses some of the features of the AC placements and adviser approaches that could be seen to 
influence, positively and negatively, both capacity development and the pursuit of placement 
outcomes.  
4.4.1.1 Establishing the relationship 
As discussed in the literature review, there has been a shift from a narrow focus on knowledge 
transfer (which conveys a sense of passivity on the part of the recipient) to a broader focus on 
learning and the associated practices that promote deep learning (OECD/DAC, 2011). This recognises 
that the capacity development relationship between an adviser and counterpart is essentially one of 
influence, with advisers working to change—sometimes in a fundamental way—the thinking and 
behaviour of their counterparts. The receptivity of the counterpart to this influence will depend on 
multiple factors, one of which is the level of trust they place in their adviser. As one counterpart 
wrote, ‘the nature of [the Adviser’s] role is that he identifies deficiencies; so building trust with 
Counterparts is critical to his success’ (C17, 2007). In the case of C17, the adviser built trust by 
conducting himself ‘with honesty and integrity with all Counterparts that he works with’. The link 
between the adviser’s personal qualities and the potential for KAS and counterpart learning is made 
explicitly here:  
[The Adviser] is a people-centred person and tries his best to know officers in the 
different branches of the department…I believe, with the type of personality he has, we 
will learn a lot of good things from him (C19, 2007) 
Advisers noted in all stages of the study the fundamental importance of counterpart receptivity to 
the success of skills transfer and other learning and capacity development initiatives (throughout the 
data receptivity was alternatively noted as ‘enthusiasm’, ‘willingness’, and other descriptive nouns 
that were collated under the category ‘counterpart attitude’). In the survey, 83 per cent of advisers 
rated the counterpart’s attitude as ‘considerably’ or ‘fully’ important to project success, and it was 
mentioned by over 50% of advisers in the PCRs reviewed (see section 3.5). This lends support to the 
conceptualisation of capacity presented in Section 2.2 as encompassing the core capability to 
‘commit and engage’. 
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Just as with other elements of capacity, a counterpart’s willingness to commit and engage can be 
influenced positively or negatively depending on the adviser’s approach to the relationship. Where 
counterpart views were available, they were clearly averse to advisers who arrived in their 
placements and tried to ‘take over’ or force their own agendas (see section 4.6.3 for senior 
managers views on this). As outlined in section 3.5.2.6, counterparts worked most successfully with 
advisers who were supportive but non-directive, who could act as good role models, who took the 
time to know their counterparts well, and who would be available for consultation and discussion on 
issues as and when they arose. Advisers needed to make it clear that they were there for their 
counterparts, and to support counterparts in achieving their own objectives and goals, rather than 
the other way around. 
Advisers agreed that they were able to generate commitment and engagement by making an effort 
to discover what motivated their counterparts as individuals and by demonstrating how their 
working together would benefit counterparts personally. Advisers also stressed the need to take into 
account and support the counterpart’s existing workload and to continuously ensure that the work 
being undertaken was in line with counterparts’ and the organisation’s priorities (see section 
3.5.2.5). It is in the nature of these approaches that they demand advisers take the time to come to 
know their counterparts well and show a genuine interest in their counterparts personally and 
professionally (see section 4.2.2 for the views of advisers and counterparts on this and 4.4.1.7 on the 
impediment of ‘time’ in placements).  
The views of both counterparts and advisers, expressed above, are encapsulated in the following 
quote: 
Building relationships—this is vital to achieving any change, and is critical in the success 
of an Adviser placement. The building of the relationship cannot be rushed and needs to 
focus on working with their needs and the priorities they perceive. KAS can be very 
disapproving if ideas or changes are forced upon them. Establishing the relationships 
and involving them is critical. (A26, 2007) 
From the very outset it is possible to see some features of third-generation approaches to technical 
assistance being favoured, or indeed at times deemed essential, for the successful pursuit of 
capacity development and placement outcomes on the ground. As stated in section 2.2, the third-
generation uses context as a starting point and is a flexible approach that uses ‘searching rather than 
planning’ (Morgan, 2010 cited in OECD/DAC, 2011, p. 5). As indicated above, this ‘searching’ style, 
and the proper understanding of context, must first begin through the development of trusting 
relationships between advisers and counterparts. 
The data revealed that at times counterparts’ and KAS’s willingness to commit and engage had been 
adversely affected from the outset, by counterparts and other agency staff being inadequately 
prepared for, or occasionally not even aware of, the impending arrival of an adviser (see section 
3.5.6). This could lead to resentment, which made it very difficult for advisers to successfully engage 
with their counterparts once on the job. One interviewed adviser found a number of her key 
counterparts unwilling to engage with her and so sought out other willing agency staff. She believed 
that the element of self-selection in this process had proved critical to her placement’s success (A17, 
2007). On the other side of the equation, in one of the instances where the agency director was 
involved in the selection of the adviser, this appeared to pave the way for a productive and 
cooperative relationship as the ‘fit’ of the adviser for the agency had already been determined 
(section 3.5.3.4). The foregoing suggests that while the ways in which advisers approach and relate 
to their counterparts are critical to fostering and maintaining engagement, the ways in which 
placements are set up and counterparts and advisers recruited are also important factors in ensuring 
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engagement and minimising active resistance (see section 4.4.1.6). (See section 4.2.2 for further 
views of advisers and counterparts on establishing relationships). 
4.4.1.2 Capacity development as learning – a ‘process’ approach 
The establishment of trusting interpersonal relationships can be seen to pave the way for a 
continuous interaction between advisers and counterparts that allows for capacity development and 
tangible placement outcomes to be pursued in an organic rather than a mechanical way. For 
advisers this was facilitated most effectively through close, daily one-on-one interactions, with the 
adviser preferably sharing office space with counterparts and/or KAS and acting as a ‘coach’ or 
‘mentor’ (see Table 3.3.1.1 and Table 3.3.1.2 in which survey results demonstrate ‘mentoring’ as 
both the most popular approach and the one that 81% of advisers rated as most effective). 
Discussion of the learning rationales underpinning the particular capacity development strategies 
adopted by advisers has already been included in sections 4.3 and 4.2.5 of this report. Suffice it to 
say here that close proximity to counterparts was seen to facilitate an ongoing interaction that 
allowed learning and consultation to be closely tied to the daily demands of counterparts’ roles and 
responsibilities, and allowed for the continual reinforcement of new processes, procedures and 
attitudes essential to ensuring that change is sustained. This is in line with the understanding of 
capacity put forward in the literature review as ‘purposive,’ that is, engaged with real-life issues, and 
capacity development as requiring an engaged and iterative approach that allows for continual 
feedback and improvement. Once more the issue of trust is pivotal here, in particular with regard to 
the creation of a ‘safe space’ that allows for open and honest discussion and can incorporate ‘failure’ 
into the process of learning. This also recognises the latent quality of capacity, and that the adviser 
must be able to actually witness that learning has occurred via visible performance. 
Closely related to this was the recognition of the need for collaborative work practices with 
counterpart and KAS (mentioned by 60% of advisers in the PCRs and noted by 93% of adviser survey 
respondents and 100% of counterpart survey respondents as ‘fully’ or ‘considerably’ important to 
the success of their placements, see sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2.3). The rationales given for the need for 
collaboration were many, and its application extended from the initial planning stages of placement 
activities all the way through to their implementation. The processes of collaboration were 
emphasised as giving rise to new practices of debate, open discussion, problem-solving and 
feedback, and contributed to counterparts’ and KAS’s ownership of placement activities and 
outcomes. Furthermore, these provided the opportunity for KAS to develop the skills to ‘take an 
activity from conception to completion’ (A13, 2006).  
The processes described are similar to those discussed in the literature review in the context of 
organisational sustainability as ‘learning’, in particular ‘action learning’. On this subject Johnson and 
Wilson (1999) discuss the need for participatory, iterative approaches that include the joint 
negotiation of agendas and agreement upon mechanisms that can be used to assess performance, 
with results fed back into the process to facilitate further learning. The description of these 
processes as ‘enablers’ in the context of this study also lends support to Baser and Morgan’s (2008) 
assertion of the need to ‘blend product and process’ (p. 89) in order to strike a productive balance 
between the pursuit of placement outcomes and capacity development such that improvement can 
become sustained and self-generating. This insight enables the question ‘what is it that is to be 
sustained following placement completion?’ While particular, tangible placement outcomes such as 
new policies and procedures are certain to become obsolete or redundant over time, what is critical 
to be sustained and sustainable is the process or processes through which outcomes can be 
articulated, formulated, pursued and successfully achieved.  
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As an example of the broader benefits that accrue from applying a collaborative process-approach to 
achieving placement outcomes, approximately 15 per cent of advisers reported in their PCRs that 
KAS could now undertake policy development independently, by virtue of their having participated 
in a comprehensive, collaborative and iterative policy development process. In addition to skills 
acquisition, advisers noted attitudinal changes in counterparts to the effect that they: appreciated 
the role of broad consultation and collaboration in the policy development process; understood the 
role of policy in implementing legislation; and accepted the need for the critical assessment of 
current practices and monitoring and evaluation to support policy implementation (section 3.1.3.2). 
As indicated by Johnson and Wilson (1999), it is through these participatory, iterative and sustained 
processes that ‘collective and purposeful norms of behaviour can be developed and changed over a 
sustained period of time, both in shared practices and in coordination and cooperation’ (p. 45). As 
discussed in section 2.2, however, it takes a long time for new norms of thinking and being to be 
cultivated and embedded in any human system. 
4.4.1.3 A tension between product and process 
Tensions existed in AC relationships between the product (as enumerated in the ToRs) and the 
processes required for sustainable capacity development as is indicated in the some of the advisers’ 
opinions about their projects’ success (see section 3.1.3). Some advisers noted having achieved their 
ToRs but expressed concerns about their sustainability (see section 4.2.3 for views of senior 
managers on this matter) given that there had not been time to embed new procedures and 
processes into organisational practice (a focus on outcomes over capacity development). An adviser 
encapsulated this point as follows. 
I would rate it as successful, however much more work would have been required to 
institutionalize it. (A10, 2006) 
Others stated, however, that the need to focus on proper processes for developing capacity made 
certain placement outcomes unachievable within given timeframes (a focus on capacity 
development over outcomes).  
In terms of the planned outcomes specifically aligned to the work plan I’d rate my 
placement as limited to successful. In terms of the broader requirement to increase 
overall capacity to understand and undertake public sector procurement for GoPNG, for 
those groups that I managed to reach, I’d rate the placement as very successful. (A18, 
2007)  
Both of these statements, as well as others made by a range of advisers, suggest that when it comes 
to the formulation of ToRs, and the timeframes in which ToRs are expected to be realised, current 
placement design favours the pursuit of tangible outcomes over the pursuit of processes aimed at 
sustainably developing capacity. This emphasis is indicative of the second-generation approach to 
capacity development which favours ‘control, clarity, efficiency, results and accountability’ (Morgan 
2010, cited in OECD/DAC, 2011, p. 5), and which stands in contrast to the more third-generation 
style of flexible, participative and iterative approaches that seem to be favoured and applied by 
advisers in the field. As discussed in section 2.2, the emergence of third-generation technical 
assistance has been based on the recognition that flexibility needs to be built in programme 
operations such that emergent needs and changing demands can be accommodated (Land, Hauck & 
Baser, 2007). This is supported by the survey data, in which 97 per cent of advisers, and 100 per cent 
of counterparts, rated ‘flexibility’ as considerably or fully important to placement success (which 
resulted in flexibility being the number one enabler selected by advisers in the survey). The data 
suggest that the way AC placements are currently constituted sets up a trade-off between achieving 
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tangible outcomes and achieving sustainable capacity development, with implications for the 
chances of success of either or both. 
4.4.1.4 Learning as a two-way process: culture and context  
The need for advisers to spend time to know and understand their counterparts was discussed 
previously, however, advisers must also learn ‘the way things work’ in PNG, and in their agency. 
They then need to tailor their approaches accordingly in order to be successful. This extends to 
understanding and working with local conventions of communication and hierarchical interactions, 
to adapting training and training materials to be culturally relevant, and to understanding the local 
legislative and political environment (see also section 4.4.3.1). Again this requires time and sound 
interpersonal relationships that allow for fruitful exchange. 
The data support the importance of cultural awareness for placement success. In the survey, 80 per 
cent of advisers and 100 per cent of counterparts rated the adviser’s cultural awareness as being 
‘fully’ or ‘considerably’ important to project success (section 3.5.1). It was also mentioned by 
advisers in almost 50 per cent of the PCRs reviewed (section 3.5.2.4), as well as by advisers and 
counterparts who participated in interviews and focus groups (section 3.5.3.2). When discussing 
cultural awareness in the PCRs, advisers frequently mentioned the lessons they had learned after 
commencing their placements, such as the need ‘stay silent and allow long pauses in the 
conversation…and in meetings’ as this ‘encourages KAS to open up and continue to share 
information’ (A26, 2007). Cultural awareness was also seen as pivotal to understanding the 
influences on counterpart behaviour that may prevent them from applying knowledge and skills that 
they already possess (the ‘knowing-doing gap’ identified by Baser & Morgan [2009, p. 87]) and 
thwart the translation of improved capacity into improved performance.  
The need for cultural awareness includes, but also goes beyond, the interpersonal interactions that 
go on at the individual level. At a more basic level, advisers made statements about the need to 
adapt training materials and other instructional documents into culturally-relevant terms and 
concepts that do not rely on an adviser for explanation and can continue to be used after the 
adviser’s departure (A13, 2006). A number of interviewed advisers were able to expand this to a 
more substantive level, and indicated that placement initiatives and outcomes themselves had to 
possess cultural fit in order to be sustainable. If not, counterparts would merely ‘revert to their old 
ways’ subsequent to the adviser’s departure (A73, 2009). With broader systems development, one 
adviser spoke of the need to adopt PNG-style approaches from the outset of system design and 
development. This particular adviser took the broader conceptual issues underpinning Australian-
type systems and integrated them with local practices to produce a ‘new PNG-style approach’. He 
added that the resulting outcomes, while successfully adopted locally, sometimes ‘horrified’ his 
Australian colleagues (A70, 2008). 
The insights above imply that successful and sustainable outcomes are in ways dependent upon a 
two-way learning process between advisers and KAS/counterparts. Therefore, the collaborative and 
participatory processes of exchange and learning described above are essential not just for 
counterpart but also for adviser learning and adaptation. Once more these examples suggest that 
advisers who placed emphasis on achieving sustainable capacity development outcomes applied 
more third-generation approaches to technical assistance on the ground, approaches which use 
context as a starting point, ‘see indigenous institutions, cultures and structures as key determinants’, 
and employ a ‘searching rather than planning’ strategy (Morgan, 2010, cited in OECD/DAC, 2011, p. 
5). 
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4.4.1.5 Ownership and sustainability 
All of the processes discussed above were also raised by advisers in connection with counterpart 
‘ownership’ of project activities and initiatives, and ownership is, in turn, intimately connected with 
sustainability. In some ways what was seen on the ground was a translation of the 2005 Paris 
Declaration principle—that donor agencies should play a supportive role in the pursuit of country 
partner priorities—to the level of practice in the field. Just as the Declaration’s principles were based 
on practical experience as to what works and what doesn’t at the country level, the data from this 
study also supports the contention that advisers who are seen to be working for their own or for 
external interests, rather than the interests of counterparts, KAS and the recipient agency, will have 
very little sustainable impact at either the individual or the organisation level (see section 4.6.5 for 
the views of senior managers on this).  
KAS, counterpart and organisational interests in turn had to be pursued by means of a process that 
was also, in significant ways, owned and pursued by local actors, with the adviser playing a 
facilitating role through establishing and guiding participatory and consultative processes. While the 
ownership of placement outcomes was seen as essential for ensuring their sustainability 
(understood as their continued application or implementation and embedding) it was the process 
through which outcomes were pursued which was important for developing the capability to adapt 
and self-renew so critical to the capacity for sustained and self-generating performance 
improvement sought by ASF/EPSP.  
4.4.1.6 The tension between second-generation design and third-generation 
application 
Some tensions emerge from the data in what can be conceptualised as a conflict between second-
generation, outcomes-driven project design and the application of third-generation, process-driven 
technical assistance approaches in the field. One of the clearest tensions emerging from the data 
presented above is the time that is needed to establish interpersonal relationships based on trust, 
and to formulate and pursue culturally-fit placement outcomes through sustainable consultative and 
participatory processes, versus the timeframes that are allocated at the outset of projects. While 
many advisers stated directly that the time required to become trusted and accepted in the 
organisation (and therefore to begin to be able to start having an impact) had not been considered 
in the establishment of placement timeframes, the emphasis on product over process in placement 
design is also clear in the observation that many advisers could rate their placements as ‘successful’ 
while still considering placement outcomes to be unsustainable (section 3.1.3). As discussed in 
section 2.2, sustainability is inherent in the very concept of capacity development and to the extent 
that outcomes are unsustainable capacity development cannot have been said to occur. This would 
indicate that the conceptual shift from a ‘static’ to a ‘developmental’ model of capacity that has 
occurred in thinking around capacity development is yet to be realised in the case of EPSP, and that, 
more generally, an explicit capacity development focus is yet to be fully integrated into placement 
design. 
This situation would appear to be exacerbated by the practice of appointing advisers for 12-month 
placements with the possibility of an extension (see sections 4.5.2 and 4.6.2). Two scenarios tended 
to play out with regard to these arrangements. The first was that an adviser would be given an 
extension but would state how, had they known at the outset that they would have an additional 
year, would have approached capacity development activities differently. The second would be that 
the adviser was granted an extension too late, by which time they had already sought and secured 
alternative employment. In these cases a new adviser would be appointed and the process of 
establishing new relationships would have to begin all over again and momentum lost (see section 
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4.2.2 for counterpart views on ‘serial’ placements). This could also lead to ‘adviser fatigue’ on the 
part of counterparts. 
[This] string of Advisers is problematic because everyone does things differently 
regardless of how detailed handover notes are… while this doesn’t mean starting from 
scratch every time there is not a nice continuous process… backtracking happens; 
relationship building has to start from scratch… and [there is the risk of] Adviser fatigue. 
(A50, 2010) 
The second, and related, tension emerges in the way that placement success is measured. Once 
more this is indicated in the PCRs, with their focus on tangible indicators of project success, 
particularly when it comes to measuring capacity development (including sustainability). This came 
out most clearly in the interviews, when advisers were able to expand upon the impact of their 
placements in a way not possible in the PCRs. As clearly stated by one adviser: 
There is a tension there about what you can put on a checklist—it is easier to say I ran 
three workshops and four seminars, two field trips and five questionnaire designs than it 
is to say I had ten conversations with her that made her feel more confident as a female 
in PNG society. It is really hard to put that in a report. (A68, 2007) 
Other comments made by advisers regarded the difficulty in quantifying changes in capacity, which 
encompassed immeasurable factors such as self-confidence and changes in demeanour and attitude 
(A16, 2007), as well as the fact that there ‘was no real formal method for identifying Counterparts’ 
development as a result of placement activities’ (A50, 2010). These findings are in agreement with 
the observation discussed in the literature review that it is rare for aid organisations to focus on 
capacity development criteria when assessing the performance of technical assistance personnel, 
which is important because monitoring and evaluation can significantly influence how technical 
assistance personnel perform (OECD/DAC, 2011). Land, Hauck and Baser (2007) suggest that 
personnel performance should be assessed in terms of the roles and functions they are expected to 
perform and stress that is it critical to avoid making technical assistance personnel responsible for 
overall results because this ‘encourages them to take over and disempowers country partners… 
[and]…can also lead to an emphasis on achieving tangible and measurable results at the expense of 
investing in less tangible but equally important process and learning tasks’ (p. 7).  
The emphasis on the tangible over the intangible in placement design and assessment perhaps also 
explains some of the differences noted in the data obtained through the PCRs and that obtained 
through the survey. For example, while over 50 per cent of adviser PCRs mentioned the production 
of checklists, manuals, guidelines and other documentation as enablers of placement success 
(particularly with regard to sustainability in that they ‘lock-in’ procedures and can be consulted 
subsequent to the adviser’s departure), this was rated as fully or considerably important by only 27 
per cent of advisers in the survey. Further, while just less than 30 per cent of advisers discussed the 
need for flexibility to enable placement success in the PCRs, 97 per cent of advisers felt that this was 
fully or considerably important to placement success in the survey. The foregoing suggests that the 
second conceptual shift in thinking around capacity discussed in the literature review—that from a 
focus on tangible to intangible aspects—is also unable to be accommodated in EPSP placement 
design and assessment as currently constituted. 
4.4.1.7 The impediment of ‘time’ 
The impediment of ‘insufficient time’ (noted by 50% of advisers in the PCRs; 28% of advisers in the 
survey; and in comments by senior managers in section 4.6.2) clearly draws some of its significance 
from the need for advisers to establish productive interpersonal relationships prior to pursuing 
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substantive project outcomes, as well as the tendency of advisers to pursue iterative and 
participatory process-driven capacity development strategies. Project timeframes essentially appear 
to be designed with product, rather than process, most clearly in mind and this requires a trade-off 
to be made between tangible results and sustainable capacity development. This is encapsulated in 
the following quote:  
…the restructure initiative was approached and supported entirely from a capacity 
building perspective. This often led to timelines not being achieved but ensured 
ownership, accountability, and understanding; allowing for the [Department] Manager 
to play a key leadership role. (A46, 2010)  
That either project outcomes, their implementation, or the embedding of sustainable processes or 
procedures were not able to be achieved within initial 12-month timeframe of adviser placements 
was indicated in the survey data where 79 per cent of advisers and 91 per cent of counterparts rated 
‘continued adviser support beyond the initial placement period’ as fully or considerable important to 
project success.  
4.4.2 Translating individual capacity into improved collective performance 
This section will discuss the various factors that can influence, positively or negatively, the 
translation of individual capacity development into improved collective performance. Due to the fact 
that advisers often work at different levels within organisations, as well as at the organisational 
level, the term ‘collective’ performance will sometimes be employed to cover these multiple levels 
of activity. 
4.4.2.1 Manuals, guidelines checklists and documentation 
One of the few tangible products noted as enablers of placement success was documentation, in the 
form of manuals; guidelines and checklists for processes developed or systematised through 
placements; adviser documentation of work that had been undertaken; and the laying out of steps 
and strategies for the implementation of policies or systems developed through the placement (see 
section 4.2.3 for the views of advisers on development of policies and planning processes). In the 
PCRs over 50 per cent of advisers listed such documentation as an enabler of placement success. 
Often this was related to sustainability, and the usefulness of guidelines, checklists etc. for ‘locking-
in’ procedures and processes that had been developed through the placement. 
The production of documents was also connected to translating work done with individual 
counterparts into organisational improvements. For example, they were cited as improving 
operational efficiency by allowing the streamlining of previously disparate procedures. Some forms 
of documentation, such as standardised reports, were also cited as facilitating collective learning by 
allowing for the identification of problems and issues as part of standard process. Training manuals 
were also cited as enabling training developed with counterparts to then be applied across the 
broader organisation. 
While there would certainly be some broader organisational benefits obtained from the documents 
discussed above, there are also reasons to be cautious about overestimating their value as tools for 
capacity development. In the first instance, as already discussed, the focus on describing tangible 
outcomes in the PCRs may have resulted in these products being overemphasised (or perhaps even 
pursued) at the expense of other initiatives. This is partially supported by the lesser valuing of such 
documentation as important to project success by advisers who participated in the survey (27%, as 
discussed above). While 82 per cent of counterparts rated documentation highly, documentation 
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was nevertheless still one of the lowest rated items, being afforded less significance than other 
intangibles such as communication, collaboration and the adviser’s cultural awareness. 
Another reason for caution lies in the static nature of manuals and guidelines etc. and the 
uncertainty around whether the underlying knowledge has also been developed that would allow 
these materials to be updated as circumstances changed or for innovation to occur. 
4.4.2.2 The team-based process approach 
Instituting a team-based, departmental- or organisation-wide approach was preferred by a number 
of advisers. In some cases this was for clearly pragmatic reasons, such as the fact that counterpart 
absence or shifting counterparts made it ineffective to focus efforts on one individual alone (around 
30% of advisers in both the PCRs and the survey noted ‘absence of key counterpart’ as a full or 
considerable impediment to placement success). Another example was a deficiency in the skills base 
throughout a department which made a team-based approach effective in creating a multi-skilled 
and therefore versatile group of counterparts and KAS (A2, 2006). Regardless of the originating 
rationale, all advisers who used this approach reported the positive outcomes that obtained at the 
collective level by virtue of its application. 
As discussed in section 3.1.3.6, the team-based process approach to skill and knowledge acquisition 
was praised by advisers as yielding: positive team-building effects; an increased appreciation for 
both consultation and the need to review existing practices; improved Counterpart ownership of 
outcomes; and enhancements in transparency and accountability. For example: 
A multidisciplinary team was formed for the implementation of the payroll and members 
researched and prepared a proposal for the implementation of a computerised payroll 
system. This team process lead to significant capacity building in terms of consultation, 
inclusion of peers, learning of systems and review of internal processes. (A46, 2010) 
Further positive outcomes were noted in terms of efficiency and productivity and giving each staff 
member ‘a better understanding of their role and the impact that delays or errors can have on other 
staff and the organization’ (A29, 2008), staff being positively acknowledged by management for the 
work they were doing (A28, 2008), and staff better understanding how roles and organisational 
structure had to support agency goals and mission (A54, 2010). 
In addition to facilitating the acquisition of process skills and the broader understanding that can 
contribute to ongoing improvements in departmental and organisational performance, these 
examples indicate that a team-based approach can lend itself to the creation of the conditions 
outlined in section 2.2 in which individuals’ new knowledge, ways of understanding and techniques 
are able to be applied straightforwardly in the organisational setting. The conditions mentioned 
were: where organisational objectives are agreed, tasks and functions reasonably clear; where both 
individual and organisational learning are aimed at improving performance; and where the 
organisation provides both opportunities and support for the application of the learning by the 
individual (Johnson & Wilson, 1999). 
Again, the descriptions of the benefits accruing from this approach encompass some of the 
intangible elements of capacity discussed in section 2.2, such as understanding the place of the 
organisation, and the individual within it, in terms of the broader systems in which they are located. 
The importance of this is indicated in the findings from the research wherein 40 per cent of advisers 
in the PCRs reviewed mentioned ‘staff understanding of purpose and function’ as an important 
enabler of placement success, and 72 per cent of advisers surveyed (and 100% of counterparts) 
rated this as fully or considerably important to placement success. As stated in section 4.3.2 this is 
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not only relevant to staff’s ability to adapt and innovate by virtue of understanding the ‘why’ that is 
the animating force of the ‘how’, it also reflects the essential contribution that sense of purpose 
makes to motivation, commitment and engagement. 
The second condition that was noted above—where the organisation provides both opportunities 
and support for the application of learning by the individual—was one that was noted by advisers as 
a significant impediment to project success in cases where it did not obtain. Fifty per cent of advisers 
noted a range of ways in which management and management practices could impede the 
application of individual counterparts’ knowledge to improve the workplace (Section 3.2.3.5), for 
example: 
[My Counterpart’s] ability to gain more from the placement was hampered by a lack of 
resources and managerial support in [the] Corporate [group] (A17, 2007). 
Some of the underlying reasons for lack of management support will be discussed in the following 
section on influences at the organisational level.  
A further impediment to accruing the full benefits of team-based process approaches was time. This 
has already been mentioned, and again here the problem lay with not having sufficient time to 
ensure that processes were embedded and institutionalised prior to project completion. As 
discussed by Baser and Morgan (2008) and mentioned in section 2.2, one of the prominent reasons 
for capacity development failing to result in improved organisational performance is where new 
knowledge, structures, systems or strategies are formulated and applied but not embedded into 
daily practice. 
4.4.2.3 The time needed to notice results 
The interview stage of this study was an important one for gathering advisers’ views of the success 
or otherwise of their placements (as discussed in section 4.2.1) after a number of years had elapsed 
since placement completion. Five advisers specifically noted how placement outcomes can actually 
occur over a longer timeframe than the placement itself, ‘often many years longer’ (A69, 2008). For 
example, one adviser stated that he could find no evidence at all that his placement had been 
successful when it was completed, but that he could arguably see evidence of it now in examples of 
organisational behaviour that indicated cultural change (A69, 2008). While four of the advisers saw 
greater evidence of success in the years following the placement, one adviser said he saw less as he 
realised that the technical knowledge (successfully) transferred was insufficient on its own to enable 
the understanding required for continued application and innovation (A58, 2011). 
These insights lend support to Baser and Morgan’s (2008) assertion that ‘patterns of both capacity 
development and performance are uneven, with progress going at different speeds at different 
times... investments in capacity can take years to yield significant results’ (p. 86). Once again this has 
implications for configuring the right mix of product and process in designing capacity development 
initiatives, and for improving the monitoring and evaluation of projects to support greater 
understanding of processes of change and support learning.  
4.4.2.4 Inter-adviser collaboration 
Section 3.1.3 provides a sample of adviser views regarding the very positive benefits that can accrue 
from inter-adviser collaboration. In terms that are by now familiar, this style of collaboration allowed 
for counterparts and KAS to develop a much broader view of the organisations of which they were a 
part, and to institute productive processes of inter-departmental communication and consultation. 
What is of particular interest here is how the collective action of the advisers was aimed directly at 
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organisational capacity development and capacity development processes, as opposed to specific 
placement outcomes (more than likely because their own placement outcomes were tied to their 
departmental ToRs), and focused more on the intangible aspects of capacity outlined in section 2.2. 
For example: 
The group training activities undertaken by the ASF Advisers in a team situation were 
extremely effective not only in the training outcomes but in breaking down the barriers 
between Branches and Divisions. The Department operates with the silo effect, where 
there is very little interaction between Divisions or Corporate or Technical groups. There 
has been a significant degree of change as a result of the workshops that have included 
corporate and technical officers in sessions such as change management, team 
leadership and management, Vision and Mission development, and Corporate 
Awareness. (A36, 2008) 
The team created a lot of synergies and the relationships between the Advisers and their 
KAS enhanced the relationship between individual KAS and the team leading to much 
more consultation over decisions. This needs to be further built on as this is where the 
real change can begin. (A42, 2008) 
4.4.3 The organisational level 
This section contains a discussion of the influences on placement success that were seen to work at 
the level of the organisation. There has been a small amount of crossover, for example in the 
discussion above regarding the need to design culturally-appropriate systems. While the design of 
such systems occurs at the level of individual actors acting collaboratively, the consequences can be 
seen to affect organisational capacity as a whole. Given that advisers most often work with a limited 
range of individuals, their ability to make an impact can be impeded by organisational features and 
actors that are beyond the purview of their influence. It is for this reason that the more negative 
and, unfortunately, pervasive impacts on placement success can occur at this level.  
4.4.3.1 Organisational and PNG culture 
As discussed in section 2.2, in 2004 Lynn Pieper completed a study that investigated the 
deterioration of public administration in PNG. The report highlighted the factors that interviewees 
saw as driving the transformation of PNG’s public service from an efficient, professional, team-
based, committed, independent and well-educated corps of individuals in touch with the basic 
service needs in the provinces, to a highly politicised, inefficient and sometimes incompetent cadre 
of state employees, often motivated by narrow political or personal interests. Some of these factors 
will be discussed further below. 
If this assessment of PNG’s public service is to be taken as correct generally speaking—it should be 
noted that the study was undertaken a decade ago and the experiences recounted by advisers 
demonstrate that this assessment does not always apply—it can explain part of the ‘knowing-doing 
gap’ that was alluded to by advisers in the PCRs and interviews. For example at times the improved 
skills, knowledge and awareness gained by counterparts through the placements would elevate their 
professional competencies above those of their senior managers, yet the general reluctance in PNG 
to challenge those in higher positions of authority would inhibit their applying that knowledge in the 
service of improved organisational performance (section 3.5.5.2).  
Advisers spoke of the tension that exists between the formal, legal, bureaucratic system in PNG and 
the informal, patrimonial system in which persons in positions of political influence and authority are 
expected to use these positions to access and distribute largesse to kin and constituents. These two 
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systems were often in competition and while advisers would work to strengthen the former, the 
implementation of completed initiatives could be thwarted, or at least unsupported, by beneficiaries 
of the latter (see also section 4.2.3). Advisers could find themselves supported in initiatives involving 
the design and formulation of policies or performance management frameworks, for example, but 
then witness how the functioning of the informal system provided a strong disincentive to actually 
implement change, once more leading to the knowing-doing gap. For example:  
These activities were effective in the sense that KAS know the right thing to do. They 
have a good understanding of the Public Finance (Management) Act and the General 
Orders. They just decline to implement those laws, preferring to take an easier or more 
personally advantageous course of action (A30, 2008) 
The wantok system in PNG could be seen to have a strong influence specifically on initiatives aimed 
at improving performance management (inadequate performance management was mentioned as 
an impediment to placement success by 40% of advisers in the PCRs). Again the operation of the 
informal system of appointments created a strong disincentive to implement or consistently apply 
performance management frameworks, and the absence of such frameworks enabled the 
continuation of underperforming or inadequately qualified appointees in their positions.  
It is safe to say that the implementation of such broad-based cultural change is beyond the power of 
any adviser or external agency. Nevertheless, the existence of informal systems of decision-making 
and resource allocation side-by-side with formal, bureaucratic ones is commonplace, as is 
recognised by third-generation technical assistance which concerns itself with the dynamics of 
change at both the formal and informal levels (Morgan, 2010, cited in OECD/DAC, 2011). However 
while advisers can and should make efforts to understand and work with these dynamics, the need 
for recipient country leaders to champion change is also vital. Further, even with the support of 
capable leaders, it must be recognised that cultural change is a long-term process that requires 
continuous engagement.  
4.4.3.2 Acting positions, contract positions, and long-term vacancies 
In her 2004 report, Pieper also discussed how the change in public service appointments in PNG 
from permanent to contract, with departmental head appointments being made by the cabinet 
rather than the Public Services Commission, resulted in the still prevalent practice of changing 
secretaries (and often other senior personnel) whenever a new minister is appointed (this is touched 
on in section 4.2.3 with the regard of getting policy changes approved). The consequence of this has 
been an undermining of the professionalism of the public service, ‘causing departmental heads to 
focus only on the short-term, and to play political games in their own attempts at survival… it has 
enabled politicians to get too close to operational areas within the public service’ (p. 4). 
The instability created by this state of affairs has been reported by advisers as having seriously 
deleterious effects on placement outcomes. The support for change from senior management (and 
consequently from any counterparts lower in the hierarchy) could ebb and flow throughout the 
course of a placement, implementation plans could be stymied, or placement initiatives successfully 
implemented could be overturned when organisational leadership was replaced. The relationship 
between support and shifting political tides seemed to be mostly apparent in cases where positions 
of leadership were acting positions, and advisers could spend the entirety of their placements 
without substantive senior managers being appointed. However, in cases where substantive 
appointments were made late in placements, advisers could see progress accelerate rapidly (section 
3.5.5.2). As an illustration of these points: 
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On paper and on the surface these things were realistic and achievable and whilst a 
corporate plan and policies and procedures were designed and formulated; the most 
important state of moving things to the completion and implementation stages were 
almost impossible because of lack of will from the acting management director due to 
resistance from the senior management group. The corporate plan, the restructure and 
other related, but difficult issues were only finally implemented when the substantive 
managing director was appointed (A44, 2009). 
The circumstances described above create two of the conditions noted by Baser and Morgan (2008) 
as inhibiting the translation of capacity development initiatives into improved organisational 
performance, namely, the knowing-doing gap that impedes progress, and political instability, which 
creates disincentives for change. They also feed into the core capability ‘to relate and attract 
resources and support,’ described by Baser and Morgan (2008) as one of the five core capabilities 
constituting capacity. As they state, and as can be witnessed in the field in PNG, there is a political 
dimension to this capability which, particularly in the public sector, is pursued as much, if not more, 
through informal and intangible channels as it is through formal and tangible. Too much of a 
preoccupation with survival in this setting can result in efficiency being sacrificed for loyalty, and the 
loss of ability to innovate. As the authors conclude, these agencies need to extend outward in the 
forging of strong stakeholder relationships or institute mechanisms that guard against total 
dependence on political support and alliances, in order to secure the operating space required to 
really build capacity. 
Political instability, and the shifting and changing priorities that instability gives rise to, was one of 
the reasons cited by advisers for the need for flexibility in formulating and pursuing placement 
outcomes (see section 4.2.1 for advisers and counterparts views on this). Flexibility allows emergent 
needs and changing demands to be accommodated and this is particularly important ‘in complex 
and politically sensitive environments where the momentum and direction of reform can quickly 
change (Land, Hauck & Baser, 2007, p. 6). There is a sense here of capacity development initiatives 
needing to be pursued somewhat opportunistically, with advisers ready to respond to opportunities 
as and when they arise  
4.4.4 Capacity diagnostics and placement design 
Capacity diagnostics were not often mentioned directly by advisers in the PCRs, however they were 
implicated in a number of impediments that were isolated in the analysis of these reports, in 
particular, ‘insufficient human capacity’ (51% of advisers) and ‘incorrect needs analysis’ (35% of 
advisers). Where EPSP’s capacity diagnostic exercise was broached by a group of advisers in a focus 
group, it was not viewed positively (see section 3.5.6.5). The process was characterised as one that 
involved eminent PNG bureaucrats investigating the ‘failings of agencies’, while eschewing both 
consultation and acknowledgement of the positive learning that had come from the ASF experience. 
In the view of these advisers, the subsequent Capacity Development Agreements often bore no 
relation to the discussions that had occurred and this contributed to poorly targeted AC placements 
and some unrealistic ToRs. 
The data from this study suggest that there are several ways in which the diagnostic framework used 
to assess capacity failed or fails to provide an accurate assessment of individual and organisational 
needs, and therefore leads to failure to accurately gauge what will be required in order to achieve 
placement outcomes prior to their commencement.  
Just on one-third of advisers noted in their PCRs that baseline conditions at the start of their 
placements were insufficient to allow placement outcomes to be achieved within given timeframes. 
For example, while ToRs may have called for the development of corporate or strategic plans, 
 150 
advisers would discover after commencing their placements that the understanding of the processes 
required to support these initiatives was either limited or absent. The absence of basic underlying 
systems or processes to support higher-level objectives then became one of the reasons for ToRs 
remaining only partially realised upon placement completion. Alternatively, a ToR would be realised 
in time, but at the expense of ensuring that the proper systems and processes were in place to 
support its later implementation and sustainable operation. As indicated, this overestimation of 
baseline capacity related to both individuals and organisations as a whole. This is acknowledged in 
PCR comments as one of the reasons why advisers who believed their ToRs to be appropriate upon 
commencement of their placements, later came to view them as inappropriate (see section 3.1). As 
such, the data points to inadequacies in the capacity diagnostics employed by ASF/EPSP when it 
comes to isolating the finer or more ground-level capacity deficits that must be addressed in order 
to pursue higher-level objectives. 
This view is encapsulated by Adviser A50 (2010) who said in the interview that she thought adviser 
job descriptions were written almost as a ‘wish-list’ in the hope that advisers would go in and 
‘magically’ fix problems that have been there for years. In her view, it is ‘more systemic’ than that, 
and the work involves big changes but also lots of very small changes. Consequently, a ‘slowly 
slowly’ approach is needed in order to achieve real and sustainable change. The idea of the ‘wish list’ 
and the absence of proper consideration as to what is actually required to achieve these objectives, 
brings up once again the tension isolated between product and process in placement design and the 
tendency to focus on the former at the expense of the latter. Also, as indicated here, a change in the 
approach to capacity diagnostics employed by EPSP or any subsequent program, and the 
incorporation of an explicit capacity development perspective in placement design, must also lead to 
a change in what would be considered to be realistic placement timeframes. 
Almost all of the issues described above, as well as others highlighted in this section, are neatly 
encapsulated in the following quote: 
At the time of accepting this position the job and person specifications appeared current 
and relevant. However on assessing the [Agency] situation and progress with their field 
operations work for the [placement focus] at the start of my contract, the situation was 
such that the role required far more operational inputs and activities than outlined in 
the job specifications as a ‘standard’ Adviser position and therefore allowed less time for 
capacity building which resulted in that particular specification being largely 
opportunistic… Further, given that it takes time to build trust and relationships in order 
to have free and frank discussions with Counterparts, the amount of lead in time to the 
project also affected the level of capacity building desired to take place. Proposed 
changes are that an appropriate assessment of the actual situation for an Adviser 
placement be undertaken to ensure that AusAID, the program management contractor, 
Adviser and Adviser facility are in full agreement regarding the capacity building, 
operational activities and expected inputs and outcomes. (A62, 2011) 
The data also suggest that deficiencies exist when it comes to diagnosing the causes giving rise to 
agency or department performance deficits. A number of advisers noted that while it had been 
assumed that underperformance was simply a function of lack of knowledge, upon engagement it 
became clear that counterparts knew what to do but were stifled in applying their knowledge by 
some other factor, such as lack of confidence, lack of support, lack of opportunity or as a result of 
some particular characteristic of the organisational or broader culture. This can be traced again to a 
general tendency to focus on the technical and formal aspects of capacity, and the concomitant 
absence of focus on the intangible elements that are also fundamental to capacity and its translation 
into performance. As discussed in section 2.2, a lack of focus on these intangibles is often a strong 
explanatory factor in the failure of technical assistance interventions to have their desired impacts. 
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And, as Baser and Morgan (2008) note, conventional needs analyses and capacity diagnostics are 
generally not equipped to uncover the deeper political, cultural, psychological and social factors that 
underpin what can be generically seen at the surface as ‘lack of commitment’ or ‘lack of will’, etc. 
When explicit consideration is given to these factors, the need for longer-term commitments when 
pursuing changes at these levels becomes readily apparent. 
It should be noted here that only seven per cent of advisers surveyed rated ‘quality of underlying 
analysis of needs’ as an impediment to project success. It is possible to conjecture as to why this was 
the case. One probable reason is that capacity diagnostics are an underlying and often ‘invisible’ 
factor that set the stage for project design, and establish adviser expectations, and then disappear 
into the background. The adviser then becomes aware of impediments to project success as they 
become apparent throughout the placement, without necessarily considering whether these 
obstacles or impediments could have realistically been foreseen. For example, in the survey, 37 per 
cent of advisers noted ‘existing infrastructure’ as a considerable (or full) impediment to project 
success, and it is reasonable to consider whether inadequacies in existing infrastructure should have 
been isolated in the initial analysis of organisational or departmental capacity. This example has 
been chosen specifically to indicate that it is not simply in the realm of intangibles that deficiencies 
appear to exist in capacity diagnostics, but also with regard to the more traditional, material 
elements of organisational capacity. 
4.4.5 Conclusion 
If AC placements are to work to develop capacity that is capable of producing sustained and self-
generating performance improvement they will need to be reconfigured in a way that 
accommodates the processes required to achieve this result. At present, the emphasis on product 
over process creates tensions that can ultimately negatively impact the achievement of both. 
Adviser and counterpart experience in the field stresses heavily the ‘human’ component of capacity 
development and the implications this has for the way that placements should be approached. 
Advisers and counterparts both need to be receptive to being influenced by the other, and there is a 
strong sense that placements in their entirety—from design, through to implementation and 
assessment—should be approached collaboratively and with a clear sense of partnership. 
In general, the findings discussed here are both a confirmation and validation of the emergence of 
third-generation approaches to technical assistance discussed in section 2.2. Whether familiar with 
the discussion of these approaches in the literature or not, advisers are discovering in the field that 
flexible, contextually-specific and iterative learning approaches are what gives capacity development 
initiatives the greatest chance of sustainable success. This stands in contrast with the second-
generation design employed by ASF/EPSP, with its focus on tangible outcomes and relatively short 
timeframes. Longer-term engagements are certainly required if change is to be deep and abiding. 
The political context in PNG creates challenges. Greater flexibility and realistic expectations, 
however, can help minimise their inhibitory forces. Once again, collaboration and partnership would 
seem to be key in ensuring there is something of a ‘climate of readiness’ in which technical 
assistance placements can operate. Moreover there needs to be readiness on the part of advisers 
and donor agencies to take advantage of opportunities as and when they arise and to bide their time 
when circumstances dictate.  
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4.5 The role of other modalities in capacity development  
4.5.1  Introduction 
This section deals with a small part of the research that was directed at ‘other modalities’, that is, 
other than AC placements. Due to what were recent AusAID interests in PNG, this matter was added 
late in the research project’s design in order to capture data about such modalities: short-term 
consultants, twinning arrangements, targeted training, grants and research. The research question 
added was: 
RQ5  What have been the outcomes of the introduction by EPSP of other modalities of capacity 
development including short-term consultants, twinning arrangements, targeted training, 
grants and research? Do these modalities provide increased efficiencies and effectiveness 
compared to the use of long-term advisers? 
The research design was principally established to collect data on AC placements from 2006–2013, 
which included the end of the ASF period and through the EPSP period. The other modalities 
research was conducted on the 2012 and 2013 period, but EPSP managed little work in other 
modalities during this period. This was confirmed by an EPSP staff member as follows. 
EPSP sought to expand the kinds of capacity development modalities available to it such 
as targeted training, research and analysis, procurement, incentive grants and co-
funding arrangements…EPSP has undergone several reviews and refocusing of its role 
and objectives over the past eighteen months. EPSP is conscious that other modalities 
have not been realised as anticipated. (Personal email communication) 
The research proceeded initially on the basis that there would be other modalities to be researched 
and that some data could also be collected in the AC placement research stages that related to 
previous (pre-2012) work in other modalities. A brief review of relevant literature and the small 
amount of data collected in this research are used in this section to provide the basis for a discussion 
of the above research questions, although clearly the absence of other modalities to study during 
the research means that there are no answers to these questions.  
4.5.2 Short-term consultants 
Perhaps the most common ‘other modality’ used for Australian aid-based development in PNG is the 
short-term consultancy. Short-term generally means consultancies of a few weeks to a few months, 
some on a multiple fly-in/fly-out basis. They may take the form of short-term extensions to long-
term AC placements, technical support, capacity substitution, consultancy etc. They differ from AC 
placements in that, usually, there are no counterparts and their ToRs do not include capacity 
development (see also section 4.4.1.6). Some short-term consultancies relate to the work of one or 
more AC placements and, in other ways, may also involve some aspects of capacity development. 
Short-term consultancies were a topic of consideration at the GoPNG and donor workshop held by 
the research team in April 2014 (see section 4.6.2 for full details). A group of participants noted that 
the benefits of short-term consultancies included: cost effectiveness for the donors, the ability to 
address specific capacity needs quickly, and improving agency staff’s particular technical skills. The 
group noted, however, that capacity development was limited at best in short-term consultancies, 
there was often resistance to consultants’ efforts to achieve change, and there was limited 
understanding on the part of consultants of cultural and contextual matters. 
 An adviser with experience of short-term consultancies confirmed the above in his following 
statement in his PCR. 
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In the current environment, where managing contractors and development partners are 
looking to see quick wins (tangible outcomes) delivered with short-term technical 
assistance and other modalities, [short-term consultancies] frustrate and fracture 
support and the work that has already been done and will hinder progress towards 
reform. (A94, 2011) 
Arguably, the negatives expressed about short-term consultancies are about them not being long-
term consultancies (AC placements). As shown later, this was a recurring theme in the data but it is 
unreasonable in the sense that short-term contracts are there for a short-term purpose and not for 
(necessarily long-term) sustainable capacity development. Various meetings with AusAID (later 
DFAT) staff in Canberra and Port Moresby expressed positive views about the usefulness of short-
term consultancies for capacity substitution etc. One short-term adviser made this point in his PCR. 
I believe that a fly in/fly out arrangement works extremely well. Advisers, like many 
consultants, are commonly tempted to complete tasks for Public Servants when they 
start to struggle. Of course, this is not sustainable. My working arrangements 
encouraged local staff to more fully participate in expediting solutions and resolving 
problems. I believe that much of the success of the [specified] reform can be attributed 
to these working arrangements. (A7, 2006)  
Generally, GoPNG senior managers, counterparts and others expressed negative views about short-
term consultancies. 
[Senior staff] did cite that they had a short-term consultant in the department to do 
some training courses but when he left the courses ceased…Also, ‘part-time’ Advisers 
are not suitable where they only come in a few days a week. This was the case for some 
consultants brought in through another arrangement, not with EPSP. We suggested that 
we needed full-time Advisers who stay for an extended time. This was essential as we 
deal with human beings who are complex and need time to deal with change. (G1&G2 
Some short-term consultants felt that they were plunged into difficult circumstances that were not 
amenable to short-term advice. 
In hindsight, looking for patterns of behaviour early on, such as, avoidance and coming 
up with more strategies to manage them. Short-term assignments are difficult. In the 
four months of the assignment, it took me a month to realise that the Secretariat 
Manager might be avoiding particular discussions or situations. (A5, 2006) 
Counterparts were similarly unimpressed with short-term consultants. 
I needed an Adviser not a consultant to help fill the gap because an Adviser has a 
genuine interest in trying to help someone develop their knowledge and skills. A 
consultant comes to do a small project, gives advice and leaves, and then isn’t around to 
see it through. (C83) 
 [Short-term] consultants collect information for themselves and retain it. They submit a 
report then come back later to review whether things have been done. (C85) 
Short-term Advisers are no good for human capacity development, or for the 
institutionalisation of new policies and procedures etc. Short term is only good for a 
specific job or product. Also short-term visits are of questionable value as people are not 
committed locally and not available on the ground. (C79) 
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Given the limited data, it is unwise to draw firm conclusions about short-term consultancies other 
than that further research will be required to do so. It may be suggested that short-term 
consultancies are probably useful in particular circumstances and are favoured by donors for their 
specificity and apparent cost effectiveness; conversely the recipients dislike short-term consultancies 
and prefer long-term AC placements, especially because of their capacity development strengths. 
4.5.3 Twinning 
The information for this section has been taken from the PNG-EPSG Twinning Initiative Phase I 
Independent Completion Report (Murphy, 2010). It contains the most recent evaluation data 
available on the contribution of the twinning initiative. 
The use of institution-to-institution ‘twinning’ arrangements commenced informally in PNG in 2006, 
and was formally instituted as Phase 1 of the Papua New Guinea (PNG)-Australia Economic and 
Public Sector Governance (EPSG) Twinning Initiative in July 2007. At the time of the Independent 
Completion Report produced near the end of Phase 1 of the Initiative, the Initiative comprised the 
PNG-Australia Audit Office Twinning Scheme (PAAOTS); the PNG-Australia Taxation Office Twinning 
Scheme (PATOTS); the PNG-Australia Treasury Twinning Scheme (PATTS); the PNG-Australia Finance 
Twinning Scheme (PAFTS); and the PNG-Australia Customs Twinning Scheme (PACTS). The three 
objectives of Phase I were to: 1) facilitate an ongoing relationship between selected PNG and 
Australian departments; 2) develop appropriate knowledge and skills among selected PNG staff in 
specific departments; and 3) develop the capacity of selected PNG departments to undertake their 
designated roles and responsibilities. 
Twinning worked ‘by pairing organisations with similar portfolios to undertake workplace exchanges; 
capacity building can occur through the sharing of decision-making processes, problems, constraints 
and the approaches taken’ (AusAID, 2010a, p. 14). Twinning activities included: training; study tours; 
work attachments (both PNG officers to Australia and Australian officers to PNG); activities or 
placements from one week to 12 months in duration; and capacity development, capacity filling or a 
combination of both (AusAID, 2010a). 
Murphy (2010) noted that, although the Initiative is portrayed as a single initiative, it is characterised 
by a variety of independently-initiated and managed schemes that vary widely in the duration and 
nature of deployments of Australians to PNG and vice versa. From Murphy’s report: ‘PATOTS and 
PACTS are characterised by very short deployments (typically one to two weeks) both in Australia 
and in PNG. PAAOTS places PNG graduates in the Graduate Program of the Australian National Audit 
Office (ANAO) for up to a year. Deployments from ANAO to PNG have so far been minimal. Between 
these two extremes PATTS and PAFTS placements are typically between 6 weeks and 3 – 5 months… 
This means that it is difficult to make any conclusions that can be generalised across the full set of 
five schemes’ (p. 3). 
The Initiative is also strongly linked with the Strongim Gavman Program (SGP), with many twinning 
activities being used to complement SGP’s strategic reforms at the operational-level. 
Murphy states that the Twinning Initiative has been effective at consolidating and strengthening 
long-term institutional links between Australian and PNG partner agencies, and enabled the 
development of close relationships at the senior, middle and junior levels of the involved 
organisations. In the case of PACTS, this led to a familiarity where involved PNG personnel were 
‘comfortable to get on the phone and “work-shop” issues and ideas with their international 
Counterparts’ (p. 6). On the other hand, the view was expressed that the twinning timeframes in 
PATTS were ‘too short to build effective relationships that facilitate effective mentoring of 
Counterparts’ (p. 6).  
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Murphy noted a few clear improvements in operational capacity, such as a reduction of the backlog 
of audit reports in the Auditor’s General Office and an increase in the number and complexity of 
cases registered in PNG Customs. Special note was made of how Customs’ investigation officers 
were now able to train their peers and were continuing to refine their training methods. 
Nevertheless, the report noted that ‘in terms of outcomes of the relevant PNG departments, there 
was not a lot of evidence [at the time] to demonstrate the Initiative’s contribution to development 
of the capacity of selected PNG departments to undertake their designated roles and 
responsibilities’ (p. 9) and that, ‘contributions to PNG agencies through technical inputs [were] 
difficult to distinguish from those of SGP’ (p. 6). In its response to Murphy’s report, Management 
stated that it ‘does not hold the view of the Report that that twinning outcomes cannot be 
differentiated from those of the SGP, although more work needs to be done to ensure that 
monitoring and evaluation frameworks capture these’ (Whole of Government Deployment and 
Capacity Development Section, 2010). 
Murphy noted in her report that skills and knowledge had been developed across a number of 
agencies, as evidenced by improved technical knowledge and work practices. Further, ‘soft skills’, 
such as written and oral communication, participation in meetings, professionalism, and relationship 
management, amongst others, were also seen as being developed through placements in Australian 
partner departments. The author believed that advances in technical skills could be capitalised on by 
widening the scope of placements to include generic skills, such as a train-the-trainer program that 
could assist with the further dissemination of the skills learned (particularly in regional areas). It was 
also observed that the benefit of placements were maximised when learning objectives were drafted 
ahead of placements such that a tailored program could be arranged for each employee.  
In terms of broader capacity development, both of the institutions and participating staff, the author 
noted that she had difficulty adequately assessing the contributions made by the Twinning Initiative, 
by virtue of capacity development being notoriously difficult to measure and in light of the 
aforementioned difficulty of distinguishing between the contributions of Twinning and those of SGP. 
However, the author believed that ‘without the complementary role of SGP, twinning deployments 
(with the exception of the PAAOTS deployments) [were] of too short duration to contribute 
significantly to capacity development’ (p. 7). Further, in a later recommendation, the author noted 
that ‘lack of support once employees return to PNG limits the ability of the employees to apply their 
newly developed knowledge, skills and confidence in the workplace’ (p. 25).  
The Auditor General’s Office was commended for using Twinning strategically for generational 
change, ‘by developing a cadre of capable young graduates who may act as change agents for the 
organisation’ (p. 7). Although the graduates faced difficulty in changing the behaviour of more senior 
staff, ‘the long-term benefit to the PNG Audit Office is that the graduates are likely to form the 
nucleus of senior management in years to come’ (p. 7). 
While there were a few shortcomings noticed above, it is clear that none of these arose from 
features inherent in the nature of the approach itself. The design of Phase II of the Initiative 
incorporates many of the recommendations made in Murphy’s report, including improvements to 
monitoring and evaluation. Further, despite these shortcomings, Murphy noted that the Twinning 
Initiative ‘has made a worthwhile contribution to delivering a jointly agreed program of high quality 
financial, technical and policy support to assist Central Agencies in PNG to build effective national 
institutions and public sector workforce capacities’. (p. 4)  
The following comparative advantages of twinning were isolated in Murphy’s report. First, the 
reciprocal nature of twinning arrangements allows personnel from PNG to experience placements in 
Australia, while the SGP and ASF/EPSP’s advisory facility only provide for the deployment of 
Australian personnel to PNG. Citing the ANAO Twinning Program Secondment Report (2008), the 
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author stated that such deployments allowed PNG personnel to develop ‘better interpersonal skills, 
levels of confidence, and communication, analytical and computing skills’ (p. 20), at a lower cost per 
deployment week than PNG-based placements (to be discussed further below). Further, Murphy 
stated that the ‘exposure of PNG personnel to the work ethic and organisational culture of a 
government agency with a similar role in an advanced economy’ enabled personnel, particularly 
those who experienced longer deployments, ‘to gain an understanding and vision for how things 
might be different’ as well as ‘the confidence and skills to act as change agents in their home 
agencies’ (p. 20). According to the report, much of this can be attributed to the whole-of-
government nature of the Twinning Initiative. 
Secondly, the tailored approach to the design of each scheme was considered to be one of the 
Initiative’s main comparative advantages. Substantial variation was allowed both between and 
within individual schemes, which maximised the relevance of twinning to PNG partner agency needs 
and allowed the capacity constraints of Australian agencies, to both supply and receive employees, 
to be accommodated. The scope for a flexible response to changing needs and priorities was 
maximised through the tailored approach, and it encouraged a strong sense of ownership by both 
partner agencies. Further, the small scale and flexibility of the schemes allowed for learning and 
change to take place easily, and the author noted that evidence of learning and analysis at the 
scheme level was strong, reflected in multiple learning cycles, continuous improvements, and the 
implementation of ‘quite exhaustive M&E approaches’ (p. 17).  
Thirdly, the Twinning Initiative is also credited as complementing the SGP program in its 
establishment of links at the graduate and middle-management levels, as opposed to the primarily 
senior level at which the SGP operates. 
Fourthly, the links and synergies created between GoA and GoPNG agencies under the twinning 
management structure are likely to lead to a greater awareness of the actual development needs of 
GoPNG agencies, and the best people to address those needs, than that which could be expected 
from a managing contractor/service provider. Further, it was highlighted that an important 
contribution of twinning is that it gives Australian partner agencies and staff an improved 
understanding and appreciation of the constraints and difficulties inherent in the operating 
environment of their PNG partner agencies, and thereby assists in facilitating constructive and 
contextually-specific engagement. 
Fifthly, in terms of value for money, Murphy noted the relative cost-efficiency of twinning as 
compared to other forms of capacity building such as that provided through long-term advisory 
support and higher-level programs like SGP. While cost differentials between twinning and SGP were 
stated, there was no direct comparison offered between twinning and long-term adviser costs. In 
support of this assertion, however, the 2010 PNG-Australia Review of Technical Adviser Positions 
(AusAID, 2010b) also concluded that twinning arrangements offered cost savings when compared to 
the average costs of long-term advisers. By way of clarification, Murphy noted that the conclusion 
that twinning is a cost-effective form of capacity building should not be taken as a statement as to its 
cost effectiveness, which was hard to calculate given the difficulty in isolating its outcome-level 
effects. 
Finally, the ‘hands-on’ approach afforded by twinning was noted as particularly appropriate to the 
Melanesian culture and ‘the personalised method of skills transfer and experience-sharing was seen 
as helping to motivate the workforce’ (p. 21).  
In the present research there were few data about twinning upon which to base conclusions. It was 
evident, however, that some advisers used their professional networks to arrange formal or informal 
visits by counterparts to Australian and/or New Zealand public sector agencies. 
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An important aspect of these projects is for Counterparts to experience life in a 
functioning department in Australia. A visit to Australia is also seen as a reward and so 
they are valued by the Counterparts. I have experienced this in my current work with 
[State Government Department] where we have had PNG people on placement. (A74) 
I help my Counterparts by providing access to the [specified area] contacts that they are 
then able to foster for themselves. I am working with executive management on a whole 
of government project. I have put the team in contact with the Australian [specified 
professional] society and also the CIO for [specified national organisation]. It’s about 
providing regional contacts at the same or higher level so that they can learn from these 
contacts and gain from them in the future. (A28) 
4.5.4 Targeted training 
The PNG-Australia Targeted Training Facility (PATTAF) commenced in April 2002 to provide targeted 
training to meet selected PNG agencies’ capacity and skills development to support the broader 
governance and public sector reform objectives of the PNG-Australia Development Cooperation 
Program. The Facility was designed to provide management of short-term training and Australian 
Development Scholarships. GRM International was engaged by AusAID as the managing contractor 
for PATTAF in 2002. Australian Development Scholarships took up 80 per cent of the facility’s activity 
budget over the life of the initial contract. 
An Independent Completion Report containing the findings of an evaluation of PATTAF’s operations 
from 2002-2009 was published in December 2009 (Reynolds, Laimo & Field, 2009). Whilst the report 
found that the program objectives outlined in the original design document had been largely met, 
the lack of explicit capacity development-related (outcome-level) objectives in the design made it 
difficult to assess the facility’s contribution to broader development goals. As the authors note, the 
original contract preceded the Paris Declaration (2005)—and the subsequent raft of aid 
effectiveness studies and formulations—and thus reflected the practice at the time of stating 
objectives at the output level. Subsequent AusAID guidance recommended that an objective 
describe, at the very least, a ‘desired outcome’ and that this outcome be stated as ‘the immediate 
effect of delivering an output, input or task’ (Reynolds, Laimo & Field, 2009, p. 10). The lack of 
outcome-level objectives in the program design had flow-on effects for the monitoring and 
evaluation framework, in that the limited definition of success restricted the collection of 
information relevant to effectiveness and sustainability. Within these constraints, the report’s 
authors were able to make several comments regarding stakeholder perceptions of the effectiveness 
of both the non-scholarship and scholarship components of the program. The authors’ ToRs required 
a focus on the scholarship component of the program, and this is reflected in the data offered 
below.  
Reynolds, Laimo and Field stated that they received ‘overwhelming feedback’ from all stakeholders 
that this element of the program had been very useful in the PNG context, for the wider PNG 
country program and, in particular, the public sector capacity building programs. Much of this 
feedback was in praise of the flexibility of PATTAF to respond to capacity building needs (isolated by 
both AusAID and GoPNG) as they emerged over time.  
The authors, however, also stated that they were unable to determine whether this positive view of 
the effectiveness of the program was limited to its ability to deliver outputs. They also advised of the 
need to ensure that flexibility was strategic in nature, rather than simply an ability to respond 
effectively to ad hoc requests.  
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4.5.5 Grants 
In the Independent Progress Review undertaken of EPSP (Saldanha, Dobunaba & Edwards, 2012), its 
grants facility was described as ‘a potentially powerful mechanism to support problem resolution or 
organisation change’ (p. 13). Whilst the authors praised those grants that could be seen to directly 
support the objective of improving service delivery in PNG (for example a grant provided to the 
Department of Finance to support revenue collection assistance in the provinces), they questioned 
the utility of grants that had been provided for requests such as conference attendances and office 
upgrades. The authors stated that of the ten grants that had been approved by EPSP as of 2012, only 
two directly related to service delivery. 
The authors believed that EPSP’s practice of calling for grant applications in ‘open rounds’ was a sub-
optimal use of the facility that encouraged ‘an input-driven, free-goods-capture approach on the 
part of applying agencies’. They offered that ‘rather, this facility should be used as part of a well-
targeted package to address very specific capacity gaps affecting performance related to service 
delivery, ideally as a supplement to the agency’s own resources being applied to the issue’ (p. 14). 
There was little evidence in our project about the use of grants. There were some examples where 
reference was made to the usefulness of purchases made with grants. A GoPNG senior staff member 
explained that: 
EPSP provided the [agency] with video equipment to record the discussion and outcomes 
of the committee as possible evidence if any of the issues went to court for legal 
challenges. My colleagues have been trained how to use the equipment and this had 
improved the way courts treated the evidence. (G4) 
The GoPNG staff member also noted that now they have video equipment to maintain and replace, 
and they were hoping EPSP would assist further. This raises the matter of the ‘sustainability’ of 
improvements brought about by grants for equipment unless there are efficiencies achieved that 
can enable funds to be redirected to equipment servicing and replacement. 
4.5.6 Research 
In their 2012 Independent Progress Review of EPSP, Saldanha, Dobunaba and Edwards noted that 
the research program had only recently been established. Given this, they were only able to 
comment on the relevance of the research commissioned to the goals of EPSP, and not on the 
outcomes of the research as such. Nevertheless, the authors wrote that ‘all of the initiatives on the 
table appear useful, and some are directly relevant to the recommended service delivery emphasis’ 
(2012, p. 14).  
An overview of the issues currently being addressed via research was given as: (i) research on the 
Effectiveness of Capacity Development in GoPNG going back to 2006 (this study); (ii) a Service 
Delivery Study (completed in 2014); (iii) the Mainstreaming of Gender initiatives within central 
agencies; (iv) the Australian National University/National Research Institute Budget and Tracking of 
Expenditures on Services, and (v) the Impact of Digital Technology on the four key service sectors. 
While endorsing the relevance of the research listed here, the authors noted that ‘there appear to 
be several initiatives currently in train to study and track budget expenditures, including one at the 
district level under the auspices of the CIMC [Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council], 
and work being done by the ADB [Asian Development Bank]. This begs a question of how well all the 
work in this area is being coordinated at present’ (p. 14). 
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4.6 Stakeholders’ views about AC placements 
In this section the views of the major stakeholders of the evidence found by the project on the 
impact and success of AC placements will be discussed. A number of mechanisms were used to 
gather the views of the stakeholders, including holding a workshop in Port Moresby attended by 
senior GoPNG managers, advisers, counterparts, DFAT and Coffey International colleagues. The 
project team presented to these stakeholders, aspects of the data gathered by the team that 
contained elements of contradiction and which the team thought would be useful to explore further 
with the stakeholders. Also, interviews and focus groups of senior managers of agencies who were 
recipients of AC placements were undertaken. 
As indicated above, the project team analysed the data gathered in Stages 1 to 4 to identify areas 
where there seemed to be conflicting or contradictory evidence. The data analysed were from 
reports of past advisers and counterparts, surveys, interviews and focus groups of current and past 
advisers and counterparts. The analysis of the data identified five areas where it was felt that the 
views of the major stakeholders would be useful and these were: 
1. Identification and planning of placements  
2. Duration of placements  
3. Relationships between advisers and counterparts  
4. Purpose of placements  
5. Sustainability of outcomes of placements  
In the sections below, each of these areas will be explored both in terms of the evidence provided to 
the stakeholders and their responses to it. Thus this section will discuss the data that addresses 
research question eight as stated below: 
RQ8  What do major stakeholders in PNG conclude from the evidence produced by this study about 
the impact and success of AC placements and other capacity development modalities in their 
areas of influence? 
Each of the sections starts by outlining the issue that was put to the workshop followed by the 
responses from the workshop and, where relevant, the thoughts of the senior managers who 
participated in focus groups and interviews. 
4.6.1 Identification and planning of placements 
The process of identifying and planning AC placements was one that usually focused around the 
ToRs, but the circumstances and processes that lead up to the writing of the ToRs were also an issue 
that generated considerable discussion among advisers and counterparts (see section 4.4.4). The 
initial project findings showed that the ToRs of an AC placement are seen by advisers and 
counterparts either as: key items to be addressed during the project; a guide to their activities; or as 
an out-dated structural impediment to the work that now needs to be done. In general, advisers 
were much more influenced by the ToRs than were counterparts, and reported that they were active 
in addressing them, modifying them or resisting/working around them (see section 4.2.1). 
The stakeholders felt that there was an inherent tension around the role of the ToRs that arose from 
the needs and views of the different players involved with the placement e.g. the funding agency, 
the managing contractor, the PNG agency, advisers and counterparts. For example, the focus group 
of senior managers of GoPNG agencies felt it was important that the agency be aware of the ‘whole 
package’ of GoPNG and GoA interests. They felt the scoping of the ToRs was critical to getting the 
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agency to buy-in and own it, and communication was critical in the agency to ensure the counterpart 
knew the adviser was coming. 
Stakeholders at the workshop felt that ToRs have both strategic and performance elements, and the 
ToRs need to be a broad statement of requirements in order to encompass them. They also felt that 
the ToRs needed to reflect the reality of what is found on the ground by the adviser and a six-
monthly review is most likely to reveal this.  
A process was proposed by the workshop group to develop the requirements for AC placements. 
They felt that a statement of needs should be drawn up initially by the agency and this then shape 
the statement of intent that is agreed to by the funding body and managing contractor. The 
statement of intent is then operationalised and becomes the ToRs. The ToRs are then modified 
following a six-monthly review with the contribution of the counterpart. The diagram below was 
developed by the group to illustrate this process.  
Figure 4.6.1.1 Stakeholders proposed development of ToRs 
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The a majority view of the workshop group was that ToRs are to inform the advisers of roles and 
responsibilities and ToRs must not be done in isolation from the counterparts; they should have the 
counterpart’s input and influence. Although the group felt that ToRs need to be developed with the 
counterparts, they also recognised that sometimes some agencies may have a need for an adviser, 
but a counterpart may not be available at the time the ToRs are written. However, where possible 
the ToRs should identify a joint activity between the adviser and counterpart and should reflect the 
reality of the organisation’s timeframe. The focus group of senior managers felt that managing 
counterparts is important prior to the placement e.g. the counterparts needs to accept the ToRs, 
and they need to be explained so that that ToRs are well understood (see section 4.4.1.1 about 
counterparts being unaware of a forthcoming placement).  
The workshop group agreed that ToRs are a critical component of the planning process and some 
felt that advisers must deliver in terms of ToRs. The senior managers’ focus group agreed that the 
skills that the adviser brings to an agency must be relevant and, if a counterpart identifies that an 
adviser does not have the appropriate skills, the adviser have an opportunity to receive some 
training. They felt that there is a need for more socialisation from non-PNG advisers than has 
occurred in the past.  
4.6.2 Duration of placements 
The duration of the placements was a contentious subject for advisers and counterparts consulted 
during the first four stages of the project. Many of the respondents were of the view that the initial 
long-term contract period (typically one year in the first instance) was too short to achieve the ToRs 
and, in particular, to do so to a sustainable level. Commonly, extensions were granted to achieve 
these ends. Some were of the view that prolonged long-term placements could cause a 
counterpart’s and agency’s dependency on the adviser, and that what was required was a first initial 
long-term period followed by subsequent short-term periods (one to three months) with breaks of 
several months in between (see section 4.5.2 for discussion of short-term placements). In this way 
the counterpart(s) would be solely in control for a period but would have brief periods of adviser 
support to consolidate actions, tasks and achievements and to identify matters to be addressed in 
the next period. There was also a view that short-term (three to six months) advising is best for 
producing cost-effective useful changes in an agency. 
The stakeholders at the workshop were of the view that there are benefits, issues and challenges for 
both long-term and short-term placements. The group felt that the key point is to consider the 
desired outcome of the placement when considering its duration. Also, they saw the issue of long- 
and short-term placements as closely related to the capacity development and substitution issue. 
They did feel, irrespective of the duration of the placement, that the socialisation of the adviser and 
counterpart is central to achieving an effective relationship in a placement and often this can take 
time (see section 4.2.2 for a discussion of the views of advisers and counterparts on working 
together). The group suggested that perhaps some combination of short-term and long-term 
placements could produce a harmony of both approaches. The duration of the adviser’s contract is 
integral to the success of the placement achieving the desired outcomes.  
Long-term placements were more likely to achieve a transfer of knowledge and overcome cultural 
sensitivities, the stakeholder group believed. They felt that long-term placements allowed fruitful 
relationships to be developed between advisers and counterparts, and that this could take up to 
three to six months. Also, counterparts at times did not recognise the support they received from an 
adviser until the end of the placement. Periodic placements may be a way of addressing this. 
The advantage of short-term placements, the stakeholder group believed, is that the outcomes are 
more likely to be achieved as they are more constrained and can produce immediate results. Short-
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term placements are also seen as cost effective from the view of the donor and they can allow for 
follow-up placements. However, they require the immediate availability of the counterpart for the 
whole time the adviser is in the agency. As indicated above, not only can it take three to six months 
to form an effective relationship between an adviser and counterpart, it can take a similar length of 
time for advisers to become used to the GoPNG system.  
4.6.3 Relationships between advisers and counterparts 
The critical issue of having an effective relationship between advisers and counterparts has been 
covered in Section 4.2.2. Arising from that discussion is whether counterparts are or should be 
leaders or followers in their placements. The evidence shows that there is a range of ways that AC 
relationships are enacted. The range spans from the adviser being seen and behaving as the de facto 
leader of the placement and of the counterpart(s) and others, through to the (main) counterpart 
being seen as the leader of the placement and other counterparts and staff, with the adviser acting 
as a mentor, guide and adviser to the counterpart. Some respondents were of the view that advisers 
were there to promote ‘the Australian way’ with little concern for PNG culture and context; others 
suggested that some advisers tried to follow the counterparts’ lead and adapt to the ‘PNG way’. 
The feeling of the stakeholders at the workshop was that advisers should have a positive and 
sensitive attitude towards PNG culture, opinions and ways of life. Counterparts should have a similar 
approach towards their advisers. Central to the relationship is ensuring respect is in place on both 
sides. 
The workshop group believed that whether the placement is of a substitution or developmental 
nature influences the leadership relationship between the adviser and the counterpart. It was 
suggested that if a placement is more of a substitution nature the adviser takes on a leadership role 
whereas if the placement is of a developmental nature the roles are often more equal but with the 
Counterpart setting the agenda. 
The stakeholders felt that there is often a tension between group and individual objectives for a 
placement and the leadership and follower roles need to be negotiated at placement 
commencement. The consensus of the senior manager focus group was that placements must be 
integrated into their agencies. Agencies need to know where their advisers fit in and the advisers 
need to report to senior managers, rather than someone else in the agency, as there needs to be a 
senior person who ensures the relationship works. The group felt that advisers need to be 
responsible to senior managers and not the funding agency. 
The workshop participants sensed that advisers and counterparts needed to work together to 
achieve the targets and results as identified in the ToRs. The senior manager focus group also 
believed that there should be no gap between advisers and counterparts as it should be a mentoring 
relationship. They felt that advisers need to treat counterparts as equals and the human relationship 
is critical. They believed mutual respect was critical, as the confrontational approach of some 
advisers can be counterproductive. The senior managers believed that some advisers develop 
relationships with an individual but do not fit into the team and that this can cause problems. They 
also indicated that some advisers bring skills and knowledge not originally required by the 
placement, which can be very useful, but also some advisers teach counterparts what they already 
know. 
4.6.4 Purpose of placements 
At the heart of the discussion around the worth and impact of AC placements is often whether the 
activity undertaken by the adviser should primarily be one of capacity substitution or development. 
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The evidence gathered from advisers and counterparts in the early stages of the research revealed 
different emphases by various parties on AC placements. Some felt they were about human capacity 
development in the sense that counterparts and others learn how to do their work differently, 
better etc. Others saw placements as being capacity substitution in the sense that there is an 
absence of capacity within the agency and the adviser fills the absence and gets the job done for the 
agency. Many placements can be seen to be located somewhere between these two positions in 
that there is, to varying degrees, some capacity development and some capacity substitution. 
The participants in the stakeholder workshop were of the opinion that strategic management leads 
to capacity development and policy development leads to capacity substitution, but they felt most 
placements sit on a continuum between the two positions. The group felt in general that long-term 
placements produced capacity development and short-term placements produce capacity 
substitution but, as previously stated, the scale is continuous and most placements sit between the 
two (see section 4.4.1.7 for a discussion around the issues on the duration of placements). They felt 
that development roles rarely happened without substitution, but also that substitution alone does 
not produce sustainability and the passing on of skills and knowledge required by the agency is 
central to the benefits of hosting a placement. The senior manager focus group thought that 
counterparts must take personal and professional responsibility for their own development. They 
believed some advisers came to their agencies to detect what they as senior managers needed to do 
which sometimes resulted in tensions in the placement. 
Some of the workshop group participants recommended that strategic substitution be the dominant 
approach, as they believe it can produce more achievements by both advisers and counterparts. In 
such a scenario, capacity substitution has a role of its own with advisers coming in and doing their 
duties and leaving when the contract has expired. However, a development phase can be added, 
with the capacity substitution phase quickly producing a model as a guide and a coaching and 
mentoring phase occurring later. The senior manager focus group felt that some advisers were more 
into mentoring or coaching and not addressing the problems of the department. They felt advisers 
could either be ‘hands on’ or more focused on the mentoring of junior staff: the consensus was that 
the former was more useful to the majority of the group. 
4.6.5 Sustainability of outcomes of placements 
One of the central principles that underlie the design of AC placements is that where possible the 
outcomes of the placements should continue after the adviser has left the GoPNG agency or 
department. The evidence collected from the initial stages of this project showed that sustainability 
claims related to particular AC placements spanned a range from no sustainability, through to full 
sustainability. Counterparts (almost) always reported that they continued to benefit personally from 
what they had learned and done during the placement. Some counterparts reported that the 
organisation continued to operate according to the capacity development that had been provided. 
Other counterparts reported that things were only partly sustained. A few reported that things had 
reverted or even reversed since the placement finished. Advisers were often of the view that their 
counterparts had benefited from the experience, and that the organisation had done likewise. While 
some advisers reported sustainability and could identify practices and systems that continued as a 
result of their placement, others were unsure because they had lost contact with the agency and 
counterpart(s). Others were of the view that sustainability was unlikely once they had left due to 
organisational inertia, change of policy, change of senior personnel etc.  
The senior stakeholder group at the workshop held various views on sustainability and, although all 
agreed that it was an important issue, there was little consensus on what was central to it occurring, 
either in terms of the design or implementation of the placements. However, the group agreed that 
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the issue of sustainability needed to be addressed from the time of identifying the need for a 
placement through to its completion.  
Some in the group felt that there needs to be flexibility in the ToRs if a placement is to be 
sustainable, in order to allow for changes in circumstances. They also believed that consultation 
during the development of the ToRs was important for sustainable outcomes and there needed to 
be a ‘critical mass of support’ for a placement before, during and after it has been completed for its 
outcomes to be sustainable. To achieve such a critical mass, advisers need to work with teams and 
placements need to take into account training needs beyond direct counterparts.  
Senior managers SM1 and SM2 felt that the major obstacle to sustainability was leadership, as 
without senior support for the outcomes of a placement they felt they were unlikely to remain in 
place after the adviser had left. They went on to say it was critical that the executive take ownership 
of policies, and the senior managers felt it was essential to have executive support for placements to 
be sustainable. Senior manager SM3 believed that one of the elements for placements to be 
sustainable was that senior people needed to understand how they worked. He felt placements 
needed to be demand-driven by GoPNG, rather than supply-driven by donor agencies. He argued 
that GoPNG departments need to identify what they need, perhaps through a needs analysis, and 
this then be communicated to the various donor agencies (see section 4.2.2). 
For a placement to be sustainable the workshop group believed counterparts, and advisers, should 
be willing to accept change. Therefore, there needs to be open communication between the adviser 
and the counterpart and the counterpart needs to be open to learning during the placement and to 
continue learning after the placement has completed (see section 4.4.1.6).  
Senior manager SM3 cited examples of improved sustainability when the advisers were PNG 
nationals; he believed that their understanding of the work and social culture of PNG was an 
important factor in the effectiveness and sustainability of placements. SM3 believed that when the 
adviser was not from PNG the counterparts often returned to their old ways once the adviser left. 
The workshop participants believed that the counterpart needed passion, vision and a positive 
attitude and to take ownership of outcomes if the placement outcomes were to be sustainable. Thus 
the planning and implementation processes of placements need to recognise the importance of ‘soft 
outcomes’, e.g. an increase in the confidence of the counterpart, for outcomes to be sustainable. 
The senior manager focus group also felt that the confidence and leadership attributes of 
counterparts had to be improved by the placement for any sustainable outcomes to be achieved. 
One of the key issues identified by the workshop group in determining if the outcomes of the 
placements are to be sustainable is the importance of leadership in the agency, particularly the 
senior leadership. Senior managers must take responsibility for the placement and at the 
organisational level there needs to be a shared vision that includes all those involved in the area of 
the placement. Thus, teamwork is essential during a placement and without this it is likely that any 
outcomes will disappear soon after the adviser leaves. In addition, the agency needs guidance as to 
what to do after any adviser leaves.  
The workshop group identified that one of the problematic issues for determining whether a 
placement’s outcomes are sustainable is their measurement, but it was recognised that from a 
donor’s point of view this is important. It was suggested that an assessment of changes that 
occurred during and after the placement could be introduced and this could be internal or external. 
However, it was recognised that it could be difficult for an external assessor to measure some 
changes e.g. changes in counterparts’ confidence, leadership etc. There were some suggestions that 
monitoring and evaluation of key performance indicators would ensure sustainable change, but a 
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timeline would need to be agreed as to when it is appropriate to determine whether sustainable 
change has occurred or not. It was also emphasised that it is important to share good stories of 
successes, as it was often the less successful outcomes that garnered publicity.  
In a similar vein, senior managers SM1 and SM2 felt they needed someone from outside the 
organisation to help with sustainability. They questioned how they and the funding agency would 
know how well a placement’s outcomes were being sustained unless there was some sort of 
monitoring in place. They acknowledged that EPSP does send a liaison officer to check on the 
operation of a placement but they noted lately that there had been different people and they felt 
that consistency was crucial. 
4.6.6 Advice for the future 
At a number of the meetings held with senior managers and the workshop of stakeholders advice 
was offered as how to improve AC placements. This advice ranged from changes to the way the 
placements were planned, through to changes in the way the placements operated, to what could 
be done after the placements were completed.  
Senior managers SM1 and SM2 felt perhaps the most effective way of addressing their needs was 
through a form of twining with Australian government staff, where they spend 12 months in PNG 
and then return six months later. They also felt that ‘part-time’ advisers that come in only a few days 
a week were not suitable (which had been the case for some consultants brought in through another 
arrangement not with EPSP). SM1 and SM2 suggested that they needed full-time advisers who 
would stay for an extended time. They felt this was essential as they deal with human beings who 
are complex and need time to be dealt with. 
Senior manager SM3 felt that mentoring and coaching of young PNG public servants was a way of 
improving the effectiveness of the public sector. He also stated that the working relationship 
between the counterpart and adviser be as compatible as possible, with the adviser being fully 
aware of the work and social cultural differences between their overseas workplace and PNG. SM 4 
thought that an extended induction program should be provided to advisers, which would introduce 
them to the cultural issues they may face. On the other hand, he also believed that counterparts 
needed to have the right attitude when participating in placements, otherwise advisers could be 
wasting their time. 
Senior manager SM4 stated that he felt that EPSP should produce a final report on a placement for 
an agency (it was explained that this was already the case for advisers) and the recommendations be 
followed up with the agencies where the placement occurred. He also thought that counterparts 
should provide a final report (it was explained about the presence of interim reports by counterparts 
but also the absence of a final counterpart report). 
SM4 believed that the outcomes from previous placements were often absent at the beginning of 
new placements and there needed to be more learnt from the past. That is, the handover process 
from one adviser to another was not allowing the new adviser to build effectively on past work. He 
commented that he felt there needed to be a move from general capacity development to 
developing specific skills for individuals and agencies. He also thought there should be a move to 
targeted placements with specific tangible outcomes. 
Advice for the future of AC placements from the focus group of senior manager of GoPNG agencies 
included: 
 It is important that the agency be aware of the ‘whole package’ of GoPNG and GoA interests 
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 The scoping of the ToRs is critical to getting the agency to buy-in and own the placement 
 Communication is critical within the agency to ensure the counterpart knows the adviser is 
coming 
 Managing counterparts is critical, e.g. the counterpart needs to accept the ToRs and they 
need to be explained so that that ToRs are well understood. 
 There is a need for further socialisation by advisers who are from outside of PNG 
 If a counterpart identifies that an adviser does not have the appropriate skills, the adviser 
have an opportunity to receive some training 
 The adviser needs to know where they fit in and they should report to the senior manager 
rather than someone else in the agency 
 Advisers need to be responsible to the senior manager and not AusAid 
 There needs to be a senior person who ensures the relationship works 
 It is essential to have executive support for the placement 
In the next and final section of the report the team conclusions and recommendations will be 
presented. 
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5 Conclusions and recommendations 
This section distils the main findings and analyses into concluding comments supporting specific 
recommendations for improvements to capacity development in PNG, especially with regard to the 
management and operation of AC placements. The evidence presented in this report shows that, in 
general, AC placements have been successful during the period since 2006. Importantly, the 
counterparts, the stakeholders and GoPNG senior managers commonly expressed views and 
reported instances of the success of the placements. Across the range of research participants some 
criticisms were made, and some examples of problems, limitations and weaknesses were identified. 
Likewise, most participants offered views about how AC placements could be improved in the 
future; and they wanted AC placements to be part of PNG’s future capacity development. 
Any government agency will atrophy without capacity development, so it is important that PNG 
agencies sustain continuous or regular capacity development to maintain good quality public 
services within changing social, political and economic circumstances. Capacity development is not, 
therefore, a single ‘boost’ required by developing nations, such as PNG, in order to attain a 
permanent ‘world standard’ public service. PNG needs sustained capacity development in the 
economic and public sectors in order to sustain an efficient and effective public sector to serve the 
emerging nation. The level of capacity development required is such that donor nations’ support 
typically accelerates the process of PNG achieving an efficient and effective public sector. The extent 
of social and economic change occurring in the nation, however, means that capacity development, 
either donor-supported or provided by PNG itself, will be required for the foreseeable future. It is in 
this context that the following recommendations are made for GoPNG and GoA to consider. 
The Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action (OECD, 2005/2008), referred to previously in this 
Report, provides a framework through which improvements to AC placements (and other 
modalities) can be viewed. The Declaration’s five key principles are pertinent in this regard. 
Ownership—Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development 
policies, and strategies and coordinate development actions; 
Alignment—Donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national 
development strategies, institution and procedures; 
Harmonisation—Donors’ actions are more harmonised, transparent and collectively 
effective; 
Managing for Results—Managing resources and improving decision-making for results; 
and 
Mutual Accountability—Donors and partners are accountable for development results 
(from, OECD, 2005/2008 pp. 3-8). 
The Declaration’s principles emerged after longstanding international concerns about aid 
effectiveness. Internationally, Australian aid has been at the forefront of efforts to embed the 
principles articulated in the Paris Declaration into capacity development initiatives, spearheading a 
move that has been characterised in the literature as a shift from the first to the second generation 
of technical assistance. Despite the consultative processes that are undertaken by the EPSP (and its 
predecessor, the ASF), the GoPNG stakeholders participating in this research identified remaining 
tensions between the interests of GoPNG agencies and donors, in this case, GoA. The GoPNG 
stakeholders and senior managers and, indeed, the advisers and counterparts, generally saw the 
placements as being primarily ‘owned’ by GoA (typically, ‘AusAID’), in particular because AusAID—
 168 
through its managing contractor—was paying and had managerial control over the advisers. These 
same parties generally understood that the outcomes were ‘owned’ by GoPNG (typically, by  the 
agency and the counterparts involved). The GoPNG senior managers felt it was important that the 
participating agency be aware of the ‘whole package’ of GoA and GoPNG interests from the outset; 
in particular, they asserted that the agency needs to scope the ToRs as a foundational investment 
toward the agency owning the placement. Given that several counterparts stated that they were not 
informed about ‘their’ placement until after it had been established, or were not fully consulted 
about their needs etc., this suggests that these key agency staff (KAS) lacked the integral 
involvement required to build sustainable change in their agencies. Some advisers reported 
complementary experiences, such as, absent or reluctant counterparts upon placement 
commencement. Arguably, the foundation for such collaboration centres on GoPNG and GoA 
negotiations about AC placements being genuinely and formally conducted in a manner that ensures 
that GoPNG ‘owns’ each placement. Thereby, GoPNG accepts and fulfils its responsibilities to 
support the AC placement and its ToRs, processes and outcomes, and to embed and sustain these in 
the agency. Furthermore, stakeholders argued that AC placements’ ToRs have both strategic and 
performance elements that must reflect ‘the reality on the ground’ at the outset, and also be open 
to modification during periodic reviews involving both advisers and counterparts.  
The above commentary suggests that AC placements, while successful, still require operational 
finessing in order to shift more fully into Morgan’s (2010, cited in OECD/DAC, 2011, p. 5) ‘second 
generation’ of technical assistance in terms of enabling agency-designed and ‘owned’ capacity 
development initiatives. Of significance here, however, are the data from this study which indicate 
that a focus on sustainable capacity development (as opposed to the more tangible placement 
outcomes favoured by donors) tends to result in more ‘third-generation’ approaches being 
employed, often more out of exigency than by design, on the ground. These approaches take the 
concept of indigenous ‘ownership’ and apply it at the micro level, giving rise to a system whereby 
processes and outcomes emerge from the local context under adviser direction and guidance. It is 
through flexible and iterative approaches that advisers attempt to ensure that not only outcomes 
but also change processes themselves are owned by, embedded in and sustainable within an agency. 
The deep operationalisation, however, of the concept of ownership inherent in third-generation 
approaches (which emphasise ‘process’) tends to conflict with the second-generation preference for 
strategies of planned change in line with donor requirements for efficiency and control, results and 
accountability (which emphasise ‘product’). The evidence indicates that, as currently constituted, 
placements in which advisers pursue ‘product’ over ‘process’ are likely to encounter problems with 
institutionalisation and sustainability, whereas the pursuit of ‘process’ over ‘product’ is likely to 
result in tangible outcomes remaining imperfectly realised within placement timeframes. The 
following recommendations in this section have been formulated with this tension in mind, and aim 
to ensure that the pursuit of ‘ownership’ within the framework of a second-generation approach 
can, where possible, both accommodate and provide a foundation for the future realisation of third-
generation program design and delivery.   
Recommendation 1 
GoPNG and GoA develop a planning and approval document to be used by agencies, 
assisted by the managing contractor, for the establishment, operation, evaluation and 
post-placement support of their future AC placements.  
This planning document should involve an agency (or cross-agency) capacity diagnostic framework 
with a specific capacity development needs analysis and an analysis of the contemporary capacity 
and infrastructure in the agency (or agencies) to support AC placements. These analyses need to 
show that satisfactory capacity and infrastructure exists, or will exist by remedies applied prior to 
the commencement of the AC placement. The schedule and length of placements should be realistic 
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for PNG’s and the agency’s circumstances. The agency should identify the post-placement support 
and conditions required to assist sustainability as part of each placement’s plan.  
In terms of a future shift to third-generation design, it is envisaged that such a planning and approval 
document will also act as a framework within which the agency will commence the identification of 
the intangible elements of the capacity development context, the understanding of which is 
fundamental to capacity building successes. These include, in Morgan’s terms, the ‘cultures and 
structures that acts as key determinants’ (2010, cited in OECD/DAC, 2011, p. 5) of capacity 
development processes and outcomes. The need for this framework also arises from an increasing 
awareness— expressed in both the literature and this Report—that more attention needs to be paid 
to the intangible elements of capacity. These elements, such as culture, politics and interactions 
within stakeholder networks, structure and influence the behaviour of actors in systems in 
important ways, yet are by their nature more difficult to analyse and understand. This is perhaps one 
of the reasons, in addition to the donor requirements mentioned above, why more attention tends 
to be paid to tangible aspects of capacity—such as the development of policy and IT systems—in the 
planning, management and evaluation of capacity development initiatives. The research data show, 
however, that intangible elements can have a decisive influence on placement processes, outcomes, 
success and sustainability. For example, features of Papua New Guinean organisational culture and 
politics were often isolated as the biggest impediments to the successful pursuit of placement 
outcomes and/or sustainability within current forms of placement design. 
The following two recommendations (Recommendations 2 and 3) address particular aspects of 
EPSP’s current diagnostic process that were identified in the research as needing improvement.  
Two recurring themes within the research were that the time required to fulfil ToRs and outcomes 
was often unrealistic for the original duration of the placements, and that the agencies’ capacities 
(staffing, staff’s knowledge and skills, IT infrastructure etc.) to support placements were inadequate 
to enable the placement to commence at the level of the ToRs. These impeded the implementation 
and institutionalisation of changes prior to project completion. It is notable that the PNG-Australia 
Review of Technical Adviser Positions (AusAID, 2010b, p.19) also identified these matters as a 
significant problem. In terms of the product/process tension outlined above, project schedules 
appeared to be designed to achieve a product, rather than a process, so that tangible results (for 
example, new policies or procedures) were often completed at the expense of sustainable capacity 
development. Baser and Morgan (2008) warn that capacity development will fail to result in 
improved organisational performance when new knowledge, structures, systems or strategies are 
formulated and applied, but are not embedded into daily practice. 
To address the aforementioned time and capacity impediments, it was common for extensions to be 
granted. Although this may be seen as a laudable piece of flexibility, it occurs so frequently that it 
appears to be a planning failure. An obvious weakness was that often AC placement schedules did 
not match PNG agencies’ annual planning cycles or the amount of time required—typically said to be 
three to five years—to achieve sustainable change within agencies. This could be remedied partly by 
ensuring that the agency, supported by the managing contractor, used appropriate capacity 
diagnostics and needs analyses. This is distinct from EPSP’s capacity diagnostic exercise and the 
Capacity Development Agreements (CDAs), which were not viewed positively by advisers. The 
research showed that the capacity diagnostic processes used to assess capacity did not provide an 
accurate assessment of individual and organisational needs, and inaccurately gauged the 
requirements for achieving placement outcomes.  
Once capacity diagnostics and needs analyses are appropriately completed, then the agencies can 
turn to creating realistic ToRs for their placements. The research showed that one-third of advisers 
noted in their PCRs and the survey that their ToRs were unrealistic given the conditions at the start 
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of their placements. The development of the ToRs was a cause of great discussion by all concerned 
with AC placements i.e. the funding agency, the managing contractor, and advisers and counterparts 
associated with the placement. The ToRs were acknowledged as central to the success or otherwise 
of the placements. They were seen as emblematic of the placements’ planning and preparation 
processes. As noted above, several counterparts stated that they were not involved in the planning 
process for their placements. They generally had lower levels of satisfaction with the ToRs at the 
beginning of the placement but had less reduction in satisfaction during the placement than did the 
advisers. It may be concluded, therefore, that the counterparts were more realistic in their 
appraisals of the ToRs than were those who developed them. This suggests that (prospective) 
counterparts should be involved in the agencies’ planning processes from the outset; this would also 
encourage the early ‘ownership’ of their placements. 
Recommendation 2 
Agencies, including prospective counterparts, and managing contractors should verify 
that each AC placement’s ToRs address the capacity development needs of the agency 
and can be reasonably expected to be fulfilled within the agreed schedule. The ToRs 
must be feasible within the agencies’ contemporary capacities, especially including the 
prospective counterparts’, and the agencies’ infrastructures.  
It was reported that ToRs were sometimes unachievable targets or limitations on the success of AC 
placements. If they were unachievable targets (for example, as previously mentioned, if they were 
unrealistic for the agencies’ capacities) then advisers became frustrated at their lack of achievement 
or focused narrowly on meeting the ToRs to the extent possible whilst ignoring other important 
matters. ToRs were limitations when they distracted from adapting to changing circumstances in the 
agencies or government so that desirable outcomes that advisers or counterparts felt useful were 
unable to be addressed.  
Recommendation 3  
AC placements’ ToRs should be sufficiently flexible to enable adaptations to changed 
GoPNG policies or procedures, and changed agency circumstances and needs etc. during 
the placements. A range of research participants argued that, if AC placements are to 
develop capacity that can sustain self-generating performance improvement, then ToRs 
need to be reconfigured to accommodate the processes required to achieve this result. 
Such ToRs need to enable advisers and counterparts to work collaboratively in 
partnership—from design, through to implementation, evaluation and assessment. The 
research participants’ argument is indicative of implied support for third-generation 
approaches to capacity development outlined earlier.  If GoPNG and GoA decide to 
adopt third-generation capacity development principles in the future, then the above 
recommendations need to be adapted to embrace broader ‘trans-agency’ or whole of 
government planning and implementation, within more flexible, responsive approaches 
for which GoPNG would exercise responsibility. 
The following three recommendations derive from this Report’s argument that learning is at the 
heart of all capacity development and, therefore, in AC placements in PNG. Technology, systems, 
infrastructure etc. are all important elements to sustaining national life, but it is the people involved 
who use, develop and maintain these elements that are the essential enabling human capacity.  
This Report has emphasised that capacity development is about people, and learning and change 
must occur for each individual for capacity development initiatives to bear fruit. This recognises that 
the capacity development relationship between advisers and counterparts involves advisers working 
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to change—sometimes in a fundamental way—the thinking and behaviour of their counterparts. The 
receptivity of counterparts to this influence will depend on multiple factors, one of which is the level 
of trust they place in their advisers. This trust is partly founded on the advisers’ understanding of, 
and sensitivity to, PNG cultures. It is also based on the interpersonal skills and the teaching 
competencies of the advisers. Broadly, the research participants appreciated the advisers’ technical 
expertise and experience in their particular fields, but the research data showed that advisers’ 
strategies and approaches to teaching their counterparts were relatively unsophisticated and over-
reliant on mentoring. Advisers’ cross-cultural competencies (or lack thereof) were generally of little 
significance in appointment decisions, as was their understanding of PNG cultures, which was often 
limited and depended on ‘learning as they went’ in their placements. This contributed to some 
dysfunctional working relationships and limited human capacity development. 
In contrast to their apparent lack of significance in recruitment decisions, the evidence showed that 
advisers and counterparts placed considerable emphasis on interpersonal factors as important 
enablers of sustainable capacity development. In addition to direct focus on the relationship, a 
number of distinctly interpersonal processes, such as collaboration and communication, as well as 
qualities that support interpersonal relationships and processes, such as cultural awareness, were 
ranked as being of fundamental importance to placement success and the creation of sustainable 
outcomes. Taken together, these interpersonal factors gave the impression of being ‘drivers of 
change’ in that they gave momentum to placement activities and created the energy required for 
counterparts and KAS to overcome obstacles and engage in and commit to a sustained process of 
change. 
Recommendation 4 
Advisers should be appointed, not just for their technical expertise, but also for their 
interpersonal capacities to help others learn in cross-cultural environments. 
Given that the foundation of capacity development requires advisers to shape, enable and assess 
counterparts’ learning to improve and change their (and their agencies’) practices, then this suggests 
that the advisers’ knowledge and skills about teaching for capacity development are crucial to the 
success and sustainability of their AC placements. Therefore, for those advisers who do not possess 
such skills, an appropriate course and assessment is required prior to commencement or as part of 
their induction to ensure that they have the necessary teaching capabilities. Some advisers reported 
that they received little advice about how to structure the counterparts’ capacity development; 
furthermore there was no mention of assessment being conducted of or with counterparts about 
their learning and, likewise, no explicit suggestion of remediation being provided for those 
counterparts whose learning was insufficient. The MaD course partly fulfilled these needs but was 
limited in scope and it was not mandatory for advisers to participate. Consideration should be given 
to providing an online module and resources developed by/for DFAT Australian Aid. This course 
should cover matters including: developing learning plans, assessing in the workplace, collaborative 
teaching and learning in PNG contexts.  
Recommendation 5 
Early in their placements, advisers should be provided with a course on the knowledge 
and skills to teach and assess in AC placements in PNG. 
The required approach to planning for learning within the development process of each AC 
placement and its ToRs is more complex than ‘knowledge transfer’ or ‘skills training’, although these 
may be part of the learning plan. Advisers become, in part, ‘learning managers’ who ensure that the 
learning plan is monitored for scheduled achievements and provide assistance, remediation etc., as 
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required to maintain the schedule. The counterparts, as a consequence, will also be learning about 
how to facilitate learning in their agencies. 
Learning plans are best seen as ones that contain an iterative process that enables each adviser and 
their counterpart(s) to review, reflect and act to keep the learning plan attuned to the counterparts’ 
and agencies’ needs and circumstances as these evolve during the placement. Process-centred, 
participatory, people-centred and iterative approaches are most likely to produce knowledge and 
outcomes that are ‘owned’ by counterparts and thus more able to be adapted and sustained in their 
future contexts. There was evidence that some AC placements successfully used team-based, 
departmental- or organisation-wide approaches to enhance counterparts’ and KAS’s knowledge and 
skills. The success was partly concerned with the increased propensity for sustainability when a 
number of KAS share the same knowledge and skills. It was said these had positive team-building 
effects; led to an increased appreciation of consultation and the need to review existing practices; 
improved counterpart ownership of outcomes; and enhanced transparency and accountability.  
Recommendation 6 
AC placements should be planned and operated explicitly as learning engagements for 
the counterparts and the agency more broadly. At commencement, advisers and their 
counterparts should develop a detailed learning plan for the placement. This should 
specify what the counterpart(s) need(s) to learn to develop their capacities and what 
teaching actions will be provided by the adviser to enable them to learn. The plan should 
specify a schedule of learning goals and their assessment, and should include scope for 
remediation, if required. 
The first three recommendations concerned GoPNG and GoA planning, approval and initiation of AC 
placements for human capacity development in the PNG economic and public sectors. The second 
three recommendations concerned the implementation of AC placements by advisers and 
counterparts as an explicit, planned and assessed collaborative learning activity for the counterparts 
and their agencies. Of central concern is that GoPNG, the agencies and counterparts ‘own’ and take 
responsibility for the success and sustainability of the placements. The current practice, therefore, of 
advisers writing and submitting ‘their’ final reports to GoA’s managing contractor is inconsistent 
with such indigenous ownership and responsibility. Previously it was acknowledged that there are 
tensions between GoA, through its managing contractor paying for and employing advisers, and 
GoPNG requiring its capacities to be developed in its own interests and for its own needs. 
Recommendations 1 to 3 suggest processes and procedures to minimise these tensions in 
accordance with contemporary OECD approaches to capacity development. This leads to the 
conclusion that each adviser and counterpart(s), as a team, should take responsibility for producing 
the final report in their placements. Not only is this consistent with collaborative approaches to AC 
placements, such as action learning, it is also consistent with counterparts learning how to take 
responsibility themselves for the sustainability of the changes they have enacted with their adviser. 
Recommendation 7 
The final reports on AC placements either should be co-produced by advisers and 
counterparts, or there should be equivalent final reports from each. 
In concert with the above recommendation, it is useful to consider ensuring consistent reporting 
relationships for advisers and counterparts. In most instances, advisers have bifurcated reporting 
relationships; one to a senior staff member in the agency, the other to a senior person in the 
managing contractor’s establishment. This reflects the aforementioned tension between GoPNG and 
GoA ownership of AC placements. Some counterparts are troubled by these relationships and have 
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the additional concern that the adviser may be another ‘boss’ for them; and one who reports on 
them to their agency ‘boss’. For the purposes of the placement, and consistent with the indigenous 
ownership thereof, it is suggested that the following recommendation be considered. 
Recommendation 8 
Consideration should be given to each adviser and their counterpart being accountable 
to, and supervised by, the same senior staff member in the agency to oversee the 
placement, and for consideration and approval of any modifications etc.  
The final recommendation is a separate entity concerning ‘other modalities’ including: short-term 
consultants, twinning arrangements, targeted training, grants and research. The research design was 
principally established to collect data on AC placements from 2006–2013, which included the end of 
the ASF period and through the EPSP period. The other modalities research was conducted on the 
2012–2013 period, but EPSP managed little work in other modalities during this time. This was 
confirmed by an EPSP staff member as follows. 
EPSP sought to expand the kinds of capacity development modalities available to it such as targeted 
training, research and analysis, procurement, incentive grants and co-funding arrangements…EPSP 
has undergone several reviews and refocusing of its role and objectives over the past eighteen 
months. EPSP is conscious that other modalities have not been realised as anticipated. (Personal 
email communication) 
The research proceeded initially on the basis that there would be other modalities to be researched 
and that some data could also be collected in the AC placement research stages that related to 
previous (pre-2012) work in other modalities. A literature review on the topic conducted for this 
research project, together with the small amount of data collected, provided some insight into the 
other modalities used in PNG, especially short-term consultancies. Given the limited data, however, 
it is unwise to draw firm conclusions about these matters other than that further research will be 
required to do so. It may be suggested that short-term consultancies are probably useful in 
particular circumstances and are favoured by donors for their specificity and apparent cost 
effectiveness; conversely some recipients dislike short-term consultancies and prefer long-term AC 
placements, especially because of their capacity development strengths. It appears reasonable that, 
as other modalities have different purposes to AC placements, they are unlikely to substitute for the 
latter. 
Recommendation 9 
If other modalities are to be researched, they will require more substantial enactment 
before they are researchable.  
Other modalities may well be useful in the overall planning of some AC placements in order to 
provide equipment, support, research, etc. that may be required to ensure sustainability of the 
placements’ outcomes. This research shows, however, that the capacity development provided by 
GoA to GoPNG has been important and valued by the agencies and counterparts involved. It is 
essential that PNG agencies sustain continuous or regular capacity development to maintain good 
quality public services within the nation’s changing social, political and economic circumstances. 
Future capacity development in the PNG economic and public sectors may increasingly come from 
PNG’s own resources; the evidence suggests, however, that Australian aid will remain important to 
help guide an efficient and effective public sector to serve the emerging nation. 
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Appendix A Advisers survey 
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Appendix B Counterparts survey 
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Appendix C Interview structure for advisers who had completed 
placements 
Background 
Please explain how you came to be an adviser in PNG? (Professional background and circumstances, 
previous PNG/OS experience etc.) 
Achieving sustainable capacity development 
How worthwhile was your placement(s) for the development of your counterpart’s/s’ capacities? To 
what extent did you identify their development? What were they key indicators for you of their 
development? 
What means did you use to develop your counterpart’s/s’ capacities? What was most effective? 
How sustainable was their capacity development (post-placement)? How do you know? 
Evidence of success 
If possible, what are the three most significant examples/pieces of evidence of success from your 
placement(s)? 
Advice for the future 
Do you have any advice or suggestions concerning the establishment of placements (including 
nomination of counterparts) and their ToRs for PNG circumstances? 
What are the best ways to ensure that adviser-counterpart placements are successful in PNG? 
What are the main obstacles to success for adviser-counterpart placements in PNG? What advice do 
you have to counter these? 
Do you have any other advice or comments to make? 
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Appendix D First round interview structure for continuing advisers 
and counterparts 
Welcome, introductions of convenor and brief overview of project and confidentiality  
Participants’ introductions: names and brief details about placement  
To what extent are the goals and intended outcomes of your placement realistic and achievable?  
Have their views changed since commencement?  
What obstacles, if any, have they identified? Unexpected?  
What strategies do you use to develop the knowledge and skills of your counterpart(s)?  
What works? What’s most effective?  
What indicators of success do you (expect to) see?  
Are these identifiable by others? Measureable? Intrinsic?  
What are your views about the sustainability of the outcomes of your placement?  
What might assist the sustainability in the future?  
What might inhibit the sustainability?  
 Advisers (ending after November)  
Welcome, introductions of convenor and brief overview of project and confidentiality  
Do we provide a document summarising the project?  
Participants’ introductions: names and brief details about placement  
Keep brief and ensure names are clearly on the recording  
To what extent are the goals and intended outcomes of your placement realistic and achievable?  
Have their views changed since commencement?  
What obstacles, if any, have you encountered? Were these unexpected? Are they countered?  
What strategies do you use to develop the knowledge and skills of your counterpart(s)?  
What works? What’s most effective?  
Do you intend to use different strategies later in the placement?  
What indicators of success do you see so far?  
Are these identifiable by others? Measureable? Intrinsic?  
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What other indicators of success do you expect to see at the end of the placement?  
Are these identifiable by others? Measureable? Intrinsic?  
Counterparts  
Welcome, introductions of convenor and brief overview of project and confidentiality  
Participants’ introductions: names and brief details about placement  
What things did you wish to learn and achieve with your adviser?  
Have these changed since commencement?  
What difficulties, if any, have you experienced in achieving your goals? Unexpected? Institutional? 
Adviser-related?  
What are the best ways for you to develop your knowledge and skills with your adviser?  
What works? What’s most effective?  
What indicators of success do you expect to see by the end of the period with your adviser?  
Are these identifiable by others? Measureable? Intrinsic?  
How sustainable do you think the outcomes of your placement will be?  
What might assist the sustainability in the future?  
What might inhibit the sustainability?  
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Appendix E Second round interview for continuing advisers and 
counterparts 
Advisers  
Welcome  
Participants’ introductions: names and brief details about placement  
To what extent were the goals and intended outcomes of your placement realistic and achievable?  
Have your views changed since commencement?  
What obstacles, if any, have you identified? Unexpected or not?  
What strategies have you used to develop the knowledge and skills of your counterpart(s)?  
What worked? What was most effective?  
What indicators of success do you see?  
Are these identifiable by others? Measureable? Observable? Intrinsic?  
What are your views about the sustainability of the outcomes of your placement?  
What might assist the sustainability of the outcomes in the future?  
What might inhibit the sustainability?  
Advice for the future about A-C placements in general  
Do you have any advice or suggestions concerning the establishment of placements (including 
nomination of counterparts) and their ToRs for PNG circumstances?  
What are the best ways to ensure that adviser-counterpart placements are successful in PNG?  
What are the main obstacles to success for adviser-counterpart placements in PNG? What advice do 
you have to counter these?  
Do you have any other advice or comments to make?  
Counterparts  
Welcome, maybe brief overview of project and confidentiality if there are new people.  
Participants’ introductions: names and brief details about placement  
Keep brief  
What things did you learn and achieve with your adviser during the placement?  
Were their other things that you would have like to have learned as well?  
 202 
What difficulties, if any, did you experience in achieving your goals? Unexpected? Institutional? 
Adviser-related?  
What were the best ways through which you developed your knowledge and skills with your 
adviser?  
What worked best for you? What was most effective?  
What are your views about the sustainability of the outcomes of your placement?  
What (could have) assisted the sustainability?  
What (might have) inhibited the sustainability?  
Advice for the future about A-C placements in general  
Do you have any advice or suggestions concerning the establishment of placements (including 
nomination of advisers) and their ToRs for PNG circumstances?  
What are the best ways to ensure that adviser-counterpart placements are successful in PNG?  
What are the main obstacles to success for adviser-counterpart placements in PNG? What advice do 
you have to counter these?  
Do you have any other advice or comments to make?  
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Appendix F Senior PNG government staff interview structure  
Background  
What experiences have you had of adviser-counterpart placements in your agency(ies)? This 
includes not only the A-Cs in their agencies, but their own counterpart experiences, of any.  
Achieving sustainable capacity development  
How worthwhile are A-C placement(s) for the development of the counterpart’s/s’ capacities? To 
what extent do you notice any such development? Are there key indicators for you of such 
development?  
 How sustainable do you believe counterpart capacity development is in your agency? How do you 
know?  
What are the main obstacles, if any, to the sustainability of capacity development in your agency?  
Evidence of success  
Can you suggest up to three of the most significant examples/pieces of evidence of success from A-C 
placement(s) in your agency?  
Other modalities  
To what extent have other modalities been used in your agency for capacity development or 
capacity replacement?  
What seems to be most effective for your agency?  
Advice for the future  
Do you have any advice or suggestions concerning the establishment of A-C placements and their 
ToRs for your agency and/or PNG in general?  
What are the best ways to ensure that adviser-counterpart placements are successful in your 
agency/PNG?  
What are the main obstacles to success for adviser-counterpart placements in your agency/PNG? 
What advice do you have to counter these?  
Do you have any other advice or comments to make? 
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Appendix G Workshop agenda 
Holiday Inn, POM 
2nd April 2014 8:30—1:00 
Participants 
30-40 Invited members of: agency senior management, Australian Aid, Coffey International, 
advisers, counterparts, and external experts (UPNG, NRI, etc) 
8:30- 13:00 
Program 
8:30 Welcome and Introduction 
Richard Guy, Coffey International 
8:45 Overview of project (Research Questions, methods etc) 
Kevin Ryland 
9:00 Selected findings that illuminate key issues for the future (establishing AC projects within 
donors’ and agencies’ interests, ToRs as targets and limitations, counterparts as leaders or followers, 
what counts as sustainable change (personal, organisational and how to enable it to occur). 
9:30 Four group (6-10 persons, structure groups beforehand to have different agencies etc) 
discussions of main conclusions and preliminary recommendations 
10:15 Refreshments (or this could be a left for people to get coffee etc and return to their group 
work) 
10:30 Group discussion continue. 
11:00 Group reports and plenary discussion 
12:15 Farewell and lunch 
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Appendix H Workshop group topics 
Group A: Capacity Development and/or Capacity Substitution  
Topic summary  
Our research has revealed different emphases by various parties on Adviser-Counterpart projects 
being about human capacity development in the sense that Counterparts and others learn how to do 
their work differently, better etc. Others see these projects as being capacity substitution in the 
sense that there is an absence of capacity within the agency and the Adviser fills the absence and 
gets the job done for the agency. Many projects can be seen to be located somewhere between 
these two positions in that there is, to varying degrees, some capacity development and some 
capacity substitution.  
Group tasks  
1 Nominate a person to take notes and report back to the whole workshop on the group’s 
deliberations.  
2 Share and discuss your experiences and views about the topic. Note the key points that are 
important to the group for consideration in the future.  
3 Discuss, develop and note your group’s key recommendations on the topic for future action.  
4 Consider, discuss and note how the group’s recommendations could be operationalized for the 
management and conduct of future Adviser/Counterpart projects.  
Group B: Terms of Reference as targets and limitations  
Topic summary  
The projects findings show that the Terms of Reference (ToRs) of an Adviser-Counterpart project are 
seen by Advisers and Counterparts either as: key items to be addressed during the project; a guide 
to their activities; or as an out-dated structural impediment to the work that now needs to be done.  
In general, Advisers were much more influenced by the ToRs than the Counterparts, and reported 
that they were active in addressing them, modifying them or resisting/working around them.  
Group tasks  
1 Nominate a person to take notes and report back to the whole workshop on the group’s 
deliberations.  
2 Share and discuss your experiences and views about the topic. Note the key points that are 
important to the group for consideration in the future.  
3 Discuss, develop and note your group’s key recommendations on the topic for future action.  
4 Consider, discuss and note how the group’s recommendations could be operationalized for the 
management and conduct of future Adviser/Counterpart projects.  
Group C: Advisers and counterparts as leaders or followers  
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Topic summary  
The evidence shows that there is a range of ways that Adviser-Counterpart relationships are 
enacted. The range spans the Adviser being seen and behaving as the de facto leader of the project 
and of the Counterpart(s) and others, through to the (main) Counterpart being seen as the leader of 
the project and its other Counterparts and staff, with the Adviser acting as a mentor, guide and 
adviser to the Counterpart. Some respondents were of the view that Advisers were there to 
promote ‘the Australian way’ with little concern for PNG culture and context; others suggested some 
Advisers tried to follow the Counterparts lead and adapt to ‘PNG way’.   
Group tasks  
1 Nominate a person to take notes and report back to the whole workshop on the group’s 
deliberations.  
2 Share and discuss your experiences and views about the topic. Note the key points that are 
important to the group for consideration in the future.  
3 Discuss, develop and note your group’s key recommendations on the topic for future action.  
4 Consider, discuss and note how the group’s recommendations could be operationalized for the 
management and conduct of future Adviser/Counterpart projects.  
Group D: Long-term and/or short-term placements  
Topic summary  
Many of the respondents were of the view that the initial long-term contract period (typically one 
year in the first instance) was too short to achieve the ToRs and, in particular, to do so to a 
sustainable level. Commonly, extensions were granted to achieve these ends. Others were of the 
view that prolonged long term placements could produce ‘Adviser fatigue’ and/or the Counterpart’s 
and agency’s dependency on the Adviser and that what was required was a first initial long-term 
period followed by subsequent short-term periods (one to three months) with breaks of several 
months between. In this way the Counterpart(s) would be solely in control for a period but would 
have brief periods of their Adviser’s support to consolidate actions, tasks and achievements and to 
identify matters to be addressed in the next period. There was also a view that short-term (three to 
six months) advising is best for producing cost-effective useful changes in an agency.  
Group tasks  
1 Nominate a person to take notes and report back to the whole workshop on the group’s 
deliberations.  
2 Share and discuss your experiences and views about the topic. Note the key points that are 
important to the group for consideration in the future.  
3 Discuss, develop and note your group’s key recommendations on the topic for future action.  
4 Consider, discuss and note how the group’s recommendations could be operationalized for the 
management and conduct of future Adviser/Counterpart projects.  
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Group E: What constitutes sustainable change (personal, organisational)?  
Topic summary  
Data from the research showed sustainability claims related to particular Adviser-Counterpart 
projects spanned a range from no sustainability, through to full sustainability. Counterparts (almost) 
always reported that they continued to benefit personally from what they had learned and done 
during the project. Some Counterparts reported that the organisation continued to operate 
according to the capacity development that had been provided. Other Counterparts reported that 
things were only partly sustained. A few reported that things had reverted or even reversed since 
the project finished. Advisers often were of the view that their Counterparts had benefitted from the 
experience, and that the organisation had done likewise. Whilst some reported sustainability and 
could identify practices and systems that continued as a result of the project, others were unsure 
because they had lost contact with the agency and Counterpart(s). Others were of the view that 
sustainability was unlikely once they had left due to the organisational inertia, change of policy, 
change of senior personnel etc.  
If sustainability of organisational change is a goal, at what point in time can one deduce that 
sustainability has been achieved? What would one expect to observe or experience that may 
constitute sustainability from an Adviser-Counterpart project.  Is there a point beyond which 
sustaining practices and procedures becomes counter-productive as circumstances, needs and ideas 
change or develop?  
Group tasks  
1 Nominate a person to take notes and report back to the whole workshop on the group’s 
deliberations.  
2 Share and discuss your experiences and views about the topic. Note the key points that are 
important to the group for consideration in the future. In particular, what does the group believe 
constitutes evidence of sustainability.  
3 Discuss, develop and note your group’s key recommendations on the topic for future action.  
4 Consider, discuss and note how the group’s recommendations could be operationalized for the 
management and conduct of future Adviser/Counterpart projects to both improve sustainability and 
also to assess/verify that is achieved.  
